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* feat: add search stack PoC infrastructure (Track 1)
Docker Compose stack for PLAN.md's new chat-search architecture:
ferretdb 2.7.0 + its postgres-documentdb 17 backing store (wal_level=logical
for the later CDC spike), a new dedicated chat_search_db (PostgreSQL 17 +
pgvector, non-default credentials, three least-privilege roles per the
Security roles section), and clickhouse (26.3 LTS). vectordb/rag_api are
untouched, per decision 3.
All four image tags verified against their registries via curl (ghcr.io
manifest lookups, Docker Hub tags API) before pinning. Host ports checked
against every existing compose file in the repo to avoid collisions.
The role-provisioning init script and healthcheck script were both actually
run against live containers once Docker became available mid-task: full
Mongo-wire round trip against ferretdb, real INSERT/SELECT proving the
writer's default-privilege grants and the reader's deny-by-default posture
against a throwaway pgvector table, wal_level and pgvector/pg_trgm extension
checks. One bug only surfaced at runtime and is fixed: psql does not
interpolate :'var' inside dollar-quoted DO $$ ... $$ blocks, so role
creation/idempotency uses \gset + \if/\else/\endif instead.
* 🔐 chore: require operator-supplied FerretDB credentials
The chat_search_db and ClickHouse services already refused to start without
operator-supplied passwords; FerretDB's backing PostgreSQL still fell back to
a working ferretdb/ferretdb pair, so the stack booted with a known credential
even though it holds projected chat content. That is the same shape as the
myuser/mypassword default the search plan calls out on the existing vectordb
service.
All four FerretDB credential references now use ${VAR:?} - compose, the
healthcheck script, and the README examples - and .env.example ships
REPLACE_ME placeholders instead of literals.
The differential-test harness at packages/data-schemas/misc/ferretdb keeps its
fixture credentials; it holds only throwaway test data.
125 lines
6.7 KiB
Bash
Executable file
125 lines
6.7 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Bootstraps chat_search_db: creates the chat_search schema, the three
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# Security roles from PLAN.md ("Security roles" under "PostgreSQL search
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# schema"), and default grants for objects the migration owner creates later.
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#
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# Runs once via docker-entrypoint-initdb.d against a fresh
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# search_chat_search_pgdata volume, connected as the bootstrap superuser
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# ($POSTGRES_USER / $POSTGRES_DB, set in search/compose.yml). Nothing in
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# chat_search_db is ever reached by the app as that bootstrap superuser -
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# see search/README.md "Credentials".
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#
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# What this script deliberately does NOT do (track 4's job - the migrations
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# in packages/api or packages/data-schemas that create
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# chat_search.{documents,embeddings,outbox,watermark}):
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# - create any table (documents/embeddings/outbox/watermark)
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# - GRANT chat_search_reader SELECT on documents/embeddings (do this per
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# table, right after CREATE TABLE, running as chat_search_owner)
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# - ALTER TABLE ... ENABLE/FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY + CREATE POLICY
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# (forced RLS can only be applied to tables that exist)
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# - grant chat_search_reader anything on outbox/watermark - the deny-by-
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# default posture below already satisfies "reader gets no grants on
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# outbox or watermark" as long as track 4 never adds a GRANT for it.
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set -euo pipefail
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: "${CHAT_SEARCH_OWNER_PASSWORD:?CHAT_SEARCH_OWNER_PASSWORD must be set (see search/.env.example)}"
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: "${CHAT_SEARCH_WRITER_PASSWORD:?CHAT_SEARCH_WRITER_PASSWORD must be set (see search/.env.example)}"
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: "${CHAT_SEARCH_READER_PASSWORD:?CHAT_SEARCH_READER_PASSWORD must be set (see search/.env.example)}"
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psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 --username "$POSTGRES_USER" --dbname "$POSTGRES_DB" <<-'PSQL'
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-- Passwords come from the container environment via psql's backtick shell
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-- exec (runs in the postgres image's own shell, not bash string
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-- interpolation), then :'var' asks psql to SQL-quote the literal safely.
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--
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-- NOTE: :'var' substitution does not happen inside dollar-quoted DO $$ ... $$
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-- blocks (psql's lexer treats them as opaque), so idempotency below uses
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-- \gset + \if/\else/\endif client-side metacommands instead of a DO block,
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-- keeping every password-bearing CREATE/ALTER ROLE at the top level.
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\set owner_password `echo "$CHAT_SEARCH_OWNER_PASSWORD"`
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\set writer_password `echo "$CHAT_SEARCH_WRITER_PASSWORD"`
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\set reader_password `echo "$CHAT_SEARCH_READER_PASSWORD"`
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-- Migration owner: schema changes only. Owns the schema and every object in
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-- it, but is not superuser and cannot create roles/databases.
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SELECT COUNT(*) = 0 AS need_owner FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'chat_search_owner' \gset
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\if :need_owner
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CREATE ROLE chat_search_owner LOGIN PASSWORD :'owner_password'
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NOSUPERUSER NOCREATEDB NOCREATEROLE NOBYPASSRLS NOREPLICATION;
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\else
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ALTER ROLE chat_search_owner PASSWORD :'owner_password';
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\endif
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COMMENT ON ROLE chat_search_owner IS
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'chat_search migration owner (track 4 DDL only) - interactive/CI use, never a request-path DSN.';
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-- Projection writer: documents/embeddings/outbox/watermark DML. Used only
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-- by the lease-held projector/reconciler/outbox consumer, never by request
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-- pods (CHAT_SEARCH_WRITER_URL, not CHAT_SEARCH_DATABASE_URL).
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SELECT COUNT(*) = 0 AS need_writer FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'chat_search_writer' \gset
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\if :need_writer
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CREATE ROLE chat_search_writer LOGIN PASSWORD :'writer_password'
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NOSUPERUSER NOCREATEDB NOCREATEROLE NOBYPASSRLS NOREPLICATION;
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\else
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ALTER ROLE chat_search_writer PASSWORD :'writer_password';
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\endif
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COMMENT ON ROLE chat_search_writer IS
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'chat_search projection writer (projector/outbox consumer/sweep) - CHAT_SEARCH_WRITER_URL.';
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-- Request reader: forced RLS, request-path DSN (CHAT_SEARCH_DATABASE_URL).
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-- Not superuser, not the table owner, not BYPASSRLS - the weekend leak gate
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-- in PLAN.md asserts exactly this. No grants on outbox/watermark, ever.
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SELECT COUNT(*) = 0 AS need_reader FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'chat_search_reader' \gset
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\if :need_reader
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CREATE ROLE chat_search_reader LOGIN PASSWORD :'reader_password'
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NOSUPERUSER NOCREATEDB NOCREATEROLE NOBYPASSRLS NOREPLICATION;
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\else
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ALTER ROLE chat_search_reader PASSWORD :'reader_password';
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\endif
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ALTER ROLE chat_search_reader SET row_security = on;
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COMMENT ON ROLE chat_search_reader IS
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'chat_search forced-RLS request reader - CHAT_SEARCH_DATABASE_URL. No outbox/watermark grants.';
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-- Schema, owned by the migration owner.
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CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS chat_search AUTHORIZATION chat_search_owner;
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-- Deny-by-default: revoke whatever PUBLIC would otherwise inherit, then
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-- grant back only what each role needs. No role here gets anything on the
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-- `public` schema either.
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REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA chat_search FROM PUBLIC;
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REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM PUBLIC;
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GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA chat_search TO chat_search_writer;
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GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA chat_search TO chat_search_reader;
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-- All three roles resolve unqualified names (`vector(1024)`, bare table
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-- names in migrations) against chat_search first - verified empirically:
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-- USAGE on a schema is not enough for bare `vector(...)` type references,
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-- PostgreSQL only consults search_path. `public` stays second (not dropped)
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-- so built-in types/functions there remain reachable unqualified.
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ALTER ROLE chat_search_owner SET search_path = chat_search, public;
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ALTER ROLE chat_search_writer SET search_path = chat_search, public;
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ALTER ROLE chat_search_reader SET search_path = chat_search, public;
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-- pgvector, scoped to the chat_search schema per the search_path above.
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CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector SCHEMA chat_search;
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-- pg_trgm backs the trigram search arm in PLAN.md's PostgreSQL search
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-- schema; installing it now saves track 4 a superuser round trip.
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CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_trgm SCHEMA chat_search;
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-- Default grants for whatever chat_search_owner creates from here on
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-- (documents, embeddings, outbox, watermark - track 4's migrations): the
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-- writer gets full DML plus sequence usage automatically, so track 4 does
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-- not need to hand-grant the writer role per table.
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ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE chat_search_owner IN SCHEMA chat_search
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GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLES TO chat_search_writer;
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ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE chat_search_owner IN SCHEMA chat_search
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GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCES TO chat_search_writer;
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-- Deliberately no default privilege grant for chat_search_reader: Postgres
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-- denies by default, which is exactly "no grants on outbox or watermark".
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-- Track 4 must explicitly GRANT SELECT to chat_search_reader on
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-- chat_search.documents and chat_search.embeddings only, immediately after
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-- creating each table, in the same migration that applies FORCE ROW LEVEL
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-- SECURITY and the tenant/user RLS policy.
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PSQL
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echo "chat-search-roles: chat_search schema + roles (owner/writer/reader) ready."
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