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1171 commits
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164f146bdf
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🛞 feat: Manage Personal Code Environment Lifecycles (#15369)
* feat: add self-service code worker pairing * fix: enforce code worker principal boundaries * fix: separate pairing control planes from execution * fix: preserve principal worker routing * fix: pin artifact traffic to code workers * fix: authenticate code worker selection * test: mock worker-aware artifact headers * fix: harden self-service code worker routing * fix: fail closed for principal code pairing * feat: manage personal code environments * fix: harden personal code environment lifecycle * fix: satisfy backend lifecycle types * fix: harden principal environment lifecycle and quotas * fix: fence environment lifecycle races * fix: reconcile code environment stack * style: format code execution headers * fix: reconcile code environment lifecycle * fix: close self-service pairing gaps * fix: close code environment reconciliation gaps * fix: close code environment UI review findings * fix: satisfy code environment type checks * fix: route code priming to selected worker * fix: harden code environment lifecycle fences * fix: type lease renewal interval * fix: harden environment lifecycle recovery * fix: close lifecycle recovery races * fix: type compensated agent timestamps * fix: fence lifecycle cleanup by tenant and revision * fix: scope environment revision fencing |
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a3c2277c38
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🚧 fix: Narrow Chat MCP Selections to What the Picker May Offer (#15478)
* 🚧 fix: Narrow Chat MCP Selections to What the Picker May Offer The chat MCP picker offers a server only when the operator has not hidden it (`chatMenu: false`) and the user reaches it directly rather than through an agent (`consumeOnly`). Nothing enforced either condition on the request, so a stale client, a replayed body, or a hand-written one could name any server and get its tools — `consumeOnly` in particular is a permission the registry derives per user, so ignoring it let a user reach in plain chat a server they had only been granted through an agent. Narrow the picker's selection in the two ephemeral loaders, against the same predicate the client's `selectableServers` uses. The resolver is injected, so `packages/api` stays free of the registry and the loaders keep their existing `deps` shape. Provenance is why this lives in the loaders rather than at the tool-resolution chokepoint: only here is a server name known to have come from the picker. Servers a model spec pins are the operator's own choice and are added after the narrowing, so pinning a chat-hidden server to a spec keeps working. `chatMenu` only ever comes from the config tier, so the overlay settles it with no lookup at all. Lookups for the rest run concurrently and are cached per server and user. A name the registry cannot resolve — request-tier, declared on the body and never registered — is kept, as is one whose lookup fails: this narrows an already-authenticated selection and is not the authorization boundary. * 📝 docs: Say What chatMenu Now Bounds The schema still described `chatMenu` as dropdown visibility alone, which is misleading now that it also bars a server from the chat selection a request carries. Spell out both halves, and what it deliberately does not restrict: agents, and servers a model spec pins. * 🛡️ fix: Close Four Gaps in the Chat MCP Narrowing Dedupe before resolving. The selection is request-supplied and the loaders used to build a `Set` immediately; mapping the raw array first let one body repeat a name enough times to launch a resolver — registry, cache, and ACL reads, with no single-flight — per occurrence. Resolve names through the tool-loading aliases. A configured `private server` is addressable as `private_server` downstream, so an exact-key lookup let the normalized spelling walk past a `chatMenu: false` check and still load tools. Names are returned as sent; only the decision is canonicalized. Let the request overlay settle `chatMenu`. The config tier is where the flag lives and is what the picker itself was built from, so an overlay that re-enables a server now outranks the durable config the registry returns, which was silently dropping a valid selection. `consumeOnly` still comes from the registry. Narrow the request body, not just the loader's copy. `applyContextToAgent` reads `req.body.ephemeralAgent.mcp` directly and prefers it over the agent's tools, so a hidden server's `serverInstructions` reached the model context even after its tools were dropped. * 🧭 fix: Ask the Registry Which MCP Servers the Picker May Offer Three rounds of review found the same mistake in three disguises: this narrowing re-derived the registry's tier precedence instead of asking for it. A config entry was treated as authoritative over a user-DB or process-backed server of the same name; the alias map was built from config names only, so a DB server named `private_server` was misrouted to a config `private server`; and the overlay short-circuit ran before any of that could be consulted. Resolve the accessible set through `resolveAllMcpConfigs` instead — the same call behind `GET /api/mcp/servers`, so what the request may use and what the picker was offered come from one place and cannot drift. Precedence, cross-tier name collisions, and the config overlay are the registry's job again, and the selectability test is a single flag check over what it returns. The result is smaller: no overlay branch, no per-server lookups, one catalog read regardless of how long the selection is, and aliases built over the whole accessible set so an exact name always outranks another server's normalized form. Publish the servers actually in play back onto the request body, spec pins included. `applyContextToAgent` prefers that list over the agent's tools, so narrowing to the picker selection alone had started dropping a spec-pinned server's `serverInstructions` while suppressing a hidden one's. |
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51edb2a660
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🛫 feat: Enable Self-Service Code Worker Pairing (#15367)
* feat: add self-service code worker pairing * fix: enforce code worker principal boundaries * fix: separate pairing control planes from execution * fix: preserve principal worker routing * fix: pin artifact traffic to code workers * fix: authenticate code worker selection * test: mock worker-aware artifact headers * fix: harden self-service code worker routing * fix: fail closed for principal code pairing * style: format code execution headers * fix: close self-service pairing gaps * fix: satisfy code environment type checks |
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5e49868f0a
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🔑 fix: Decode Action OAuth Credentials After Decryption (#14698)
* 🔑 fix: Decode Action OAuth Credentials After Decryption Action client credentials are URL-encoded before encryption, but the OAuth token exchange decrypted them with `decryptV2` alone, sending values like `abc%40domain.com` to the provider and causing 401s for secrets containing `@`, `+`, `=`, `/` or `:`. Decoding falls back to the raw decrypted value so legacy secrets stored before |
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aa7539909b
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🪶 feat: Enable Standalone Skill Authoring (#15480)
* feat: enable standalone skill authoring * test: align skill e2e flow with enable toggle * fix: preserve legacy skill state on version restore |
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dfb264811c
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🪢 test: Prove MCP OAuth Resume End to End (#15485) | ||
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6195273429
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🧲 fix: Anchor Memory Partitions to Accessible Agents (#15475)
* fix: validate agent memory partitions * fix: authorize agent memory mutations * test: cover agent manager memory access * fix: centralize agent memory authorization * fix: harden agent memory authorization * fix: support synchronous role providers |
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dccd7ae496
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🧶 fix: Preserve Multi-Agent Tool Call History (#15468)
* 🧭 fix: Preserve Multi-Agent Tool History * 🧰 fix: Preserve Lazy Subagent Tool History * 🧪 test: Enable Lazy Code History Fixture * 🧭 fix: Derive Effective Lazy Tool History * 🧪 fix: Tolerate Empty MCP Name Audits * 🧪 test: Mock Lazy MCP Name Audit * 🧭 fix: Expand Lazy Historical Tool Names * 🧱 fix: Derive Durable Wildcard History * 🧬 fix: Traverse Nested Wildcard History * 🔭 fix: Resolve Wildcard Server Boundaries * 🔐 fix: Persist MCP Call Identity * 🪪 fix: Stamp Resolved MCP Execution Identity * 🕸️ fix: Resolve Graph Member MCP Identity * 🧭 fix: Fall Back From Empty Graph Member ID * 🧭 fix: Preserve Aggregated MCP Identity * 🧭 fix: Harden MCP Identity Resolution * 🧭 test: Assert Concurrent Graph Limit Invariant * 🧭 fix: Centralize Lazy History Policy * 📦 chore: Bump `@librechat/agents` to v3.7.13 * 🧪 test: Align Content Filter Fixture With SDK History |
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a290677d21
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🗿 fix: Bound Background Task Retention (#15477)
* fix: bound background task registry memory * fix: preserve background registry capacity state * fix: align background payload accounting * fix: harden background capacity admission * fix: honor background payload admission * fix: make background eviction atomic |
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ce209102b8
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🧫 fix: Contain Detached Tool Output (#15476) | ||
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6122d210da
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🛄 fix: Reclaim Pending MCP OAuth Prompts on Resume (#15471) | ||
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74535662fe
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🎖️ fix: Apply Fallback Role on Group Overage (#15472) | ||
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67e2107d74
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🔐 fix: Keep OpenID Metadata Out of Logs and Traces (#15470)
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* 🔒 fix: Keep Secrets Out of Debug Logs and Spans * 🧯 fix: Derive Safe Exception Types * 🛡️ fix: Close Diagnostic Redaction Gaps * 🧼 fix: Redact Escaped JSON Secrets |
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a34d5dbfc7
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🪂 fix: Preserve Subscribers Through Terminal Handoffs (#15462)
* fix: preserve fenced terminal subscriber handoff * test: parse replay conversation pathname * fix: capture late terminal subscribers |
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c8939c9730
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🪄 fix: Reuse Downloaded Artifacts for Image Reads (#15454) | ||
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8f6228095f
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🖼️ fix: Stop Reporting a Failed Sandbox Image Read as an Unreadable Format (#15453)
* 🖼️ fix: Stop Reporting a Failed Sandbox Image Read as an Unreadable Format `read_file` on a `/mnt/data` image collapsed every failure — rate limit, missing path, truncated transfer, transport error — into the binary-file hint, whose image branch reads as a permanent capability limit ("is an image file and cannot be read as text"). The model stopped retrying, and the operator had no way to tell which failure had actually occurred. The failure that surfaced it: the reader windows the bytes through `/exec` stdout, one call per window, against the Code API's per-user execution limiter (20 requests / 30s in the reference deployment). At a fixed 32KB window a 122KB chart cost 4 calls and a 1MB image cost 33 — more than a whole limiter window, so anything over ~640KB could never complete. A turn that generates several charts and reads them back exhausts the budget partway through and reports the 429s as unreadable images. - `handlers.ts`: failed reads name the real cause and the affordance that matches it — rate-limited waits and retries, a missing path lists the directory, a truncated transfer retries. The "cannot be read as text" phrasing is now reserved for bytes that are not a supported image. An image past the inline budget says to downscale and read the smaller copy rather than pointing at `bash_tool`, which cannot show an image. - `process.js`: the window is derived from the runner's stdout budget (48,960B vs 32,768B, so a 122KB chart is 3 calls and 1MB is 22), halves and re-reads the same offset when a runner truncates anyway (remembered per Code API, with the env remedy logged), waits out a rate limit it can afford instead of discarding the bytes already pulled, and stops at a 24-call ceiling so no read stalls a turn across limiter windows. - `utils/code.ts`: shared `getCodeApiRetryAfterMs` (header, then the `retry_after_seconds` body); `skillFiles.ts` drops its private copy. * ♻️ refactor: Move the Sandbox Image Reader Into TypeScript Addresses the review round on #15453. - P1: windowing, window sizing, the in-sandbox reader script, response parsing and byte assembly move to `packages/api/src/files/code/image.ts`, and the Code API rate-limit policy to `packages/api/src/utils/code.ts`. `process.js` keeps only the `/exec` transport it owns. Both new modules are tested against their real implementations (19 + 13 cases), including the round-trip ceiling, the changed-file guard and the shell-injection guard on the reader script. - P2: a configured stdout budget below the old 8KB window floor produced a window the runner could never emit, and narrowing was pinned to the same floor, so no retry could succeed. The window now aligns to the base64 group size instead, and the round-trip ceiling bounds what a small budget costs. - P2: `.env.example` documented a 32,768-byte default that no longer holds and never mentioned the stdout budget. It now describes `LIBRECHAT_CODE_SANDBOX_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE` as the setting to tune, with the chunk override as the escape hatch. - P3: `process.spec.js` no longer reimplements the retry parser in its module mock. Behaviour is tested where it lives; the mock is a declared passthrough and the spec covers what the transport still owns — session forwarding, the profile header, parser hand-off and error logging. - P3: `getCodeApiRetryAfterMs` reads the response body through `in` narrowing rather than an `as` assertion. - P3: the window-sizing JSDoc no longer claims a multiple of 3 in the one case that is not — an explicit `LIBRECHAT_CODE_IMAGE_CHUNK_BYTES`. * 🎯 fix: Size Sandbox Image Reads to What the Limiter Can Deliver Addresses review round 2 on #15453. - Narrowing now halves the caller's own failing window instead of the shared learned value, and the learned value only moves down to the narrowest size any read needed. Reads run concurrently (one per tool call), so two reads failing at the same size were compounding into a window two steps smaller than the runner would have accepted, and persisting it for every later read. - Narrowing continues until a runner accepts a window or a floor below which no runner could serve an image at all. Two halvings stopped at 12,240 bytes — still ~16KB of base64 — so an 8-10KB stdout cap that was not configured up front stayed unreachable. - The round-trip ceiling is now one limiter window (20), and a read that cannot finish within it says so from the FIRST response rather than spending the whole budget rediscovering it: the first window reveals both the file size and what a call really delivers. A near-limit image no longer drains the turn's executions before failing, which is what made the wait budget look too small. - The round-trip message names the size this deployment can actually inline, so the model has a downscale target instead of a guess. - `python3: not found` from the sandbox reader was matching the generic "not found" in `isSandboxMissingFileError` and being reported as a missing image path, sending the model to `ls /mnt/data` while hiding a runner dependency. Image reads now classify only path-specific ENOENT forms as a missing file. * 📐 fix: Size a Truncated Read's Retry From the Cap It Revealed Addresses review round 3 on #15453. A ~1KB sandbox stdout cap is a real runner default, and the 1,536-byte narrowing floor sat above it: discovery stopped one step short and declared every image unreadable, even though small ones fit comfortably in the 576-byte window the configured path already derives. Narrowing now runs until no smaller window exists. It also no longer has to grope its way down: a truncated response emitted exactly as much as the runner allows, so its length measures the cap this deployment never declared, and the retry is derived from it directly — one round-trip instead of the eight blind halvings it takes to fall from ~49KB to ~1KB. Blind halving remains the fallback and bounds the result either way, so every retry is strictly smaller than the window that just failed. |
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cdfe54c349
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🚦 fix: Downgrade Stale Generation Fence Telemetry (#15452)
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* fix: downgrade stale generation fence telemetry * fix: preserve fenced persistence failures * fix: avoid duplicate fence warnings * fix: propagate terminal publication fences * style: format fencing audit changes * fix: keep successor transitions generation scoped * fix: bound predecessor handoff retirement * fix: reconcile discovered successors completely * fix: preserve successor handoff acknowledgement |
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224512851a
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🗂️ fix: Resolve Code Interpreter Destination Collisions (#15449)
* 🗂️ fix: Resolve Code Interpreter Destination Collisions
Codeapi mounts each `/exec` input at a destination derived from its `name`
and rejects the whole request when two entries land on one. LibreChat never
enforced that: `primeFiles` sent `name: file.filename` verbatim, and the
graph seed deduped by `(storage_session_id, id)` — identity, not destination.
Two conversation files sharing a filename therefore killed code execution for
the rest of the conversation. The rejected request never reaches the sandbox,
so no result comes back to collapse the pair, and every later turn re-primes
both and fails identically. Only code-generated outputs are covered by the
`(filename, conversationId, context, tenantId)` partial unique index; uploads
carry `context: message_attachment`, so one conversation can hold several
records sharing a filename — two uploads of `image.png`, or an upload whose
name a later execution wrote back in place.
`packages/api/src/files/code/destinations.ts` now owns the name → destination
mapping for every contributor to an `/exec` file list, mirroring codeapi's
conflict rule including directory-prefix conflicts:
- `primeFiles` claims per pushed file, disambiguating with a `-2`, `-3`
counter and echoing the resolved path into the tool context, so the model
is told where each file actually mounts. Claim order comes from immutable
`createdAt`, not `getFiles`'s `updatedAt` sort, which usage accounting and
re-upload both bump — order-dependent destinations would silently repoint
a path an earlier turn had already handed the model. Newest wins the bare
name, matching `ToolNode.updateCodeSession` and giving an in-place rewrite
precedence over the original it superseded.
- `seedCodeFilesIntoSessions` drops a later file whose destination is already
claimed. Renaming there would invent a path nothing told the model about,
and a conflict at that layer means one logical file arrived twice under
different storage pointers.
Fixes #15443
* 🧹 chore: Tolerate Holes in the Destination Priority Sort
`primeFiles` sorts the raw `getFiles` result before its own per-entry guard
runs, so the comparator has to survive a null row rather than throw ahead of
the loop that was already defending against one.
Also tightens the tool-context assertion in the upload-vs-output case, which
was passing on a trailing space rather than on the path.
* 🔁 fix: Address Codex Review on Destination Assignment
Four findings from the review of `
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22a9368604
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🛄 fix: Refresh Stale Skill File References (#15413)
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* fix(agents): check skill version in codeEnvRef cache-hit path
When a SKILL.md body is edited, `updateSkill` bumps `Skill.version`
but does not clear the `codeEnvRef` on bundled skill files. The
cache-hit path in `primeSkillFiles` reused those stale refs without
comparing versions, causing Code API to return 403 ("Unauthorized file
reference") because the session key no longer matched.
Add a version check to the cache-hit guard: a ref whose version does
not match the current skill version is treated as a cache miss, forcing
a fresh upload under the new session key.
Closes #15275
* fix(agents): apply version check to aggregate cache path in primeInvokedSkills
The previous commit added a version check to the per-skill cache-hit
path in primeSkillFiles. Codex review pointed out that
primeInvokedSkills has its own aggregate cache-hit branch that returns
cached refs before delegating to primeSkillFiles. That branch checked
ref presence and session activity but not ref.version against
skill.version, so a stale ref from an older skill revision would still
bypass the guard.
Add the same version comparison to the aggregate filter and include the
skill object in the allResolved entries so the version is accessible.
Addresses Codex review on #15413
* fix(agents): type skill cache version checks
---------
Co-authored-by: dymux <putramkti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
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49e1e32f3a
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🧺 fix: Funnel MCP Catalog Work Through a Shared Gate (#15429)
* 🧯 fix: Bound MCP Catalog Work Across Requests * 🛑 fix: Reject Saturated MCP Discovery * fix: fairly bound MCP catalog work * test: type catalog snapshot mock arguments * test: assert snapshot deadline forwarding * fix: harden MCP catalog scheduling |
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2e2c29e10d
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🫀 fix: Expire Aborted Background Tool Leases (#15428)
* fix: Bound Background Tool Producer Heartbeats * fix: fence timed-out delivery retirement |
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982a9a5141
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🧴 fix: Strip LangChain URLs From Provider Errors (#15421)
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* 🧹 fix: Strip LangChain Attribution From User-Facing Provider Errors LangChain classifies provider failures by mutating `error.message` with a docs URL, and that message is forwarded verbatim into the error content part we persist, so users saw `docs.langchain.com/...` credited for a provider's own 429. The client only intercepted `MODEL_NOT_FOUND`, leaving every other code to render raw. Resolve the classification server-side instead: codes with localized copy become the typed payload the client already knows how to localize, and every other message keeps the provider's wording with the docs URL removed before it reaches the database. The untouched error still reaches the logs through `getSafeErrorMetadata`. The client keeps a code-driven lookup for messages persisted before this, and gains `com_error_model_rate_limit` alongside the existing not-found copy. The OpenAI-compatible and Responses controllers now share one provider-error helper rather than three copies of it, so the strip applies on those surfaces too. * 🛡️ fix: Harden Error Sanitization For Non-String Messages And Legacy Text Codex review follow-up. `stripLangChainTroubleshootingUrl` assumed a string, so an error-like object with a truthy non-string `message` threw `.replace is not a function` inside the error handler that was meant to report it — the template interpolation it replaced had coerced such values safely. It now coerces at the boundary, as does the code lookup. Legacy messages whose LangChain code has no localized copy still rendered the docs URL, which is exactly the historical case the client-side path exists to clean up. The rendered fallback is now stripped too. Both helpers move to `librechat-data-provider`, which is shared by the client and the backend, so one implementation serves both instead of a second regex drifting in the component. |
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f0f82ec5fa
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🧷 fix: Fence Server-Admitted Queue Boundaries (#15393)
* fix: fence server-admitted queue boundaries * fix: preserve effective queue admission boundaries * fix: fence queue recovery predecessor * fix: unify queued boundary reconciliation * fix: make queued turn receipt settlement monotonic * fix: narrow queued receipt projection status * fix: close queued turn settlement races * fix: make queued admission lineage clock independent * fix: centralize queued turn admission ownership * test: type queued admission outcomes * fix: make queued admission identity durable * fix: carry queued admission identity end to end * style: sort queued turn test imports * fix: unify indeterminate admission ownership * fix: migrate queued admission fence state * fix: migrate every queued admission owner * fix: surface queued admission reconciliation * fix: preserve queued receipt evidence * test: type queued receipt regression * fix: stabilize queued receipt authority * fix: supersede initial receipt fetches |
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b7ae67307e
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🕰️ fix: Anchor Temporal Variables to Turn Start (#15419) | ||
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26887bc5a9
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🛗 chore: Elevate @librechat/agents to 3.7.11 and multer to 2.3.0 (#15409)
* 📦 chore: bump `@librechat/agents` to v3.7.11
* chore: bump multer to latest
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413906abc3
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🖍️ fix: Honor Agent Image Detail Settings (#15407)
* 🖼️ fix: Apply an Agent's Configured Image Detail The Agent Builder exposes an Image Detail slider and saves it to `model_parameters.imageDetail`, but nothing ever read it back: `encodeAndFormat` resolves the level from `req.body.imageDetail`, which the agents route never populates, so every image was encoded as `detail: "auto"`. Providers that reject `auto` — MiniMax's OpenAI-compatible API among them — fail every image upload through an agent, and the setting that would fix it has no effect. The root cause is a classification error rather than a missing argument. `extractLibreChatParams` splits LibreChat's own settings out of an agent's model parameters, and its key set is derived from the `librechat` group in `parameterSettings`. `imageDetail` sat in `baseDefinitions` instead, so it was neither extracted for LibreChat's use nor stripped from the options handed to the provider. It is now grouped with `resendFiles` and the other LibreChat-level parameters, which gives it the same path those already take: extracted during agent initialization, carried on the initialized agent, passed to the client, and read by `encodeAndFormat`. `AgentClient.getSaveOptions` already expected `options.imageDetail` — nothing had ever populated it. The request body still wins where it is set, so the classic endpoints keep resolving detail from conversation settings exactly as before. Fixes #15359 * 🔤 fix: Type Image Detail as Its Enum, Not a Bare String `TConversation.imageDetail` is the `ImageDetail` enum, so the extractor's return type and the initialized agent's field are now declared as that enum rather than widened to `string`, and the tests pass enum members instead of raw literals. Caught by CI's type check, which I had run before adding the tests and not after — jest compiles the specs through babel, so the suite stayed green over a type error. |
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14d4f2789d
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🍃 fix: Send a Pure Inclusion Projection From the Legacy Receipt Sweep (#15390)
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* 🍃 fix: Send a Pure Inclusion Projection From the Legacy Receipt Sweep The legacy actor-receipt sweep selected its candidates with `.select('_id +agentEventActorReconciliations')`. `_id` alone does not make a Mongoose projection inclusive and a `+` token only un-hides its field, so this compiles to `{ _id: 1 }` plus a `: 0` exclusion for every other `select: false` sibling — a mixed projection MongoDB tolerates via the `_id` exception but Amazon DocumentDB rejects (`Projections cannot have a mix of inclusion and exclusion`). The sweep failed on every 30-second maintenance pass, receipts never expired, and the rejection took the whole Promise.all down with it, so the sequenced lane reclamation never ran either. - The candidate read uses the object form `{ _id: 1, agentEventActorReconciliations: 1 }` — a pure inclusion that still returns the hidden field and fetches nothing extra. A regression test spies on the driver call and asserts the compiled projection contains no exclusions. - Every maintenance step now fails alone: a rejection is logged with its step name and counted as zero progress instead of aborting the pass, and lane reclamation runs regardless. Covered by a test rejecting one step and asserting reclamation still runs. - The static guard gains a detector for the exact broken shape — `select('_id +field')` — with fixtures for both directions. The shape is narrow on purpose: probing real Mongoose shows a bare non-`_id` token makes the projection inclusive and turns `+` tokens into plain `field: 1` inclusions, so the repo's nine other `+`-selects are all legal and stay unflagged. The live audit suite gains a raw mixed-projection probe and drives the sweep itself as production shape number eight. * 🍃 fix: Gate Lane Reclamation on Batch Recovery and Type the Projection Assertion Review round 1, both findings real: - Batch-receipt recovery is a prerequisite of lane reclamation, not an independent step: reclamation consumes the lane-cleanup markers (`fulfillLaneCleanupRequest` unsets the delivery-side marker, and `reclaimLaneIfInactive` clears `cleanupRequestedAt` when the lane is still retained), so running it against a half-recovered batch erases a request no later successful recovery can re-arm, retaining the lane permanently. The blanket isolation reintroduced exactly that; reclamation now waits for a batch-recovery pass that did not fail, while the genuinely independent steps keep failing alone. Covered by a test rejecting batch recovery and asserting reclamation is withheld. - The captured-projection assertion drops its `Record<string, unknown>` cast and asserts deep equality with the exact expected pure-inclusion projection, which is both typed and strictly stronger. |
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c7f0a8f247
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📬 feat: Move Agent Queued Turns Server-Side (#15370)
* feat: move agent queued turns server-side * test: update queued turn composition coverage * fix: harden queued-turn lifecycle ownership * fix: centralize queued-turn lifecycle ownership * fix: close queued-turn lifecycle gaps * fix: unify queued turn lifecycle transitions * fix: fence queued-turn deletion admission * fix: preserve queued-turn lifecycle ownership * fix: close queued-turn reconciliation races * fix: reconcile quarantined queued-turn admissions * fix: annotate admission evidence default * fix: deepen queued turn lifecycle admission * fix: fence queued turn provider admission |
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1e4cae07c7
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🧠 feat: Retain Subagent Reasoning Like Main Chat and Drop the Running Status Chip (#15379)
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fcae1025c0
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🧳 feat: Register Principal-Owned Code Environments (#15365)
* feat: add principal-owned code environments * fix: address code environment CI coverage * fix: expose principal code environments in endpoint config * fix: reject missing code environment bodies * fix: harden code environment lifecycle * fix: revalidate principal code environments * fix: synchronize code environment authorization * fix: bind code environments to current principals * fix: fail closed on code ACL cache errors * fix: prevent code environment override shadowing * fix: preserve principal environment defaults * fix: suppress revoked code environment aliases * fix: fail closed on environment augmentation * fix: narrow code environment defaults * fix: isolate code environment fallback * style: sort code config imports |
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0389a92452
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📦 chore: bump @librechat/agents to v3.7.10 (#15378)
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a9ccac8656
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🧲 feat: Enable Secure Attached Environment Pairing (#15355)
* feat: add secure code environment pairing * fix: satisfy code environment type checks * fix: secure code environment administration * fix: isolate code pairing control plane * fix: validate code pairing control responses * fix: secure code pairing transport * fix: validate code pairing wire format * fix: harden pairing secret lookup |
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7533d138fa
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🧬 perf: Evolve Compaction Guidance on Warm Turns (#15371)
* perf: evolve compaction guidance on warm turns * style: sort compaction adapter imports |
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9dcef360e2
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🧳 fix: Carry Stateful Environments Through Runtime Config (#15374) | ||
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29b3e2ef3e
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📜 fix: Resolve MCP Server Instructions for Startup-Deferred Servers (#15361)
* fix: Fetch MCP Instructions from the First Live Connection Startup inspection intentionally defers servers that need per-user or runtime context, including OAuth/OBO, custom variables, user API keys, runtime placeholders, and startup-disabled servers. An enabled serverInstructions declaration therefore never resolves to text during inspection, even though the first live connection already has the instructions from the initialize response. Backfill resolvedInstructions from that connection through an identity-preserving YAML cache patch. Preserve updatedAt so live connections do not become stale, and globally invalidate the tenant-scoped read-through caches because YAML entries are shared across tenants. Literal instruction strings continue to win. Scope remains YAML-tier servers. Config-overlay servers are keyed by config hash, and DB-backed user servers need a separate identity-preserving write through mongoose timestamps and credential sanitization. * fix: Surface per-identity MCP instruction divergence `resolvedInstructions` is a single field on a config shared by every user of the server, and for a startup-deferred server the text now comes from one user's authenticated connection. That is exact for a server advertising one static block, but a server that tailors instructions per identity cannot be represented by it. Rather than let the stored copy churn per connection — each write invalidates the read-through cache globally, and the model context would vary by whoever connected last — keep the first text and log the divergence, so the assumption is diagnosable instead of silent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * perf: Skip MCP instruction backfill for non-YAML tiers `setResolvedInstructions` writes only the YAML tier, so a config-overlay, user, or plugin server reached it, spent a cache round-trip — a network hop under Redis — and was refused. That repeated on every connection creation, because the refusal leaves `resolvedInstructions` unset and nothing memoizes the outcome. Gate on the existing `isUserSourced`/`isPluginSourced` predicates plus an explicit `config` check. An unset source still proceeds: it predates per-tier stamping and the registry resolves it by name. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * test: Pin the MCP instruction context read path Every existing assertion read back through `getServerConfig`, but `MCPManager.getInstructions` resolves instructions from `getAllServerConfigs`, which is served by a different read-through cache. A backfill that invalidated only the per-server cache would pass the suite and still leave the reported bug unfixed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * fix: Refuse MCP instruction backfill from mismatched configs Self-review findings on the backfill, both in the shared-copy write: A config-tier override shadowing a YAML base keeps the base's 'yaml' source tag (`overlaySource`), so the connection manager's tier guard cannot see it, and instructions fetched from a tenant's overridden endpoint would be patched into the shared global YAML entry — reaching every other tenant's model context and persisting after the override is removed. `setResolvedInstructions` now takes the config the delivering connection was created from and compares it field-wise against the stored entry over ADMIN_CONFIGURABLE_FIELDS, refusing on mismatch. Field-wise rather than whole-object, since inspector-derived fields legitimately differ. The skip condition also only refused *identical* text, so a connection built from a stale read-through snapshot (resolvedInstructions still unset) could overwrite already-stored different text — violating the documented first-write-wins invariant and re-triggering global cache invalidation per divergence. The condition is now `!= null`. Documented the aggregate-key cross-instance write race alongside its existing tolerance for `reinspectServer`: the backfill patch fires at most once per server per registry lifetime, and the atomic-write upgrade (hash fields or Lua CAS) is the follow-up that closes the race for every writer at once. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * fix: Scope deferred MCP instructions safely * fix: Narrow optional Keyv namespace in Redis store detection Keyv types `namespace` as `string | undefined`, so passing it straight into `FORCED_IN_MEMORY_CACHE_NAMESPACES?.includes(...)` fails `tsc --noEmit` in both cache classes — tsdown builds do not catch it, but the TypeScript type checks CI job runs tsc and would. An unset namespace (never the case after construction) now reads as not Redis-backed, which falls back to the guarded non-Lua path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * fix: Harden the shared-instruction gate and CAS the patch Codex round two, both verified before fixing: A configured `oauth` block slips the backfill gate whenever `requiresOAuth` is not literally true. The inspector stamps `requiresOAuth = false` on every `startup: false` server without consulting `oauth`, so the stamped population connects bare and fetches anonymously — but the gate's safety rested entirely on that stamp: a config reaching the manager unstamped gets OAuth machinery armed (`isOAuthServer` treats `oauth != null` as OAuth) while `requiresUserScopedConnection` waves it through. The gate now rejects `oauth`/`oauth_headers` outright; genuinely static servers carry neither. The registry validates config identity against a snapshot that can lag by the cache TTL, while the Lua patch checked only that `resolvedInstructions` was unset — so a replica could validate against an old entry, another replica replace it, and the patch land instructions on the replacement. `patch` now takes the validated entry's `updatedAt` and both Lua scripts (and the in-memory and fallback paths) refuse when the stored entry no longer matches: identity validation and the write are one compare-and-set. Both guards verified red-without-fix; suite 36/36. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * fix: Loosen apiKey on the scoping config and sort imports CI caught two things local gates filtered past: `UserScopedConnectionConfig` gained `apiKey` on the strict Pick side, but raw (pre-inspection) configs carry an optional `apiKey.source` — exactly what the type's loosened intersection exists for — so `agents/initialize.ts` stopped compiling. The gate only reads `apiKey?.source`, so the loosened shape is sufficient and the TypeScript type checks job goes green again. The `canBackfillSharedServerInstructions` import landed unsorted in UserConnectionManager.ts, failing the changed-file import-sort gate. Verified with a full `tsc --noEmit` error-list diff against clean dev (zero branch-only errors) rather than per-directory counts, which is how the initialize.ts error slipped local verification. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * fix: Make MCP aggregate writes atomic * test: Fix Redis aggregate spy assertion * fix: Reject placeholder-bearing admin keys from shared backfill Codex round three P1, verified end-to-end before fixing: processMCPEnv injects an admin `apiKey.key` into the request headers (env.ts:448) BEFORE header values get per-user placeholder resolution (env.ts:478), so a key like `{{LIBRECHAT_OPENID_ACCESS_TOKEN}}` makes the connection identity-scoped — while `placeholderBearingFields` never inspects `apiKey.key` and the gate rejected only `source: 'user'`. Instructions fetched under one user's identity could then be stored for everyone. The gate now scans the admin key value with the same runtime-placeholder predicate. Kept narrow deliberately: widening `placeholderBearingFields` itself would change `requiresUserScopedConnection` for every caller — connection pooling included — which is its own decision. Static admin keys still backfill (positive control test); both new refusal tests verified red without the gate change. Suite 39/39. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * refactor: Drop gate term covered by placeholder-bearing apiKey |
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91cfd04f22
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🏕️ fix: Restore Code Environments From Runtime Config (#15373) | ||
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30124f21b2
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🎻 refactor: Orchestrate Agent Runs Through a Request-Free Host (#15366)
* refactor: decouple agent initialization from HTTP * refactor: centralize remote agent execution lifecycle * fix: preserve pre-settlement error rendering * fix: preserve request-backed tool loading * style: sort agent execution imports * fix: adapt public agent tool loaders |
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c1cb591d49
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🗿 feat: Add Attached Stateful Code Environments (#15352)
* feat: add attached stateful code environments * fix: include code environment in lazy agent type * fix: harden stateful environment routing * fix: complete code environment route isolation * fix: declare code environment map type * fix: preserve configured code execution routes * fix: harden stateful environment updates * test: assert route-scoped sandbox readiness * fix: harden stateful environment lifecycle * fix: isolate migrated code sessions * test: assert route-qualified code sessions |
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dc77b78d3e
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🔇 refactor: Quiet Framework Logging in Unit Tests (#15363)
* 🔇 refactor: Quiet Framework Logging in Unit Tests Unit test output was overwhelmingly framework log lines rather than test results. A `packages/api` run printed 9,076 lines for 434 suites; 1,596 of them were the identical `at Console.log (winston/transports/console.js:87)` frame that Jest staples onto every winston write. Three causes: - Each winston logger built its Console transport with a hard-coded `level: 'info'`. Winston resolves a transport's explicit level ahead of its parent's, so the logger's own `NODE_ENV`-derived `warn` never applied — in tests or in production. `CONSOLE_LOG_LEVEL` now drives it, defaulting to the previous `info` so deployments are unaffected. `meiliLogger` had the same hard-coded level and is routed through the same helper. - `LOG_TO_FILE` defaults on, so every Jest worker opened DailyRotateFile transports. A run left `packages/api/logs/` holding a 107KB error log, a gzipped rotation, audit JSON, and — from fake-timer suites — files dated 1969 and 2023. - Client suites carried leftover debug `console.log` in shipped source (`Test mode. Skipping silent refresh.` alone accounted for 109 blocks) plus three test-harness defects whose React error dumps buried everything else: a markdown suite rendering Mermaid with no Router, a `~/Providers` mock missing `useSearchContext` (the component's own catch swallowed the throw, so the sources path was dead while the suite passed), and `getBoundingClientRect` stubs without `left`, which made a computed `right` NaN. A shared `config/jest.setup.logging.cjs` sets the two env vars for both backend workspaces. It sets env only and requires nothing: eagerly requiring the logger froze `CREDS_KEY` into `encryptV3` before specs could set it and broke five suites. `TEST_VERBOSE_LOGS=true` restores the logs for debugging. Output per full run: packages/api 9,076 -> 770 lines (winston lines 1,596 -> 0) packages/data-schemas 2,521 -> 946 lines (winston lines 290 -> 0) client 10,384 -> 3,153 lines (console blocks 285 -> 74) Test counts are unchanged: client 476 suites / 5,827 tests green, and the Ariakit `act(...)` warnings the selector suites emitted are gone rather than suppressed. * 🔧 fix: Settle Shutdown Timers Before Counting Them `destroy()` finishes cancelling its fenced retirement timers on the tick after it resolves. The count only returned to the baseline because a console write from the logger happened to yield first — silencing that logging left four timers still pending at the assertion, deterministically failing the suite in CI's sharded, coverage-enabled run. Advance the fake clock by zero before counting, so the assertion proves the timers were cancelled rather than that something incidental yielded. * 🛡️ fix: Validate CONSOLE_LOG_LEVEL Instead of Trusting It Winston resolves a level name against the logger's level map, so a name outside it resolves to `undefined` and the transport drops every message. Passing `CONSOLE_LOG_LEVEL` straight through meant a typo (`warning`) or a stray space silently muted all console output — a misconfiguration that reads as a dead deployment. Validate against the level set, normalize case and whitespace, and fall back to the default with a warning on the way past, since the logger cannot report its own misconfiguration. The level map itself was duplicated verbatim in both loggers; it now lives in `utils` beside the validation that depends on it. * 🎚️ fix: Let CONSOLE_LOG_LEVEL Outrank DEBUG_CONSOLE `DEBUG_CONSOLE=true` forced the console transport to `debug`, so on those deployments every non-`silent` value of `CONSOLE_LOG_LEVEL` was discarded — `CONSOLE_LOG_LEVEL=error` still emitted debug and info, defeating the control it advertises. `DEBUG_CONSOLE` now only moves the *default* level and keeps choosing the debug format, so an explicit level stays in charge of verbosity. With no explicit level the resolved default is still `debug`, unchanged for existing setups. Covers the wiring with a spec that re-imports the logger per environment, rather than only testing the resolver in isolation. |
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cd3768ed1f
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🍵 feat: Continue Late Steers in Warm Agent Runs (#15357)
* feat: continue late steers in warm agent runs * chore: bump agents sdk to v3.7.9 * fix: guard terminal steer admission |
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180b56531a
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fix: log config-blocked MCP recovery at debug instead of error (#15360)
A server blocked by the domain policy (or any configuration that makes discovery impossible) fails recovery deterministically on every catalog request, and each attempt logged at error level. In the e2e suite, where e2e-http is deliberately policy-blocked to exercise the allowlist override flow, this produced an error line every few seconds. Discovery raises McpError InvalidRequest precisely for these config-impossible cases, so classify it in discoverCandidate and log at debug — the level this file already uses for config-proven skips — keeping error for genuinely unexpected failures. |
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2ae6c8aea9
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🛎️ feat: Wake Agents on Background Tool Completion (#15350)
* feat: wake agents for background tool completion * fix: isolate background completion contracts * fix: anchor background completion identity * fix: close background completion delivery gaps * fix: preserve manual background polling * fix: preserve legacy tool group identity * fix: close background wakeup identity gaps * test: type background wakeup enqueue mock * fix: preserve background completion identity * test: type activity phase fixture * test: mock phase media query * fix: arbitrate background result ownership * fix: retain tool step routing helper * test: expand phase groups before identity checks * fix: preserve background completion ownership * fix: bound durable background results * fix: type wakeup input budget export * chore: sort background handler imports * fix: persist timed-out background completions * fix: reconcile background completion ownership * fix: type background completion capabilities * fix: harden background completion terminalization * test: type missing completion evidence * fix: require evidence for completion retirement * chore: satisfy background completion static checks * test: cover automatic background completion wakeups * test: assert background wakeup agent identity * fix: wake capability-fenced trigger deliveries * test: keep capability shield fixture public * test: assert capability worker wakeup * fix: close background completion ownership gaps * test: satisfy completion lease static checks * fix: preserve artifact completion wakeups * fix: close background delivery recovery gaps * fix: simplify background receipt guidance * fix: recover dead background completion batches * fix: fence background completion recovery * fix: recheck background recovery ownership * fix: fence unpublished background continuations * test: await background message hydration |
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e3ccaba5af
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🛄 feat: Restore Compaction Guidance Across Continuations (#15356)
* 🧭 feat: preserve compaction guidance across continuations * 🔧 fix: narrow persisted compaction fields |
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b97d2868d4
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🛑 feat: Cancel MCP Discovery Work at the Caller Deadline (#15353)
* feat: cancel discovery probes and tools/list at the caller deadline deadlineMs could only be checked, never enforced: between checkpoints, the health probe's ping ran to the SDK's 60s default, an in-flight tools/list page ran to its page timeout, and a spent budget still paid for credential preparation and a publication-order reservation before anything noticed. Derive one AbortSignal per discovery from the deadline and the caller's own cancellation, and hand it to the work the SDK can genuinely cancel: client.ping (and its fallback verification) via isConnected(signal), and every tools/list page via fetchToolsSnapshot. An aborted probe reports false for that caller only and never mutates connection state, so a shared app connection stays usable for everyone else. Phases that cannot be cancelled are no longer started once the budget is spent: discovery returns before Graph preprocessing and token resolution begin, and a snapshot returns incomplete before reserving publication order. Teardown stays deliberately exempt — dispose() must finish. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xr1Dabvdn1mzzyYgpJgU5B * fix: keep aborted probes honest and combine caller signals Codex round 1 on the abort threading found three gaps, all real: - An aborted ping left lastConnectionCheckAt stamped, so a dead shared connection read as healthy for the whole CONNECTION_CHECK_TTL. The probe now restores the stamp when the caller signal caused the failure; the real-SDK test closes the server after an aborted probe and asserts the next caller sees it dead. - The app-connection fast path built its signal from the deadline alone, so cancelling the originating request did not cancel a hung probe or tools/list there. One shared createDeadlineAbortSignal helper now combines both, used by the factory and the manager. - The entry checkpoint could not see a budget that expired during credential preparation; discoverToolsInternal rechecks before token resolution begins. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xr1Dabvdn1mzzyYgpJgU5B * fix: consult the caller signal at discovery decision points Round 2 found the pattern left half-applied: the signal cancels SDK requests, but two orchestration points ignored it. - An app-connection probe aborted by the caller fell through to discovery fallback, opening a fresh connection for a request that no longer exists. The manager now returns before the fallback when the caller signal is aborted or the budget spent, and the caller signal travels into non-OAuth discovery too — previously only OAuth connections could carry one, so signal moves to UserConnectionContext. - fetchOrderedToolsSnapshot bounded the refresh wait by the deadline but not the signal, so a signal-only caller stayed blocked for the shared refresh's full cycle. settlesBefore now interrupts on either. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xr1Dabvdn1mzzyYgpJgU5B * fix: gate every discovery checkpoint on one cancellation predicate Round 3 exposed the structural cause of the last two rounds: discovery carries the same fact in two forms — a deadline number and a signal — and each gate consulted only the deadline. isDiscoveryCancelled() is now the one predicate at the static entry, the post-preparation entry, and the pre-fallback gate, matching the manager gate and the snapshot gates that already checked both. connect() cannot carry the signal, so a signal-only abort previously waited out the full connection timeout. connectWithinBudget races connect against the timeout and the abort with owned cleanup: the timer is always cleared, the abandoned attempt's rejection is swallowed, and disposal hands whatever the dead connect still constructs to the mid-connect disposal guard. |
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41c92dfd06
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⏱️ fix: Bound MCP Tool Discovery With a Caller Deadline (#15346)
* fix: bound MCP tool discovery end to end with a caller deadline connectionTimeout bounds a single connect() only. Discovery then spends it again on the unauthenticated fallback and hands tools/list its own 30s budget, so a caller working to a deadline had no way to cap the whole operation. Thread an optional absolute deadline through discovery into both connect() and the tools/list walk, and dispose a timed-out authenticated connection before the fallback opens its own socket — withTimeout does not cancel the connect it abandoned, so the two were briefly concurrent. Passive catalog recovery now sets one 3s per-server budget instead of a per-attempt timeout it could spend several times over. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xr1Dabvdn1mzzyYgpJgU5B * fix: close deadline gaps in the app path, refresh wait, and disposal race Codex review of the deadline threading found three real gaps: - discoverServerTools returns through an app-connection fast path that never reached the factory, so its tools/list kept the 30s default. - fetchOrderedToolsSnapshot checked the deadline before awaiting a refresh but the refresh runs on the connection's own budget, so an in-flight one could still hold a budgeted caller for that budget. Stop waiting on it rather than adopting it. - connectClient never rechecked isDisposed after awaiting constructTransport, so a connect abandoned by its caller could assign a transport and connect after dispose() had already found nothing to close. Disposing before the fallback widened that window, so bound the attempt to its own disposal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xr1Dabvdn1mzzyYgpJgU5B * fix: close the transport itself when disposal beats connect Rewriting the disposal-race test against a real SDK server and transport exposed a defect the mocked version could not see: client.close() only closes a transport the client has adopted, and it has not adopted one when disposal lands before client.connect(). The abandoned attempt's session therefore stayed open and the reference was merely dropped. Close the transport directly before closing the client. The test now asserts the server observed the close, which fails against the previous fix. |
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70f735336d
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🛎️ fix: Enroll Remote Agent Runs in the Generation Lifecycle (#15349)
* fix: enroll remote agent runs in generation lifecycle * fix: close remote lifecycle ownership gaps * fix: close remote conversation drain races * fix: fence remote runs during conversation deletion * fix: reconcile remote deletion and settlement races * fix: complete owner deletion recovery * fix: preserve remote cleanup receipts * fix: consume deletion receipts before cleanup * fix: expose idempotent deletion option * chore: sort remote lifecycle imports |
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8fcab7e44f
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🔄 fix: Recover Missing MCP Marketplace Catalogs (#15323)
* fix: recover missing MCP marketplace catalogs * fix: make MCP catalog recovery passive * test: type MCP catalog recovery fixtures * fix: bound and back off passive MCP catalog recovery Passive recovery runs inline on `GET /api/mcp/tools` and its results are request-local by design, so every list request re-dialed the same cold servers with the default connection timeout. Three limits keep that cost proportional to what recovery can actually recover: - Cap the discovery timeout at 5s instead of inheriting the connection default (`initTimeout ?? 30s`); a server configured to connect faster keeps its own shorter limit. - Skip a server the config tier already marked `inspectionFailed`, leaving it to that tier's retry window rather than re-dialing it per request. - Skip a server whose declared `customUserVars` are unset, matching the gate `reinitMCPServer` applies for issue #10969 — connecting without them fails auth, so the attempt is spent for nothing. Servers that still fail discovery enter a one-minute per-process cooldown, which is what stops an unreachable server from being re-dialed by every subsequent list request. A server that recovers clears its own entry, and expired entries are swept at most once per window so the map stays bounded. Skipped servers render exactly as they did before recovery existed: present in the catalog with an empty tool list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xr1Dabvdn1mzzyYgpJgU5B * fix: bound passive MCP recovery by deadline, key cooldowns by config Both follow-ups address the same mistake: recovery expressed its own request-level constraints in terms borrowed from other layers. `connectionTimeout` bounds one connection attempt, and `MCPConnectionFactory.discoverToolsInternal` spends it twice — once on the authenticated connection, then again in `attemptUnauthenticatedToolListing` — so capping it bounded no total this layer could reason about. Recovery now enforces its own wall-clock deadline per server with `withTimeout`, which holds however many attempts the factory makes; `connectionTimeout` is left to do only its own job, still honouring a shorter operator `initTimeout`. An attempt abandoned by the deadline disposes its own connection when it settles, and `Promise.race` keeps a handler on it, so a late rejection is not unhandled. A per-request budget now caps total recovery regardless of server count. A server is dialed only if the remaining budget can fund a full deadline; never dialing one is not evidence against it, so a skipped server records no cooldown and a later request reaches it once those ahead are cached or cooling down. Cooldown identity now includes the publication generation — the same effective-config identity the tool caches fence on — instead of just user and server name. Correcting a server's URL or transport keys a new entry, so the refetch the client issues on update is no longer skipped for up to a minute by the previous configuration's failure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xr1Dabvdn1mzzyYgpJgU5B * refactor: keep passive MCP recovery stateless and bounded by its own work Reverts the cooldown, request budget and deadline race added in |
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16c2bb4149
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📬 feat: Establish Background Continuation Admission (#15348)
* feat: establish background continuation admission * fix: preserve routed subagent wakeup controls * fix: probe configured subagent task store |
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fa913148fb
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🔒 fix: Refresh MCP OBO Tokens From the Live OpenID Session (#15334)
* 🧊 fix: Inline-refresh OpenID session tokens at MCP OBO call time Resolves the walk-away failure mode where MCP tool calls using OBO auth fail with "No valid OpenID access token is available for OBO exchange" after a user idles past their access-token lifetime. The strategy-time snapshot on `user.federatedTokens` could expire mid-stream before `resolveOboToken` ran, while `req.session.openidTokens` carried a still- valid (or refreshable) token that nothing read. - New OpenIDSessionRefresh service: per-user single-flighted closure that reads `req.session.openidTokens` at OBO time and inline-refreshes via `openid-client.refreshTokenGrant` when expired (30s skew), persisting via `req.session.save()`. No cookie writes (headers already flushed). - `resolveOboToken` gains a required UpstreamTokenProvider parameter (typed as `() => Promise<OIDCTokens | null>`, reusing the shared shape from @librechat/data-schemas). Compile-time guarantee that every call site is updated. - New `session_refresh_failed` OboTokenResolutionReason distinguishes "session expired and IdP rejected refresh" from "no upstream token ever existed." - `req` threaded through createMCPTool/createMCPTools/createToolInstance to construct the closure with captured request, plus fail-closed guards in MCPConnectionFactory.getOboTokens and MCPManager.callTool when the closure isn't plumbed. - Startup warning in MCPServersInitializer when OBO is configured but OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is unset (the strategy populating user.federatedTokens is only registered under reuse, so OBO would fail every call without it). Tests: 16 new in OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js; obo.spec.ts extended for the new param + error reason; wiring smoke tests in MCPManager, MCPConnectionFactory, MCPServersInitializer, and MCP.spec.js. * 🛡️ fix: Harden OBO inline-refresh against token type and session edge cases - Token-preference asymmetry: live-token reuse and expires_at derivation now strictly gate on the access_token, not the id_token. Added a required `tokenPreference` parameter on isLiveSessionTokenStillValid, buildOIDCTokensFromSession, and createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider so every call site is explicit. Dropped the bogus id_token-exp fallback in performIdpRefresh — id_token TTL is governed by IdP session policy and would mark a short-lived access_token reusable past its real lifetime. - Missing req in /reinitialize route: the manual reconnect endpoint now forwards req into reinitMCPServer, so OBO servers can build a session-aware upstream-token closure instead of failing with missing_upstream_token. - Single-flight key collisions: composed key as tenantId:openidIssuer:openidId:sessionId via getSingleFlightKey. Concurrent calls in the same session still coalesce; separate sessions never share an in-flight refresh, preventing refresh-token rotation from breaking sibling sessions and preventing cross-tenant token crossover when distinct users share an IdP sub. - Opaque access token reuse): persist accessTokenExpiresAt (unix seconds, from tokenset.expires_in) on each refresh AND on initial login / SPA refresh in setOpenIDAuthTokens. New getAccessTokenExp helper falls back to it when the access token isn't a JWT, avoiding redundant inline refreshes for Microsoft Graph and Auth0 default audiences. - Log hygiene: the single-flight key (containing sessionId, openidId, openidIssuer, tenantId) is now SHA-256-hashed in the "Joining in-flight refresh" debug log. Preserves cross-line correlation via a 12-char prefix without leaking credential or PII material. Documented req.session.openidTokens shape contract via JSDoc typedef so the new accessTokenExpiresAt field has a discoverable home alongside the existing accessToken/idToken/refreshToken/expiresAt/lastRefreshedAt. Tests: OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js up to 30 passing (added coverage for opaque-token reuse, JWT-access-token-exp fallback, no-id_token-fallback regression, cross-session no-coalesce, persistence on refresh, and a guard against stale accessTokenExpiresAt carryover). AuthService.spec.js adds two cases covering accessTokenExpiresAt persistence on login. mcp.spec.js (route) gains a regression test asserting req flows into reinitMCPServer. * 🔍 fix: Detect OBO-only MCP admin config overrides Admin Config overlays for YAML-defined MCP servers compare only ADMIN_CONFIGURABLE_FIELDS to decide whether to lazy-init a config-tier override. The OBO config field was added after that fingerprint list, so an override that only added or changed `obo` was treated as unchanged YAML and skipped. Include `obo` in the admin-configurable field list and add a regression test for an OBO-only override. * 🔊 fix: Mock MCP OAuth timeout in SDK integration test MCPConnectionFactory.attemptToConnect reads mcpConfig.OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT when building the OAuth connection timeout. The SDK OAuth integration test mocked mcpConfig without that field, which made the timeout calculation produce NaN and caused the test to fail before the OAuth refresh/start path completed. Add OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT to the test mock. * ♻️ refactor: Pass OBO upstream-token closure into MCP instead of req Build the OpenID upstream-token provider at the request boundary and thread only the closure through MCP handling, so the MCP service layer no longer receives the raw Express request. The closure still reads/refreshes the live session at tool-call time, preserving the walk-away recovery. - Drop `req`/`capturedReq` from createMCPTools, createMCPTool, reconnectServer, createToolInstance, and reinitMCPServer; forward `upstreamTokenProvider` instead. Closure is constructed in loadTools, loadToolDefinitionsWrapper, and the reinitialize route, where req/res are in scope. - OBO: fall back to user.federatedTokens when the provider yields no live session, so OIDC remote-agent calls (verified bearer, no session) still work. - Inline refresh: mirror a rotated refresh token to the refreshToken cookie via a shared setRefreshTokenCookie helper, guarded by !res.headersSent (no-op on the streaming path; session copy stays authoritative). - Single-flight: hydrate a joining request's own session from the resolved tokens so a later OBO call doesn't replay a rotated-away refresh token. Addresses owner feedback and three review findings. * 🔒 fix: Recover OIDC refresh-token rotation after SSE OBO refresh When an inline OBO refresh rotates the OpenID refresh token after SSE headers have already been sent, the browser refreshToken cookie cannot be updated. Store a short-lived encrypted bridge from the stale cookie token to the rotated token so /api/auth/refresh can recover after express-session loss. Use the signed openid_user_id cookie to load user context for bridge validation, retry only on invalid_grant, and delete the bridge only after the bridged refresh succeeds. * 🔨 fix: hydrate joined OIDC refresh sessions with stable refresh tokens Update single-flight OIDC refresh joiners whenever refreshed access token state changes, even if the IdP keeps the refresh token unchanged. This prevents joined requests from retaining stale accessToken or accessTokenExpiresAt values and redundantly refreshing later in the same run. * 🌉 Persist OIDC refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB Store SSE OBO refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB instead of process-local memory so /api/auth/refresh can recover after worker restarts or cross-worker routing. Derive bridge expiry from REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY so the recovery window matches the stale refreshToken cookie it repairs, and delete bridges after successful recovery. * 🤝 Coordinate OIDC inline refreshes across workers Add a short-lived Mongo-backed refresh-flight record so concurrent OBO refreshes for the same OpenID session do not redeem the same rotating refresh token on different workers. The winning worker performs the IdP refresh and stores an encrypted result; joiners wait for that result, hydrate their request session, and return without calling the IdP. * ⚓ Keep OpenID marker cookies aligned on inline refresh Refresh token_provider and openid_user_id with the same expiry as the rotated refreshToken cookie when an inline OBO refresh can still write headers. Share the marker-cookie writer with the normal OpenID auth refresh path so the fallback /api/auth/refresh branch continues to recognize valid OpenID refresh tokens after session expiry. * 🔑 fix: include refresh token in OIDC local refresh flight key Key the process-local OIDC refresh coalescing by the current session refresh token, matching the Mongo-backed flight key. This prevents a request with a newly rotated token from joining an older pending refresh and inheriting its failure/result. * 🌉 fix: store OIDC refresh bridge without cookie response Treat missing or non-cookie responses like headers-sent streaming responses during inline OIDC refresh. When the IdP rotates the refresh token and cookies cannot be written, persist a recovery bridge so a later /auth/refresh can recover after session expiry. * 🫙 fix: preserve stale OIDC cookie bridge key Track the refresh token last written to the browser cookie separately from the current session refresh token. When inline OIDC refreshes rotate tokens without a writable response, keep bridging from the browser-stale token directly to the latest session token. * 🙌 fix: keep OIDC bridge recovery success on cleanup failure Make refresh-token bridge cleanup best-effort after a bridged OIDC refresh succeeds. A transient delete failure now logs a warning but does not convert the already-refreshed session and cookies into a 403 response. * 📦 test: Exclude RefreshTokenBridge from tenant-isolation coverage Add RefreshTokenBridge to the tenant-isolation coverage allowlist because refresh bridge lookups run during unauthenticated OpenID refresh recovery. The controller first recovers user context from the signed OpenID marker cookie, then the bridge methods apply explicit user and tenant filters. Ambient tenant isolation would bind this recovery path to request-local tenant context that is not available at the point the stale cookie is being resolved * ⚡ Fix OpenID refresh flight retry and marker hydration Allow failed OpenID refresh flights to be reclaimed immediately instead of pinning transient errors. Preserve the browser refresh-token marker when joined refreshes hydrate session tokens from a shared flight result. Stabilize AuthService tests by isolating mocked module imports from prior suites. * 🛠️ fix: centralize OBO identity scoping Add shared auth identity helpers for app user ids, OpenID subjects, tenant ids, and normalized OpenID issuers. Thread a non-placeholder-visible OBO identity context from the real request user through MCP connection, tool-call, reinit, and refresh paths. Keep tenantId and openidIssuer out of createSafeUser so MCP user placeholders do not expose those fields. Scope OBO token cache and in-flight exchange keys by tenant, issuer, OpenID subject, scopes, and a SHA-256 hash of the upstream assertion. This prevents cross-tenant/cross-issuer collisions and avoids reusing tokens minted from stale rotated assertions. Use the shared identity helpers for OpenID refresh-flight keys and refresh-token bridge recovery records so related OBO refresh paths share the same identity normalization rules. The helper is intended for auth-boundary and credential-cache code, not as a blanket replacement for ordinary app user id ownership checks. * 🛠️ fix: preserve OIDC refresh-token sync on save failures Sync OpenID refresh-token cookie/bridge state before persisting the session so a transient session-store failure cannot lose an IdP-rotated refresh token. Also trigger sync when the session refresh token differs from the browser refresh-token marker, not only when the current grant rotates the token. This lets later writable refreshes repair stale browser cookies left behind by SSE refreshes. Route refresh bridge identity through the shared identity helper with the threaded OBO identity context, falling back to request/user context when needed. Add regression coverage for session-save failures, stale browser cookie repair, non-writable bridge storage, and shared-helper identity fallback. * 🛠️ fix: keep OIDC refresh bridge during recovery grace After successful bridged refresh recovery, re-store the stale-cookie bridge with a short grace TTL instead of deleting it immediately. This lets parallel /api/auth/refresh requests that already sent the stale browser cookie recover before they can observe the first response's Set-Cookie. Retarget the bridge to the refresh token returned by the bridged retry so B-to-C refresh-token rotation remains recoverable. The grace TTL is parsed with math() and defaults to 60s, which shrinks the replay window from the original REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY bridge lifetime to the short recovery grace period. Remove the now-unused explicit bridge delete path from the service and data-schemas method surface. Add regression coverage for grace re-store, identity symmetry, retry failure behavior, and same-key upsert replacement. * 🛠️ fix: fail closed on OBO MCP user identity mismatch Add an OBO-specific guard before MCP tool execution that requires the effective invocation user and captured request user to both have ids and to match. This prevents OBO tool calls from falling back to a separate configurable.user_id identity after request-bound OBO context has already been captured. Keep the existing user id fallback behavior for non-OBO MCP calls. Tests cover mismatched OBO users, missing user ids, and the matching-user path ignoring a conflicting configurable.user_id. * 🛠️ fix: Guard OpenID bridge retry user identity Extract the shared OpenID refresh/user-resolution flow in AuthController so the normal refresh path and bridge-recovery retry use the same grant, claims, issuer, user lookup, and diagnostic logging code. Preserve the existing path-specific behavior: the normal path still owns migration updates and 401 login redirects, while the bridge retry still falls through to the existing 403 invalid-token response. Add a bridge-recovery guard that rejects retry results whose resolved user id differs from the signed openid_user_id cookie before issuing tokens or re-storing the grace bridge. Cover both the successful matching-user recovery and the mismatched-user rejection. * 🛠️ fix: type-safety polish on OBO data layer Replace refresh token bridge query/update Record<string, unknown> usage with typed Mongoose FilterQuery and UpdateQuery definitions. Harden OpenID marker cookie JWT expiry handling by converting refresh expiry milliseconds to integer seconds and rejecting invalid or non-positive durations. Add focused CSRF tests for fractional refresh expiry values and invalid expiry configuration. * 🛠️ fix: Bind OpenID session tokens to authenticated identity Stamp OpenID session token state with the LibreChat user id, OpenID subject, tenant id, and normalized issuer when tokens are stored. Fail closed before OBO inline token reuse/refresh when the session token identity does not match the current authenticated identity, preventing a stale or mixed Express session from supplying another user's upstream assertion. Also validate the normal /api/auth/refresh session-token reuse shortcut against the signed marker-cookie user before returning cached session tokens. Note: sessions created before this change carry no identity stamp and are treated as a mismatch. This is self-healing — the reuse path forces a full IdP refresh (which re-stamps the session) and the OBO path throws, surfacing as a one-time re-authentication for active OBO users at deploy time. The session re-stamps within one session lifetime (SESSION_EXPIRY, default 15 min). * 🛠️ fix: Recover OpenID refresh token drift Prefer the browser refresh-token cookie when it differs from the server-side OpenID session state, and force a real IdP refresh in that case instead of reusing stale session tokens. Store a short-lived refresh-token bridge when inline OBO refresh writes a rotated browser cookie but session persistence fails, so follow-up refreshes can still recover from the old token. Keep the bridge grace TTL centralized in RefreshTokenBridge so both recovery paths use the same env-backed value. Note: drift is measured against the last-synced browserRefreshToken marker, so the SSE path (intentionally stale cookie, authoritative session) does not false-positive. Sessions predating the marker have no browserRefreshToken; for those, drift falls back to comparing the cookie against the session refresh token and prefers the cookie on difference. This is the same self-healing pre-change-session window as the identity binding fix and re-syncs within one session lifetime. Tests cover cookie/session drift selection, reusable-session bypass on drift, bridge storage after session-save failure, and the shared bridge constant wiring. * 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO token caching and expiry handling Reject malformed OBO grant responses before writing them to the exchanged-token cache so a missing access_token cannot poison the cache. Store absolute expires_at values with cached OBO tokens and ignore legacy cache entries without usable expiry metadata. This keeps cached-token freshness based on the token’s real remaining lifetime instead of reusing the original relative expires_in on cache hits. Move OBO expiry normalization and skew helpers into packages/api and use them from both the JS exchange service and the TS MCP resolver. Apply a 30-second safety margin with a one- second floor for short-lived tokens, covered by direct helper tests and caller-level regression tests. Tests: - packages/api: npm run build - packages/api: npx jest src/mcp/oauth/expiry.spec.ts src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts - api: npx jest server/services/OboTokenService.spec.js * 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO refresh-token bridge lookup and indexing Reuse getValidOpenIDReuseUserId for the bridge-recovery user lookup in refreshController instead of re-verifying openid_user_id inline. The shared helper enforces the JWT_REFRESH_SECRET presence check and a strict typeof payload.id === 'string' guard, rejecting tokens whose id claim is present but not a string (e.g. a numeric id) that the inline check accepted. Fail closed on issuer mismatch in getRefreshTokenBridge. Both the stored and the expected issuer are now normalized and compared for equality, so a bridge is recovered only when both sides agree (both absent, or both present and equal after normalization). Previously the check was skipped whenever the stored issuer was absent, allowing recovery across mismatched issuer context. Drop the unused {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId, openidIssuer} index and the openidIssuer field on RefreshTokenBridgeQuery. The data-layer filter only queries the 3-field {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId} index; the issuer is verified in application code, not the query. Hoist the repeated model accessor into getRefreshTokenBridgeModel. Note: issuer is now load-bearing for recovery. A bridge stored with an issuer recovers only when the lookup supplies a matching issuer; the recovery lookup reads user.openidIssuer via AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION (an exclusion projection that retains the field). If a user's persisted openidIssuer is empty while the stored bridge has one, recovery fails closed (falls through to normal re-authentication) until the bridge TTLs out — no security regression. Tests cover invalid signed-cookie payloads bypassing the bridge, both asymmetric issuer-presence cases, issuer normalization before comparison, and an index-alignment assertion guarding against re-adding the dropped index. * 🛠️ fix: Degrade OBO discovery on token resolution failures Catch expected OboTokenResolutionError failures during MCP tool discovery and fall back to unauthenticated tool listing instead of aborting discovery. This keeps discovery aligned with the existing unauthenticated listing behavior while preserving unexpected errors as real failures. Also correct OBO tool-call freshness comment and tighten the OBO trust-check permissions type to the existing role permission shape. Tests: - npx jest src/mcp/__tests__/MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts --runInBand --coverage=false - npx jest src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts --runInBand --coverage=false * 🛠️ fix: tighten OBO tool-call errors, bridge logging, and flight typing Move resolveToolCallUserId inside the tool-call try/catch so an OBO identity mismatch surfaces with serverName/toolName context and the standard tool-call-failed message instead of an opaque bare Error. Raise the refresh-token bridge lookup failure log from debug to warn so transient infrastructure failures on the unauthenticated /api/auth/refresh path are observable, and guard the message access against non-Error values. Replace the unknown+cast in isDuplicateKeyError with a hasErrorCode type predicate so the duplicate-key check reads error.code without an assertion. Preserve real math/isEnabled in the MCPConnectionFactory test mock (mock only processMCPEnv) so mcpConfig timeouts no longer resolve to NaN, fixing the TimeoutNaNWarning that masked slow OAuth retry behavior. * 🧪 fix: Restore the Flight Uniqueness Index and Buffer the Graph Cache TTL Two CI failures on the merge, both in suites this environment cannot run (their MongoDB binary download is blocked). `GraphApiService.spec.js` still asserted the unbuffered TTL. Graph tokens route through the same `getTokenCacheTtlMs` as the OBO and openidStrategy caches, so the entry now expires 30s before the credential does. `openidRefreshFlight.spec.ts` dropped the database between tests, which takes the indexes with it, and Mongoose builds them only once when the model is compiled. Whether the unique `key` index survived into a test was a race with that one-time build. Without it a second `create` inserts instead of raising a duplicate-key error, so every worker believes it won the flight — the mutual exclusion the file exists to prove. Indexes are now rebuilt after each drop, which also makes the reclaim and complete cases reach those paths for the right reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * fix: address OBO review findings * 🔐 fix: Install Bridge Indexes and Carry OBO Through Assistant Recovery Two findings from the Codex pass on |
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10981b8637
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🍱 feat: Guide Compaction With a Bounded Semantic Index (#15340)
* 🧭 feat: guide compaction with semantic context * 🛡️ fix: fail closed on semantic intent collisions |