3x-ui/web/session/session.go
Farhad H. P. Shirvan 428f1333ac
Security hardening: sessions, SSRF, CSP nonce, CSRF logout, trusted proxies (#4275)
* refactor(session): store user ID in session instead of full struct

Replaces storing the full User object in the session cookie with just
the user ID. GetLoginUser now re-fetches the user from the database on
every request so credential/permission changes take effect immediately
without requiring a re-login. Includes a backward-compatible migration
path for existing sessions that still carry the old struct payload.

* feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change

checkLogin middleware now detects default admin/admin credentials and
redirects every panel route to /panel/settings until they are changed.
The settings page auto-opens the Authentication tab, shows a
non-dismissible error banner, and lists 'Default credentials' first in
the security checklist. Login response includes mustChangeCredentials
so the login page can redirect directly. Logout is now POST-only.
Password must be at least 10 characters and cannot be admin/admin.

* feat(settings): redact secrets in AllSettingView and add TrustedProxyCIDRs

Introduces AllSettingView which strips tgBotToken, twoFactorToken,
ldapPassword, apiToken and warp/nord secrets before sending them to
the browser, replacing them with boolean hasFoo presence flags. A new
/panel/setting/secret endpoint allows updating individual secrets by
key. Secrets that arrive blank on a save are preserved from the DB
rather than overwritten. Adds TrustedProxyCIDRs as a configurable
setting (defaults to localhost CIDRs). URL fields are validated before
save.

* fix(security): SSRF prevention, trusted-proxy header gating, CSP nonce, HTTP timeouts

Adds SanitizeHTTPURL / SanitizePublicHTTPURL to reject private-range
and loopback targets before any outbound HTTP request (node probe,
xray download, outbound test, external traffic inform, tgbot API
server, panel updater). Forwarded headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For,
X-Forwarded-Host) are now only trusted when the direct connection
arrives from a CIDR in TrustedProxyCIDRs. CSP policy is tightened with
a per-request nonce. HTTP server gains read/write/idle timeouts. Panel
updater downloads the script to a temp file instead of piping curl into
shell. Xray archive download adds a size cap and response-code check.
backuptotgbot is changed from GET to POST.

* feat(nodes): add allow-private-address toggle per node

Adds AllowPrivateAddress to the Node model (DB default false). When
enabled it bypasses the SSRF private-range check for that node's probe
URL, allowing nodes hosted on RFC-1918 or loopback addresses (e.g.
a private VPN or LAN setup).

* chore: frontend UX improvements, CI pipeline, and dev tooling

- AppSidebar: logout via POST /logout instead of navigating to GET
- InboundList: persist filter state (search, protocol, node) to
  localStorage across page reloads; add protocol and node filter dropdowns
- IndexPage: add health status strip (Xray, CPU, Memory, Update) with
  quick-action buttons
- dependabot: weekly go mod and npm update schedule
- ci.yml: add GitHub Actions workflow for build and vet
- .nvmrc: pin Node 22 for local development
- frontend: bump package.json and package-lock.json
- SubPage, DnsPresetsModal, api-docs: minor fixes

* fix(ci): stub web/dist before go list to satisfy go:embed at compile time

* chore(ui): remove health-strip bar from dashboard top

* Revert "feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change"

This reverts commit 56ce6073ce.

* fix(auth): make logout POST+CSRF and propagate session loss to other tabs

- Switch /logout from GET to POST with CSRFMiddleware so it matches the
  SPA's existing HttpUtil.post('/logout') call (previously 404'd silently)
  and blocks GET-based logout via image tags or link prefetchers. Handler
  now returns JSON; the SPA already navigates client-side.
- Return 401 (instead of 404) from /panel/api/* when the caller is a
  browser XHR (X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) so the axios interceptor
  redirects to the login page on logout-in-another-tab, cookie expiry,
  and server restart. Anonymous callers still get 404 to keep endpoints
  hidden from casual scanners.
- One-shot the 401 redirect in axios-init.js and hang the rejected
  promise so queued polls don't stack reloads or surface error toasts
  while the browser is navigating away.
- Add the CSP nonce to the runtime-injected <script> in dist.go so the
  panel loads under the existing script-src 'nonce-...' policy.
- Update api-docs endpoints.js: GET /logout doc entry was missing.

* fix(settings): POST /logout after credential change

* fix(auth): invalidate other sessions when credentials change

When the admin changes username/password from one machine, sessions
on every other machine kept working until they manually logged out
because session storage is a signed client-side cookie — there is
no server-side session list to revoke.

Add a per-user LoginEpoch counter stamped into the session at login
and re-verified on every authenticated request. UpdateUser and
UpdateFirstUser bump the epoch (UpdateUser via gorm.Expr so a single
update statement is atomic), so any cookie issued before the change
no longer matches the user's current epoch and GetLoginUser returns
nil — the SPA's 401 interceptor then redirects to the login page.

Backward compatible: the column defaults to 0 and missing cookie
values are treated as 0, so sessions issued before this change
remain valid until the first credential update.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
2026-05-13 12:52:52 +02:00

193 lines
3.8 KiB
Go

package session
import (
"encoding/gob"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/database"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/logger"
"github.com/gin-contrib/sessions"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
const (
loginUserKey = "LOGIN_USER"
loginEpochKey = "LOGIN_EPOCH"
apiAuthUserKey = "api_auth_user"
sessionCookieName = "3x-ui"
)
func init() {
gob.Register(model.User{})
}
func SetLoginUser(c *gin.Context, user *model.User) error {
if user == nil {
return nil
}
s := sessions.Default(c)
s.Set(loginUserKey, user.Id)
s.Set(loginEpochKey, user.LoginEpoch)
return s.Save()
}
func SetAPIAuthUser(c *gin.Context, user *model.User) {
if user == nil {
return
}
c.Set(apiAuthUserKey, user)
}
func GetLoginUser(c *gin.Context) *model.User {
if v, ok := c.Get(apiAuthUserKey); ok {
if u, ok2 := v.(*model.User); ok2 {
return u
}
}
s := sessions.Default(c)
obj := s.Get(loginUserKey)
if obj == nil {
return nil
}
userID, ok := sessionUserID(obj)
if !ok {
s.Delete(loginUserKey)
s.Delete(loginEpochKey)
if err := s.Save(); err != nil {
logger.Warning("session: failed to drop stale user payload:", err)
}
return nil
}
if legacyUserID, ok := legacySessionUserID(obj); ok {
s.Set(loginUserKey, legacyUserID)
if err := s.Save(); err != nil {
logger.Warning("session: failed to migrate legacy user payload:", err)
}
}
user, err := getUserByID(userID)
if err != nil {
logger.Warning("session: failed to load user:", err)
s.Delete(loginUserKey)
s.Delete(loginEpochKey)
if saveErr := s.Save(); saveErr != nil {
logger.Warning("session: failed to drop missing user:", saveErr)
}
return nil
}
if !sessionEpochMatches(s.Get(loginEpochKey), user.LoginEpoch) {
s.Delete(loginUserKey)
s.Delete(loginEpochKey)
if saveErr := s.Save(); saveErr != nil {
logger.Warning("session: failed to drop stale epoch:", saveErr)
}
return nil
}
return user
}
func sessionEpochMatches(cookieVal any, userEpoch int64) bool {
var got int64
switch v := cookieVal.(type) {
case nil:
case int64:
got = v
case int:
got = int64(v)
case int32:
got = int64(v)
case float64:
got = int64(v)
default:
return false
}
return got == userEpoch
}
func IsLogin(c *gin.Context) bool {
return GetLoginUser(c) != nil
}
func sessionUserID(obj any) (int, bool) {
switch v := obj.(type) {
case int:
return v, v > 0
case int64:
return int(v), v > 0
case int32:
return int(v), v > 0
case float64:
id := int(v)
return id, v == float64(id) && id > 0
case model.User:
return v.Id, v.Id > 0
case *model.User:
if v == nil {
return 0, false
}
return v.Id, v.Id > 0
default:
return 0, false
}
}
func legacySessionUserID(obj any) (int, bool) {
switch v := obj.(type) {
case model.User:
return v.Id, v.Id > 0
case *model.User:
if v == nil {
return 0, false
}
return v.Id, v.Id > 0
default:
return 0, false
}
}
func getUserByID(id int) (*model.User, error) {
db := database.GetDB()
if db == nil {
return nil, http.ErrServerClosed
}
user := &model.User{}
if err := db.Model(model.User{}).Where("id = ?", id).First(user).Error; err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return user, nil
}
func ClearSession(c *gin.Context) error {
s := sessions.Default(c)
s.Clear()
cookiePath := c.GetString("base_path")
if cookiePath == "" {
cookiePath = "/"
}
secure := c.Request.TLS != nil
s.Options(sessions.Options{
Path: cookiePath,
MaxAge: -1,
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: secure,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
if err := s.Save(); err != nil {
return err
}
if cookiePath != "/" {
http.SetCookie(c.Writer, &http.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookieName,
Value: "",
Path: "/",
MaxAge: -1,
Expires: time.Unix(0, 0),
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: secure,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
}
return nil
}