LibreChat/e2e/specs
Danny Avila 5f187d3a6c
🧽 test: Restore the Admin Allowlist Override This Spec Leaks Into the Shard (#15543)
* 🧽 test: Restore the Admin Allowlist Override This Spec Leaks Into the Shard

The spec writes a per-user `mcpSettings.allowedDomains` override for the shared
primary user and never removes it. The list holds only its own fixture's
origin, and allowlist matching is protocol- and port-inclusive, so for the rest
of the shard every other MCP fixture is blocked: `e2e-oauth` fails inspection,
and an agent expecting its tools initializes into
AGENT_EXPECTED_MCP_TOOLS_UNAVAILABLE (503) instead of producing its OAuth
prompt.

Whether that bites depends only on which specs the shard runs afterwards, so it
surfaces as a deterministic failure in an unrelated spec — `mcp-oauth-resume`
failing an assertion that fires before any resume happens — which passes
whenever it runs first. A client-only PR whose path selection reordered the
shard hit it three times across two heads.

Delete the override in a `finally`, and confirm against the stored config
rather than by re-running `reinitialize`: the connection this test established
stays live, so reinitialize keeps succeeding once the allowlist is gone.

* 🩹 test: Read the Config Wrapper and Treat 404 as Cleared in the Override Teardown

`GET /api/admin/config/:principalType/:principalId` returns `{ config }`, and
deleting the last override removes the document, so the follow-up read is a
404 — the cleared state, not a read failure. The poll treated both as
unreadable and timed out.

* 🧭 fix: Await Config Cache Invalidation Before Answering Admin Config Writes

Every admin config mutation fired `invalidateConfigCaches` and answered without
waiting for it. The write was durable, but the effective configuration — app
config, per-principal overrides, cached tools, the MCP config-source cache —
could still describe the previous overrides when the response arrived, so a
caller that read right after writing could observe state it had just changed.
That is exactly how the allowlist-override e2e's teardown could report a clean
shard while the leaked allowlist was still in force.

`invalidateConfigCaches` already settles every clear and only logs failures,
so awaiting it cannot fail the request; it only orders the response after the
attempt. The e2e teardown now leans on that instead of polling the config
document, brackets the baseline assertion inside its cleanup scope so an
interrupted attempt can still un-poison the shard on retry, and treats a 404
from cleanup as a failure only when the override was actually installed, so it
can never mask the error that prevented installing it.

* 🧽 test: Confirm the Effective Allowlist Reverted Instead of Awaiting Invalidation

Reverts the awaited cache invalidation in the admin config handlers. Codex was
right on both counts: `invalidateCachedTools` can wait up to 30 seconds on the
Redis tool-cache lock, so awaiting it could hold a committed write until the
client's timeout; and APP_CONFIG is per-container by default, so an await only
ever proves this replica reverted while another keeps the previous overrides
for up to the override TTL. A test-hygiene PR should not ship a product
contract it cannot keep.

The teardown instead confirms the effective allowlist with the cache-backed
read the test already relies on. `reinitialize` disconnects the user
connection and re-resolves the merged allowlists per request, so the baseline
`success: false` returning is the definitive signal that the leaked override no
longer governs connections. The window exceeds the merged-config cache TTL, so
even a missed invalidation converges rather than leaking into the next spec.
The baseline stays inside the cleanup scope and a 404 from cleanup is a failure
only when the override was actually installed.

* 🧽 test: Verify the Override Is Gone, Not That a Connected Server Re-Blocks

The previous teardown polled `reinitialize` for the baseline `success: false`.
CI showed it never returns: a server that has already connected keeps
re-initializing successfully for more than 90 seconds after the override is
removed — past the 60-second merged-config TTL — because its allow decision
is not on the path that poisoned the shard. That path is agent tool loading,
which consults the merged app config per request; it is in-memory in these
shards and cleared by the mutation's asynchronous invalidation, and the
downstream victim, `mcp-oauth-resume`, passes with this cleanup in place.

Cleanup now always runs (a leaked override from an interrupted attempt is the
exact state it exists to remove), confirms the override document is gone with
only 200-without-the-override or 404 as definitive answers (anything else
retries), treats a 404 as a failure only when this attempt installed the
override, and describes the PUT's invalidation as what it is: asynchronous.
2026-09-03 12:42:10 -04:00
..
mock 🧽 test: Restore the Admin Allowlist Override This Spec Leaks Into the Shard (#15543) 2026-09-03 12:42:10 -04:00
real 🎨 feat: Color the Context Gauge by Category and Collapse its Breakdown (#14855) 2026-08-14 22:46:10 -04:00
a11y.spec.ts ♿ fix: Resolve axe Violations in Sidebar, Tools Dropdown and Footer (#14979) 2026-08-20 11:52:53 -04:00
keys.spec.ts
landing.spec.ts 🛟 test: Restore Playwright Smoke E2E (#13020) 2026-05-14 09:49:26 -04:00
messages.spec.ts 🔁 fix: Rerun a Message the Editor Has Not Changed (#15212) 2026-08-25 20:04:02 -04:00
nav.spec.ts 🛟 test: Restore Playwright Smoke E2E (#13020) 2026-05-14 09:49:26 -04:00
popup.spec.ts
settings.spec.ts