diff --git a/extra/vulnserver/vulnserver.py b/extra/vulnserver/vulnserver.py index e82f38506..95c1a9da4 100644 --- a/extra/vulnserver/vulnserver.py +++ b/extra/vulnserver/vulnserver.py @@ -407,6 +407,10 @@ _lock = None _server = None _alive = False _csrf_token = None +_ratelimit_hits = 0 + +# number of initial hits to '/ratelimit' answered with 429 before it behaves normally +RATELIMIT_INITIAL_429 = 1 def init(quiet=False): global _conn @@ -963,6 +967,22 @@ class ReqHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): self.wfile.write(b"Request blocked: security policy violation (WAF)") return + # rate-limit emulator ('/ratelimit'): the first hit(s) answer 429 with a 'Retry-After', then + # it behaves like the default SQLi endpoint - so a client that honors the backoff and retries + # eventually gets through (drives the adaptive rate-limit handling) + if self.url == "/ratelimit": + global _ratelimit_hits + _ratelimit_hits += 1 + if _ratelimit_hits <= RATELIMIT_INITIAL_429: + self.send_response(429) + self.send_header("Retry-After", "0") + self.send_header("Content-type", "text/html; charset=%s" % UNICODE_ENCODING) + self.send_header("Connection", "close") + self.end_headers() + self.wfile.write(b"Too Many Requests") + return + self.url = "/" + if self.url == "/xxe": self.send_response(OK) self.send_header("Content-type", "application/xml; charset=%s" % UNICODE_ENCODING) diff --git a/lib/core/enums.py b/lib/core/enums.py index ced9700a8..7973d48b3 100644 --- a/lib/core/enums.py +++ b/lib/core/enums.py @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ class HTTP_HEADER(object): RANGE = "Range" REFERER = "Referer" REFRESH = "Refresh" # Reference: http://stackoverflow.com/a/283794 + RETRY_AFTER = "Retry-After" SERVER = "Server" SET_COOKIE = "Set-Cookie" TRANSFER_ENCODING = "Transfer-Encoding" diff --git a/lib/core/settings.py b/lib/core/settings.py index d91c207f4..f4abc3823 100644 --- a/lib/core/settings.py +++ b/lib/core/settings.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ from lib.core.enums import OS from thirdparty import six # sqlmap version (...) -VERSION = "1.10.7.181" +VERSION = "1.10.7.182" TYPE = "dev" if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] != '0' else "stable" TYPE_COLORS = {"dev": 33, "stable": 90, "pip": 34} VERSION_STRING = "sqlmap/%s#%s" % ('.'.join(VERSION.split('.')[:-1]) if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] == '0' else VERSION, TYPE) @@ -58,6 +58,17 @@ IPS_WAF_CHECK_TIMEOUT = 10 # false positive) rather than the back-end actually answering. WAF_BLOCK_HTTP_CODES = (403, 406, 429, 451, 501, 503) +# HTTP status signalling that the client is being rate-limited (kept as a literal because Python 2's +# httplib has no such constant) +TOO_MANY_REQUESTS_HTTP_CODE = 429 + +# Adaptive rate-limit handling: one-time backoff used when a rate-limited response carries no usable +# 'Retry-After', the additive step by which the inter-request delay is raised on each hit, and the +# ceiling for both the honored backoff and the auto-throttle (seconds) +RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT_DELAY = 1.0 +RATE_LIMIT_DELAY_STEP = 0.5 +RATE_LIMIT_MAX_DELAY = 60.0 + # Candidate tamper scripts for automatic WAF-bypass, ordered by empirical WAF-bypass value # (structural token-substitution first, camouflage last; per identYwaf data). The back-end DBMS # is not pre-filtered here: semantics-preservation is verified at runtime by re-running detection diff --git a/lib/core/testing.py b/lib/core/testing.py index eaecba780..e6d62cfa5 100644 --- a/lib/core/testing.py +++ b/lib/core/testing.py @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ def vulnTest(tests=None, label="vuln"): ("-u --data=\"security_level=5\" -p id --flush-session --technique=B", ("unable to automatically bypass the WAF/IPS", "does not seem to be injectable")), # automatic WAF-bypass honest bail: a libinjection-class WAF that no User-Agent or tamper can defeat ("-u -p id --flush-session --technique=B --proof", ("sqlmap proved exploitation of the following injection point", "Parameter: id (GET)", "Technique: boolean-based blind", "TRUE (5/5)", "repeatably", "Retrieved: back-end DBMS banner '3.")), # --proof: report-grade proof in the injection-point style - forces the boolean technique (so a multi-technique point still proves), and actively reads a value out as the strongest proof ("-u --mine-params --flush-session --technique=B", ("mining for hidden GET parameters", "found hidden parameter 'id'", "held back parameter(s) that break the base request", "Parameter: id (GET)", "Type: boolean-based blind")), # --mine-params: discover an injectable parameter absent from a bare URL, hold back the raw-SQL sink that would shadow it, then confirm the injection on the mined 'id' + ("-u \"ratelimit?id=1\" --flush-session --technique=B", ("target appears to be rate-limiting", "Parameter: id (GET)", "Type: boolean-based blind")), # adaptive rate-limit handling: the endpoint answers 429 with 'Retry-After' first, so detection only succeeds if sqlmap honors the backoff, throttles, and retries rather than treating 429 as a hard block ("-r --flush-session -v 5 --test-skip=\"heavy\" --save=", ("CloudFlare", "web application technology: Express", "possible DBMS: 'SQLite'", "User-Agent: foobar", "~Type: time-based blind", "saved command line options to the configuration file")), ("-c ", ("CloudFlare", "possible DBMS: 'SQLite'", "User-Agent: foobar", "~Type: time-based blind")), ("-l --flush-session --skip-waf -vvvvv --technique=U --union-from=users --banner --parse-errors", ("banner: '3.", "ORDER BY term out of range", "~xp_cmdshell", "Connection: keep-alive")), diff --git a/lib/request/connect.py b/lib/request/connect.py index fc23cf99a..e3cd05b47 100644 --- a/lib/request/connect.py +++ b/lib/request/connect.py @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ See the file 'LICENSE' for copying permission """ import binascii +import calendar +import email.utils import inspect import io import logging @@ -119,9 +121,13 @@ from lib.core.settings import PERMISSION_DENIED_REGEX from lib.core.settings import PLAIN_TEXT_CONTENT_TYPE from lib.core.settings import RANDOM_INTEGER_MARKER from lib.core.settings import RANDOM_STRING_MARKER +from lib.core.settings import RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT_DELAY +from lib.core.settings import RATE_LIMIT_DELAY_STEP +from lib.core.settings import RATE_LIMIT_MAX_DELAY from lib.core.settings import REPLACEMENT_MARKER from lib.core.settings import SAFE_HEX_MARKER from lib.core.settings import TEXT_CONTENT_TYPE_REGEX +from lib.core.settings import TOO_MANY_REQUESTS_HTTP_CODE from lib.core.settings import UNENCODED_ORIGINAL_VALUE from lib.core.settings import UNICODE_ENCODING from lib.core.settings import URI_HTTP_HEADER @@ -223,6 +229,49 @@ class Connect(object): kwargs['retrying'] = True return Connect._getPageProxy(**kwargs) + @staticmethod + def _parseRetryAfter(responseHeaders): + """ + Parses a 'Retry-After' response header (RFC 7231 delta-seconds or an HTTP-date) into a number + of seconds to wait, or None when it is absent or unparseable. + """ + + value = (responseHeaders.get(HTTP_HEADER.RETRY_AFTER) if responseHeaders else None) or "" + value = value.strip() + + if value.isdigit(): + return float(value) + + parsed = email.utils.parsedate(value) + return max(0.0, calendar.timegm(parsed) - time.time()) if parsed else None + + @staticmethod + def _rateLimitRetry(responseHeaders, code, **kwargs): + """ + Handles a rate-limited response by honoring its 'Retry-After' (capped), adaptively raising the + inter-request delay so subsequent requests self-throttle under the limit, then re-issuing the + request. Returns the retried (page, headers, code) or None when the retry budget is exhausted, + so the caller can surface the rate-limited response as-is. + """ + + threadData = getCurrentThreadData() + if threadData.retriesCount >= conf.retries or kb.threadException: + return None + + retryAfter = Connect._parseRetryAfter(responseHeaders) + backoff = min(retryAfter if retryAfter is not None else RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT_DELAY, RATE_LIMIT_MAX_DELAY) + + # additive-increase throttle: nudge the inter-request delay up toward a sustainable pace. The + # auto-throttle is capped, but a larger user-set '--delay' is never lowered. It is monotonic, + # so a lost concurrent update across threads self-heals on the next hit. + conf.delay = max(conf.delay or 0, min(RATE_LIMIT_MAX_DELAY, (conf.delay or 0) + RATE_LIMIT_DELAY_STEP)) + + singleTimeWarnMessage("target appears to be rate-limiting requests; sqlmap is backing off and throttling accordingly (consider raising '--delay' or lowering '--threads')") + logger.debug("rate-limited (HTTP %d)%s; sleeping %.1f second(s), inter-request delay now %.1f second(s)" % (code, " honoring 'Retry-After'" if retryAfter is not None else "", backoff, conf.delay)) + + time.sleep(backoff) + return Connect._retryProxy(**kwargs) + @staticmethod def _connReadProxy(conn): parts = [] @@ -844,7 +893,13 @@ class Connect(object): raise SystemExit if ex.code not in (conf.ignoreCode or []): - if ex.code == _http_client.UNAUTHORIZED: + if ex.code == TOO_MANY_REQUESTS_HTTP_CODE or (ex.code == _http_client.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE and Connect._parseRetryAfter(responseHeaders) is not None): + retried = Connect._rateLimitRetry(responseHeaders, ex.code, **kwargs) + if retried is not None: + return retried + debugMsg = "target kept rate-limiting after %d retries (%d)" % (conf.retries, code) + logger.debug(debugMsg) + elif ex.code == _http_client.UNAUTHORIZED: errMsg = "not authorized, try to provide right HTTP " errMsg += "authentication type and valid credentials (%d). " % code errMsg += "If this is intended, try to rerun by providing " diff --git a/tests/test_brute.py b/tests/test_brute.py index c13395978..f85fe4c6c 100644 --- a/tests/test_brute.py +++ b/tests/test_brute.py @@ -161,8 +161,10 @@ class TestBrute(DbmsStateMixin, unittest.TestCase): def _cbe(expression, expectingNone=True): calls["n"] += 1 - # initial sanity probe uses two random strings (no real column name) - if "id" not in expression and "name" not in expression: + # initial sanity probe queries a random table, not the real 'users' one - so keying on the + # table name is collision-proof (unlike a column-name substring, which a random probe value + # can incidentally contain, e.g. 'id') + if "users" not in expression: return False # MySQL numeric-type follow-up: `not checkBooleanExpression(... REGEXP '[^0-9]')`. # 'id' is numeric (no non-digit chars => probe False => numeric);