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73 commits
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0d8c4c191a
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🧵 feat: Run Background Shell Commands Without Holding Their Worktree (#18247) | ||
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06c58c5fc1
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🚪 fix: Refuse Interactive MCP Sign-in on Remote Agent API Runs (#18058)
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* 🚪 fix: Refuse Interactive MCP Sign-in on Remote Agent API Runs A run started through the remote agent API (API key or OIDC bearer) has no signed-in browser reading its response. When one of the agent's MCP servers needed OAuth, the run still published LibreChat's sign-in prompt into the OpenAI-compatible response and waited up to two minutes for a sign-in the caller could not complete. The remote auth middleware now marks the response it admits. The prompt emitters refuse to write to a marked response, and tool loading skips the turn-start wait when no reader exists. Background Responses keep their prompts: those go to the generation stream the owner follows in LibreChat. * 🧭 refactor: Pass the Unattended Fact Explicitly and Release Unattended Callers From Shared Sign-in Review feedback on the first commit: - The response registry coupled the auth middleware to MCP through module state. The remote controllers now supply `unattended` as an argument (chat completions always; Responses through the runtime's tool context, foreground only) and it is passed through tool loading to the manager and the prompt transports. The registry and the middleware side effect are gone. - A remote run that reached a server while its owner had a sign-in open in a browser joined that recovery and waited for the person. The manager now guards an unattended caller at its two entry points: the first sign-in prompt, from the caller's own flow or from a recovery it waits on, ends that caller's wait with a typed error and leaves a shared recovery running for its other waiters. A recovery announces a sign-in request so waiters that registered no prompt handler are released too. * 🧪 test: Cover Unattended Sign-in Through the Real MCP SDK The shared-sign-in tests replaced the production OAuth handler with a synthetic listener, so they did not exercise the SDK lifecycle whose cancellation and shared-recovery behaviour the change depends on. They now run against the real Streamable HTTP test server, the real connection factory handler and the real flow manager: an unattended tool call alone, alongside the owner's open sign-in, joining a recovery that then stops being silent, recovering through a silent refresh, and opening a connection that needs sign-in. The synthetic-handler versions are removed. |
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8552368176
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🔄 fix: Restore MCP Sign-In Prompts After Reload (#17604)
* 🔄 fix: Restore MCP Sign-In Prompts After Reload
* wip: Separate OAuth Presentation and Publication Lifecycles
* wip: Verify OAuth Publication and Presentation Ownership
* fix: Fence OAuth Publication and Preserve Tool Outcomes
* fix: fence first-turn OAuth recovery by durable identity and retention
* test: Cover Canonical OAuth Recovery Replay in Manager
* fix: Unify Startup OAuth Prompt Lifecycle Ownership
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bcbb8290ec
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🔌 perf: Look Up MCP Server Catalogs Concurrently for Tool Definitions (#17973)
* perf: Look Up MCP Server Catalogs Concurrently for Tool Definitions * test: Cover MCP Sign-In Order for Concurrent Catalog Lookups * docs: Widen the mcpCatalogLookups Comment in the Example Config * test: Cover the Catalog Lookup Bound Passed to the Definitions Loader |
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99fb03cb93
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🚤 fix: Keep Host Tool Loading Independent of Worker Status (#17628)
* 🚤 fix: Keep Host Tool Loading Independent of Worker Status
* fix: Classify Workspace Tools at the Agent Boundary
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Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai>
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65d0ba8563
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🧯 fix: Return Approved Tool and Generation Error Text Instead of Raw Exceptions (#17508)
* fix: Return approved tool and generation error text instead of raw exceptions * fix: Redact generation error text without the data-schemas helper * fix: Redact credentials and emails from shown generation errors * refactor: Move the Wolfram status policy into packages/api * test: Fix the Wolfram probe constructor and jest summary match * test: Match the jest pass count through color codes * fix: Redact credentials a tool input error echoes from its arguments * fix: Drop free-text fields from typed generation errors under a content policy * fix: Keep only the code and numeric fields of typed errors under a content policy |
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8c51a3f9f8
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🙈 feat: Let Config Profiles Hide librechat.yaml MCP Servers and Remove Their Fields (#17327)
* 🙈 feat: Let Config Profiles Hide librechat.yaml MCP Servers and Remove Their Fields Config profiles are the `__base__`, role, group and user documents written through `/api/admin/config`. A profile can tombstone `mcpServers.<name>`, and the merge then removes that server from the principal's resolved `mcpConfig`. * 🛡️ fix: Apply MCP Hiding to Server Instructions, Failed Removals and the Startup Audit - Server instructions bound for the model now leave out librechat.yaml servers hidden from the acting user, including one a model spec pins. `applyContextToAgent` passes the request user through `formatInstructionsForContext`, which drops the user's hidden set from the user-less catalog it reads. - A config-tier candidate that removes a librechat.yaml value (a field, or a key of a record such as `headers`) and fails inspection now stands as a failed config-source entry instead of falling back to the librechat.yaml base that still carries the removed value. A failed change that removes nothing still falls back, and an entry with no transport (fields written over a hidden server) keeps the documented librechat.yaml fallback. - The startup tombstone report reads every tenant's profiles in the system tenant scope, so it also runs from entry points without an outer system scope under strict tenant isolation, and names each profile's tenant. * 🗂️ fix: Project the Startup MCP Tombstone Report Query and Run It Alongside Connections * 🔑 fix: Keep Removed OAuth Headers Out of the MCP OAuth Callback * 📝 docs: Note That Removed OAuth Headers Stay Out of MCP Sign-In * 🔐 fix: Recheck the MCP OAuth Flow's Server Before Initiation Redirects OAuth initiation redirected to a flow's stored authorization URL, or started a new authorization from the flow's stored server URL, without resolving the server again, so a principal whose profile hid the server after the flow was created could still be sent to its authorization endpoint. The callback's active-server check and its OAuth header fallback lived in the CJS route. resolveMCPOAuthTarget (packages/api/src/mcp/oauth/target.ts) now owns both: it resolves the server in the principal's current config with a strict read, refuses a flow admitted for another server, a server the principal can no longer use, or a redefined one, and selects the headers the flow sends (the initiation snapshot, else the principal's config). Initiation calls it before either redirect (404 or 400); the callback calls it before the exchange and from the token-store fence. * 📝 docs: Note That a Hidden MCP Server Ends OAuth Sign-Ins Already Started * 🚩 feat: Publish the yamlMcpHide Admin Config Meta Flag Profiles can hide librechat.yaml MCP servers and a hidden server is an access boundary, so GET /api/admin/config/meta now reports features.yamlMcpHide for the admin panel to gate its hide UI on. The meta.spec probe checks the behaviour itself: the admin API stores an mcpServers.<name> tombstone, the merged config drops the server, the registry withholds it from principal lookups and checkout but not from app-level lookups, process-backed servers stay, and an unreadable principal config withholds every hideable server. * 🧪 test: Align MCP Tombstone Specs With the Portable Config Store The admin config handlers now write whole documents through writeConfigDocument, so the end-to-end tombstone spec wires it in place of the removed upsertConfig/patchConfigFields deps. A reset of a whole MCP record now also prunes the parents it leaves empty. |
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f7b053789e
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🔐 feat: Defer MCP OAuth Sign-In Until a Deferred Tool Is Used (#17225)
* feat: Defer MCP OAuth Sign-In Until a Deferred Tool Is Used Adds an oauthPrompt server option (on_start by default, or on_use) and an operator-declared oauthToolCatalog. With on_use, an operator-configured OAuth server whose selected agent tools are all deferred no longer prompts at turn start: tool search offers the declared catalog (or the user's own cached catalog), and sign-in happens on the first tool call through the existing in-run OAuth step. Without a declared catalog the turn-start prompt is kept. Both fields are operator-only. Related to #16765 * test: Cover MCP OAuth Sign-In on First Deferred Tool Use * fix: Bound the Declared OAuth Tool Schema to Non-Recursive Types * refactor: Move MCP OAuth Deferral Orchestration Into packages/api * refactor: Move the Cached-Catalog OAuth Prompt Branch Into packages/api * fix: Defer MCP OAuth Only When the Offered Catalog Covers the Selection * fix: Cover Runtime OAuth, Background Tools, and Tokenless Discovery in Deferral * fix: Match Legacy Keys, Honor Background Capability, and Reject Unsupported Schema Keywords * fix: Resolve Wildcard Background Opt-In and Tighten Declared Catalog Matching * fix: Validate Declared Tool Schema Types and Enums * fix: Accept Canonical Catalog Keys the Definitions Loader Accepts * test: Pin the Declared Catalog Requirement for Cached User Catalogs * fix: Resolve Deferred Tool Options Across MCP Spelling Aliases |
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1692814a30
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🔌 feat: Enable Pull Requests by Default With a Token Fallback (#16876) | ||
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caeb786e97
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🔀 feat: Show the Conversation Pull Request in the Sidebar List (#16815)
* feat: Show the Conversation Pull Request in the Sidebar List Add a batch lookup route and a sidebar row mark: the state icon with the CI dot, opening the same card beside the row on hover. The row keeps the conversation's own title. * fix: Address Review Findings on the Sidebar Pull Request Batch and Row Mark Cap the whole batch with a configurable deadline, make the row mark a keyboard-reachable button that opens the card on focus, refresh rows when the window regains focus through the shared batch, and show a retryable failure state instead of treating a failed first lookup as no pull request. * fix: Send Sidebar Pull Request Batches One at a Time Queue every batch request behind the one before it, so an oversized list or an overlapping flush cannot multiply the server's configured lookup concurrency, and bound how long one request may hold the queue so a request that never answers cannot stop the rest. * fix: Keep the Batch Request Timeout Above the Server Deadline Default the client's request timeout to just past the longest batchTimeoutSeconds a deployment may configure, so a queued request never starts while the previous request's server-side lookups are still running. * fix: Keep Batch Lookups Inside the Concurrency Limit and Per-Entry Failures Per Entry Share one lookup limiter across every batch request so lookups that outlive a request's deadline keep their slot, answer a missing token only for the conversations that needed it, and point the row at its pull request description only while that text is in the page. * fix: Bound Batch Reads, Scope Concurrency Per Credential, and Gate the Sidebar on the Batch Version Start the batch deadline when the request arrives and bound the config and lane reads, count lookup slots per credential, advertise a batch route version and ask only a server that has it, take no row space for an absent mark, show a failed refresh over a cached empty answer, keep a malformed response from stalling the request queue, and repair the lane recording tests that still used a mock removed on dev. * fix: Move Capability Resolution Into the Package and Harden the Batch Route and Queue Resolve the pull request startup capabilities in packages/api so the route stays wiring only, bound the config and lane reads by the configured deadline, merge identical lanes before taking limiter slots, fall back to the single route when a replica has no batch route, and dispose the batch queue when the signed-in user changes. * fix: Abort the Batch Fallback With Its Request So the Queue Never Overlaps It Give the batch fetcher the request's abort signal and pass it to every single-route call, abort a request that times out or is disposed, and stop the fallback workers from starting more calls once it has. * fix: Forward the Abort Signal to the Batch POST Pass the request's abort signal through the batch fetcher, the data-provider call and Axios, so a batch request that times out or is disposed is cancelled instead of continuing beside the next one, and settle a request promptly when it is aborted. * fix: Close the Pull Request Lookup Follow-Ups and Cancel Abandoned Sidebar Rows |
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225aa91d0a
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🩹 fix: Stub the Attached Route in the Lane Recording Specs (#16840) | ||
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6b5cf0a231
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🏝️ fix: Apply the No-Workspace Decision Wherever an Agent's Code Route Resolves (#16798)
* 🏝️ fix: Apply the No-Workspace Decision Wherever an Agent's Code Route Resolves
A conversation set to run without attached workspaces failed mid-turn with
"Choose an attached workspace before using this agent." when its agent's
default machine was attached and the turn loaded a skill or another tool at
execution time. Request-start initialization honoured the decision, but the
execution-time tool loader re-resolved the agent's attached default and then
demanded a workspace selection the conversation intentionally never made.
The per-agent code rule now lives in one typed function,
resolveAgentCodeExecution (packages/api/src/code/agent.ts): it applies the
conversation's no-workspace opt-out, the run-code grant, the stateful
capability and the stateful environment policy, then resolves the base route.
Request-start initialization, lazy subagent metadata and graph members, the
execution-time and definition tool loaders, and the legacy execute_code
loader all go through it, so an opted-out agent lands on the managed default
route with no code tools at every site. Per-call subagent machine choices
offer and accept no attached machine in such a conversation, and a source
invariant test keeps new resolver call sites on the shared rule.
* fix: Pass the Implicit Stateful Route Rollout Into the Shared Code Rule
The per-agent code rule read the implicit stateful route rollout from the environment itself. It now takes it as a parameter, and the request boundaries (initializeAgent and withRequestCodeInputs) resolve it from the deployment configuration, so the rule stays a pure function of its inputs.
* fix: Carry the Initializer's Code Opt-Out Into Tool Definition Loading
initializeAgent hands the tool loaders a partial agent record (id, tools, provider, model) together with the code route it already resolved. Without the agent's route fields the definition loaders could not see a no-workspace opt-out and recomputed code execution as enabled, so tool classification could advertise the programmatic bash tool that execution then refuses. initializeAgent now passes attachedEnvironmentOptOut through every tool loader, and the shared rule keeps an opt-out its caller already decided.
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ae44437e16
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🗂️ feat: Record Lane Git State and Serve Conversation Pull Requests (#16793)
* feat: Record Lane Git State and Serve Conversation Pull Requests A conversation now stores the branch, head and repository its code lane last reported, written only by the server after a finished bash command and excluded from ordinary reads, generic saves, unset fields and imports. GET /api/convos/:conversationId/pull-request finds the pull request for that branch through an injected GitHub source with a bounded cache, answers null for an absence, and maps failures to stable codes without upstream text. The feature is off unless endpoints.agents.pullRequests is enabled with a token reference. * fix: Address Review Findings on Pull Request Lookup and Lane Writes Scope the lookup cache, shared in-flight request and rate limit cooldown to the credential, so one tenant's token never serves another. Ask for open pull requests on their own before falling back to the newest closed one, read every page of check runs up to a bound and never report an incomplete rollup as passing, order lane writes per conversation so an older write cannot land last, and name both required token permissions in the example config. * fix: Address Second Round Review Findings on Pull Request Lookup Clear the stored lane when the conversation moves to another workspace or leaves attached execution, so the previous workspace's pull request is never served. Fence the lane write on the time it was reported, so an older report from another replica cannot replace a newer one. Honor GitHub's reset window up to an hour instead of ten minutes, and expose the request timeout, whole lookup timeout and check run page limit as endpoints.agents.pullRequests settings with the previous values as defaults. * fix: Authorize Pull Request Repositories and Fence Lane Writes Require an administrator allowlist of repositories before the server token is used, since a worker reports its own repository. Match a pull request to the commit the conversation last ran at, so a reused branch name does not return another pull request. Fence the lane write on the workspace the command ran in, so a write queued before a move cannot bring the old lane back, and record a subagent thread's lane on the visible root conversation. Key the lookup cache and shared request by the recorded commit and the lookup policy, and document the worker flag in the example config. * fix: Order Lane Reports by a Database Sequence and Tighten Head Matching Replace wall clock ordering of lane reports with a per conversation counter reserved in the database when the command settles, so replica clock skew cannot reject a newer report. Treat a pull request whose head is behind the recorded commit as no match, and expose the candidate and comparison bounds of the history search as settings. Read the app config and the owner scoped lane together, inject the HTTP transport from the route instead of falling back to a global, skip a report identical to the last one written, and name the Contents permission that commit comparison needs. * fix: Queue Lane Reports by the Visible Conversation and Read Checks for the Current Head Order lane report reservations by the conversation the write lands on, so two subagent threads of one conversation share a chain, and write every report instead of skipping a repeat, since another recorder may have changed the lane in between. Read a pull request's detail before its check runs and use the head it reports, so line counts, mergeability and checks describe one commit. Treat an expired temporary chat as gone when reserving, writing and reading the lane, and make the shared cache capacity a setting. * fix: Fence Lane Reports by Attachment Epoch and Place Recorders Before Reporting Strip dotted descendants of lane fields from saves and imports, partition the pull request cache per credential, resolve the lane write target when the tool is created, and fence reports with a codeAttachmentEpoch that advances only on an owner move or detach. * fix: Fence Subagent Lane Reports by the Root Epoch and Cover Forks and Moved Heads Read the visible root's attachment epoch for a subagent report, gate lane recording on pullRequests.enabled, make the credential partition bound a config field, revalidate the detail head against the recorded commit, and find fork pull requests through the recorded commit. * fix: Keep the Credential Cache Bound Deployment Wide and Budget Head Revalidation Apply the largest configured credential bound to the shared cache, count cache hits as use, spend the comparison budget on a moved head, and fix the data-provider config default test. * fix: Cool Down Headerless Secondary Rate Limits A 403 whose message names a secondary rate limit now starts the credential cooldown for at least a minute instead of being cached as a ten second failure. |
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114394c6a0
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🦉 feat: Compare Review Commit Ancestry Without Git (#16734)
* 🦉 feat: Compare Review Commit Ancestry Without Git * test: Cover Attached Reviewer Compare Registration * 🦉 feat: Compare Review Commit Ancestry Without Git * test: Cover Attached Reviewer Compare Registration * 🦉 feat: Use SDK GitHub Comparison With Host Eligibility Gates * test: Await the Comparison Timeout Assertion --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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af35fe5439
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🪚 chore: Deprecate Agent Chain Authoring (#16745)
* feat: consolidate orchestration into a native tool * test: complete persisted subagent graph fixture * fix: keep orchestration pickers inside the modal focus scope * chore: deprecate agent chain authoring * fix: preserve runtime-equivalent legacy handoff classification * test: stabilize orchestration dialog lifecycle coverage * test: wait for stream completion before final title polling --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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0e3c9088f6
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🫰 feat: Configure Tool Approval Modes Per Agent (#16707)
* 🫰 feat: Configure Tool Approval Modes Per Agent
* fix: Fence Remembered Tool Approval Authority
* fix: Unify Tool Approval Execution Invariants
* fix: Revalidate Learned Approval at MCP Invocation
* fix: Preserve One-Time MCP Review at Invocation
* fix: Execute Reviewed Calls on Templated MCP Connections
* fix: Scope Approval Witnesses to Executing Agents
* fix: Retain Approval Bindings for Hook-Rewritten Inputs
* fix: Pin Review Authority and Retire Settled Tool Calls
* fix: Fingerprint Effective MCP Request Headers
* fix: Preserve Routing Around Renewable MCP Token Fragments
* fix: Bind Tool Consent to OAuth Credential Generations
* test: Keep Mobile Approval Save Outside Drawer Escape Race
* fix: Fence OAuth Consent at MCP Transport Retries
* fix: Let Shared Agent Viewers Reset Personal Consent
* fix: Preserve Renewed Consent Across Reset Races
* fix: Resolve Verified Aliases for Personal Tool Reset
* fix: Fence Renewed OAuth Consent and Credential Review
* fix: Require Foreground Execution for Review-Only MCP Calls
* fix: Pin Invocation Ownership and Stable MCP Consent
* fix: Fence Superseded Tool Consent Completion Writes
* fix: Scope Consent Epochs to Effective MCP Authentication
* fix: Scope Approval Admission to Reachable Agent Tools
* fix: Preserve Approval Epochs for Runtime-Detected OAuth
* fix: Address Tool Approval Review Findings
* fix: Preserve Captured Consent When Tool Approval Is Inherited
* fix: Preserve Approval Admission Through Lazy Metadata
* fix: Fence Programmatic Reviews and Unresolved Lazy Approval Keys
* fix: Account for Normalized and Skill-Contributed Lazy Tools
* fix: Scope Lazy Approval to Selected Tool Spellings and Servers
* fix: Honor Disabled MCP Capability During Lazy Approval Admission
* test: Preserve Approval Merge Regressions After Rebase
* fix: Preserve One-Time Review During Non-OAuth Grant Outages
* fix: Retain One-Time Consent Across Resume Recovery
* fix: Preserve Reviewed Consent Through Transport Outages
* fix: Preserve Case-Variant Lazy Approval Hook Admission
---------
Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai>
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5674faaa01
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🪀 fix: Separate Workspace Admission and Transport Budgets (#16728)
* fix: Separate workspace admission and transport budgets * fix: Validate workspace run reserves and retry test types --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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76fcf0a6eb
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📝 docs: Describe Attached-Workspace Lanes, Sandbox Scratch, and Skill Files in Tool Descriptions (#16702)
* 📝 docs: Describe Attached-Workspace Lanes, Sandbox Scratch, and Skill Files in Tool Descriptions - Lane-mode `cwd` now states that any call outside `.worktrees/<name>` (with or without cwd, and file tools on such paths) is checkout-wide: it waits for running worktree calls and blocks new ones until it finishes, so checkout-wide calls are reserved for creating, pruning or removing worktrees. - `command`/`cwd` state that the command starts in cwd, so the model does not also cd into it; the lane-mode cd hint says the call ran checkout-wide. - Workers advertising the native SRT sandbox profile (`anthropic-srt`, `anthropic-srt:<preset>`) get a bash bullet that / and /tmp are read-only and scratch files belong in $TMPDIR or the workspace. Carried as `codeWorkspace.nativeSandbox` into tool definitions and the bash tool. - The attached skill-aware `read_file` description says skill files are not on the attached machine and must be written into the workspace to run there. - Tightened the attached bash description so the native variant stays within the 1024-character tool description limit. * 📝 fix: Keep the Skill-Copy Warning on the Command-Only Workspace's Skill read_file A workspace that offers execute_command but not read_file falls back to the skill-only read_file definition. It now carries the same sentence as the attached skill-aware definition, so the model knows bash_tool cannot reach skill files by path there. * 📝 fix: Name bash_tool in the Skill-File Warning Only When It Is Registered The skill-copy sentence on attached read_file definitions now depends on the attached bash_tool being registered beside it (includeBash and an advertised execute_command), for the attached skill-aware definition, its custom line-limit variant, and the skill-only fallback. Workspaces without commands keep the plain skill description. |
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59b772f132
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🥽 feat: Configure Attached Defaults and Honor Skill Read Ranges (#16540)
* feat: configure attached command and read defaults * fix: separate programmatic timeout defaults from ceilings * fix: retain attached programmatic schema instructions * fix: honor explicit skill and sandbox read ranges * fix: remove duplicate command imports after rebase * fix: retrieve complete sandbox text before paging --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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7b27e7941e |
🧩 feat: MCP Apps support (#13831)
* feat: add MCP Apps support
* fix: preserve MCP App results and enforce sandbox policy
* fix: bind persisted MCP Apps to their server configuration
* fix: complete MCP Apps runtime integration
* fix: type the optional MCP App binding codec explicitly
* test: provide MCP Apps policy in bridge mocks
* fix: pass admitted App policy to the tool call owner
* fix: align MCP Apps CI contracts
* test: preserve MCP abort reasons in recovery mocks
* fix: preserve MCP compatibility across policy profiles
* test: use profiled MCP catalog generations
* test: expect the standard MCP session profile
* fix: remove the unused MCP abort import
* test: expect profiled MCP fixture arguments
* test: seed profiled MCP manager fixtures
* Fix request-header bearer resolution after canary merge
* Preserve MCP App views across canary message updates
* Document message-owned MCP App placement
* ci: Recheck MCP Apps Against Canary Base
---------
Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai>
(cherry picked from commit
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63363a7776
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⏱️ fix: Fit Workspace Command Timeouts Inside the Configured Request Budget (#16464)
* ⏱️ fix: Fit Workspace Command Timeouts Inside the Configured Request Budget * ⏱️ fix: Make Workspace Command Admission Reserve Configurable * 🧪 test: Match Steering E2E Labels on Dev * ⏱️ fix: Reject Impossible Workspace Command Admission Reserves * 🧪 test: Match Failed Call Count in Dev E2E * ⏱️ fix: Bound Workspace Admission Headroom and Document Its Budget * ⏱️ fix: Validate Default Workspace Command Admission Reserve --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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f624ad0876
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🔁 fix: Retry Code API Rate Limits That Reject Before a Workspace Call Starts (#16453)
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* 🔁 fix: Retry Code API Rate Limits That Reject Before a Workspace Call Starts * 🔁 fix: Bound Workspace Rate Limit Retries by Code API Budget * 🔗 fix: Isolate Code API Retry Default from Utility Graph * 🧩 fix: Type the Shared Code API Retry Default * 🔁 fix: Keep Workspace Admission Retry Budgets Independent --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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6658e3b314
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📴 fix: Surface Missing Scheduled OBO Authorization (#16416)
* 📴 fix: Surface Missing Scheduled OBO Authorization * 🛟 fix: Preserve Scheduled OBO Failures Across Clients and Resumes * 🧊 fix: Skip Scheduling Setup for Unrelated MCP Errors * 🧭 fix: Keep Scheduled MCP Auth Evidence Through Recovery * 🎨 style: Format Scheduled MCP Receipt Checks --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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f15c8a0f1b
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🗂️ fix: Stop Telling Attached Workspaces That Uploads Are at /mnt/data (#16389) | ||
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c0affede00
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🎟️ fix: Preserve BYOM Tool Calls Through Capacity Windows (#16060)
* ⏳ fix: Keep BYOM tools queued across capacity windows * ⏳ fix: Configure the admission budget and refresh queued credentials Addresses the Codex review on #16060: - Add `limits.maxQueueWaitMs` to the code environment config schema so a deployment can shorten or disable the five-minute admission budget from `librechat.yaml`; omission keeps the merged behavior, `0` surfaces the first capacity expiry to the model. Resolved through `resolveAttachedWorkspaceQueueWaitMs` and passed by ToolService, matching how `maxCommandTimeoutMs` already flows. - Accept an auth-header supplier in `executeWorkspaceTool` and mint it per admission attempt, so a call queued past the Code API token TTL presents fresh credentials instead of failing permanently with 401. The attached Bash tool and the workspace file operations now pass suppliers. - Recheck the deadline after a clamped wait and throw the saved rejection rather than opening an admission window that could still be admitted once the budget is spent. * fix: Complete workspace admission wiring and caller regressions * fix: Share protected edit retry budgets and schema limits --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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4d08bcf203
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⛓️ fix: Bind Programmatic Bash to Selected Workspaces (#15992)
* fix: Enable programmatic Bash in selected attached workspaces * Centralize project PTC construction and preserve recognized capabilities * Prevent stale list refreshes from restoring removed pins |
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345cf8877f
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🍵 fix: Support Renewable MCP Credentials for Schedules (#15908)
* fix(schedules): forward renewable MCP credentials * fix(schedules): require unattended MCP credentials * fix(schedules): resolve MCP credentials during execution * refactor(schedules): inject unattended credentials * fix(schedules): scope renewable credential resolution * fix: isolate lazy scheduled OBO credentials across MCP lifecycle * fix: preserve MCP cancellation and retryable credential lookup * fix: bind MCP cancellation to the owning run signal * test: supply flow manager in OBO cancellation regression * fix: preserve MCP cancellation across exchange and API ingress * style: sort MCP manager imports * fix: propagate cancellation through agent discovery * test: preserve agent discovery edge literals * fix: propagate agent initialization cancellation * fix: expose initialization signal in OpenAI adapter |
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74fa60cee1
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🔎 fix: Enforce WEB_SEARCH Role Permission on Agents (#15875)
* 🔎 fix: Enforce WEB_SEARCH Role Permission on Agents Squash of #15822 onto dev, preserving authorship: - 🔎 fix: Enforce WEB_SEARCH Role Permission on Agents - 🧪 test: Cover the Runtime Tool Loader's Web Search Gate - 🔒 fix: Gate Web Search on the OpenAI-Compatible Embedder Surface - 🩹 fix: Authorize Web Search by the Execution Context's User - 📝 docs: Note the Grant Memo's One-Subject-Per-Request Assumption - 🧹 fix: Deny Web Search Before an Endpoint Default Can Grant It - 🙈 fix: Withhold the Web Search Model Parameter From a Denied Role - 🧱 fix: Strip Provider-Native Search an Endpoint Re-Enables After Denial - 🔌 fix: Close the OpenRouter Plugin Path and Stop Pruning Hidden Parameters * 🧭 fix: Gate Provider-Native Web Search on the Built Config The web search role gate ran before the provider builder and only when the agent's stored `web_search` was not `false`, so an endpoint's `addParams` re-enabled native search for a denied role, and every OpenAI-compatible and Responses request read the role whether or not search was in play. The gate now reads the builder's output: when it carries a native search tool or OpenRouter's `web` plugin, the `WEB_SEARCH` grant is resolved and the search stripped on denial. The routes that reach `initializeAgent` with `runtime` and no `req` pass a lazy `resolveWebSearchGrant` that joins their request-memoized grants, forwarded through agent discovery to handoffs and subagents. The embedder surface wires it whenever `getRoleByName` is supplied, independent of `appConfig`. --------- Co-authored-by: TomasPalsson <tomas2212042710@gmail.com> |
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9f311b810d
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🪔 feat: Expose Bounded Attached Bash Timeouts (#15776)
* 🕰️ feat: Add BYOM Bash Execution Timeouts * 🔧 fix: Type Bash Timeout Bounds * 🔒 fix: Bound BYOM Bash timeouts by policy * 🧪 test: Propagate BYOM timeout policy fixture |
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a8087ce454
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🏕️ feat: Select Attached Code Workspaces (#15768)
* feat: Select Attached Code Workspaces * fix: Preserve Workspace Boundaries Across Agent Graphs * fix: Validate Lazy Agent Workspace Bindings Before Persistence * fix: Include Handoff Environments in Workspace Selection * fix: Close Workspace Admission and Remote Ingress Gaps * fix: Preserve Workspace Selection In Chat Runtime Envelopes * fix: Authorize Deployment Workspace Status And Match Readiness * fix: Preserve Ephemeral Chats And Pin Runtime Worker Identity * test: Complete Deployment Pairing Fixtures |
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968950a4bd
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🪫 fix: Gate Programmatic Bash on Stateful Worker Capabilities (#15726)
* fix: Gate Programmatic Bash by Worker Capabilities 🧩
* fix: Resolve Capability Credentials From Deployment Config
* fix: Require Bash Runtime for Programmatic Tool Calling
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a3fc3b9dbf
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🚧 fix: Gate File Search and Run Code by Role (#15691)
* fix: enforce FILE_SEARCH role permission server-side
The FILE_SEARCH role permission is stored, served by GET /api/roles/:name and
settable through the admin API, but nothing ever checks it.
PermissionTypes.FILE_SEARCH occurs zero times under api/server; the three
occurrences in @librechat/api are all in the interface-to-role sync, which
writes the permission rather than checking it.
Measured on v0.8.8-rc1 and confirmed unchanged in rc2: a user whose role has
FILE_SEARCH.USE = false can still upload a document with
tool_resource=file_search and gets 200 with "embedded": true. The same user
calling execute_code correctly gets 403.
Two gates, both mirroring toolAccessPermType in ~/server/controllers/tools.js:
* Upload (api/server/routes/files/files.js): a tool-resource-to-permission map
checked before any branching, so it also covers the assistants path. Returns
403 with the same log line as the RUN_CODE gate. execute_code is included
because it had the same hole: the tool CALL was gated, the upload was not.
* Tool loading (api/app/clients/tools/util/handleTools.js): checked outside the
lazy loader so a denied user never gets the tool equipped, rather than one
that fails when called. Fails closed if the permission check itself throws.
All four required imports were already present in that file, next to an
existing FILE_CITATIONS check.
Both changes live in /api (JavaScript) rather than /packages/api (TypeScript)
as CLAUDE.md prefers for new backend code: each mirrors an existing pattern in
exactly these files, and a second permission gate in another language and
package would be harder to keep in step with the first.
Tests: api/app/clients/tools/util/handleTools.fileSearchPermission.test.js
covers permit, deny, the log line, and the fail-closed path.
* fixup! fix: enforce FILE_SEARCH role permission server-side
* 🔐 fix: Gate `file_search` and `execute_code` on Role Permissions
The `FILE_SEARCH` gate added in the previous commit lives in
`handleTools.loadTools`, which `loadAgentTools` only reaches when
`definitionsOnly` is false. That default is false on the chat path
(`Endpoints/agents/initialize.js`) but true on the responses and
OpenAI-compatible controllers, so on those paths a denied user still got
the tool definition advertised to the model and their files primed by
`primeSearchFiles`, and the call failed later in `loadToolsForExecution` —
the "gets one that fails when called" outcome the gate set out to avoid.
Move the decision to the capability filters that both loaders already run,
mirroring how `canUseMCP` resolves the `MCP_SERVERS` permission ahead of the
synchronous filter. `AgentCapabilities` stays the instance-wide deployment
switch; the role grant is a second condition a tool has to clear. Because
`hasFileSearch`/`hasExecuteCode` derive from the filtered list, priming is
skipped for a denied user too.
`RUN_CODE` had the same hole: `toolAccessPermType` in
`~/server/controllers/tools.js` gates only `POST /tools/:toolId/call`, not
the agent run, so a role without `RUN_CODE.USE` could still execute code
through an agent. Both tools go through the same map.
Checks use `checkAccessWithRequestCache` and run only for tools whose
capability is already enabled, so a run costs at most one role read. A check
that throws denies the tool.
Also formats the test file added in the previous commit, which Prettier
rejects as-is.
* 🔐 fix: Close the Remaining `RUN_CODE` and `FILE_SEARCH` Bypasses
Codex review of the previous commit found four ways past the gates. All four
share a cause: the permission map was copied per call site, so every boundary
that was not copied into stayed open.
Moves the maps and the check into `packages/api/src/tools/rolePermissions.ts`,
per CLAUDE.md ("all new backend code must be TypeScript in `/packages/api`",
"keep `/api` changes to the absolute minimum"), and points the four `/api`
boundaries at it.
- `handleTools.loadTools` now gates every tool in `toolRolePermissions`, not
just `file_search`. It is the shared boundary the Assistants required-action
flow crosses via `processRequiredActions`, which never passes the agent
capability filter — so a legacy Assistant with a raw function named
`execute_code` ran arbitrary code for a role denied `RUN_CODE`.
- The check is now request-cached (`checkAccessWithRequestCache`). The previous
`checkAccess` call omitted `req`, so the agent path resolved the same grant
twice and issued a second serial `getRoleByName` during chat startup, against
the rule in AGENTS.md.
- `codeExecutionEnabled` is gated by the role result at all three loaders, not
only the `execute_code` entry in the filtered list. It drives tool
classification and the programmatic bash tool, so an agent pairing
`execute_code` with an MCP `code_execution` tool still advertised and
instantiated `run_tools_with_bash` for a denied role.
- The upload map covers `EToolResources.code_interpreter`, which the Assistants
builder posts instead of `execute_code`, and native `code_interpreter` /
`file_search` tools are dropped when an assistant is created or updated.
Those run inside the provider and reach neither loader, so configuration time
is the only place they can be gated.
Renames `handleTools.fileSearchPermission.test.js` to
`handleTools.rolePermissions.test.js` — it now covers both tools.
* 🔐 fix: Gate the Image Upload Route and the v1 Assistant Writers
Second Codex round found the same shape again: boundaries the map had not been
wired into. Adds two shared helpers next to the maps in
`packages/api/src/tools/rolePermissions.ts` so a new upload handler or assistant
writer gets the check by calling one function.
- `/files/images` accepts `tool_resource` and routes agent uploads to
`processAgentFileUpload` on its own. The Code Files UI sends images there, so
every image was a way around the upload boundary for a role denied
`RUN_CODE`. Both upload routes now call
`checkToolResourceUploadPermission`.
- That helper passes `req`, so the role read joins the request cache. The
previous `checkAccess` call omitted it, and an allowed Assistants upload goes
on to `processFileUpload` → `addResourceFileId` → `updateAssistant`, whose own
check does pass `req` — two serial lookups per upload, against AGENTS.md.
- `/assistants/v1` is still mounted and its `createAssistant` / `patchAssistant`
write native tools straight to the provider. Both now filter through
`resolveAssistantToolPermissions`, which v2 also uses in place of its local
copy.
Run-time enforcement for native assistant tools is deliberately not here: it
means overriding `body.tools` at `createRun` in both chat controllers, which
changes run semantics, and is better argued on its own.
* 🔐 fix: Gate Legacy `retrieval` and the Code-Environment File Tools
Third Codex round, same shape twice more.
- The v1 assistant builder submits `{ type: 'retrieval' }` where v2 submits
`file_search` (`AssistantPanel.tsx:203`). Only the v2 spelling was mapped, so
`resolveAssistantToolPermissions` treated legacy retrieval as ungated and both
v1 writers preserved it for a role denied `FILE_SEARCH`. Both spellings now
answer to the same grant.
- `codeEnvAvailable` in the agent initializer was capability-only, and
`initializeAgent` rebuilds `bash_tool`, `read_file` and the workspace file
tools from it — after the tool loader has already dropped `execute_code` for a
denied role. The bash gate stops command execution, but those handlers still
read, search, create and edit files in an attached code environment. The flag
now carries the role grant, and short-circuits before the role read when the
deployment has the capability off.
* 🔐 fix: Resolve Tool Grants Once Per Request and Pair Every Capability Gate
Four review rounds found thirteen issues, all one class: a boundary the
permission check had not been copied into. Rounds 2 and 3 each found gaps
created by the previous round's fix, and a manual sweep of tool constructors
and upload routes still missed the `codeEnvAvailable` family entirely — because
the thing worth enumerating is not "paths that reach a tool" but "reads of the
capability".
There are 28 such reads. This replaces per-site permission checks with one
resolution per request, pairs every read that is a gate, and pins the list so a
new one cannot be added silently.
- `resolveToolRoleGrants` resolves `RUN_CODE` and `FILE_SEARCH` together and
memoizes on the request. Both perf findings disappear by construction: gates
share one role read instead of each issuing its own.
- Newly paired gates: `codeEnvAvailable` in the OpenAI-compatible, Responses and
memory-agent initializers (`initializeAgent` rebuilds `bash_tool`, `read_file`
and the workspace file tools from it, and hands their handlers the code
environment); the capability checks in agent upload processing and in
agent-management upload purposes; and the library chat-completion service,
behind an optional `getRoleByName` dependency so embedders are not broken.
- The v1 Knowledge upload posts `assistant_id` with no `tool_resource`, so there
is no resource to authorize. It now reads the assistant's own native tools and
requires their grants, instead of treating a missing resource as unrestricted.
- The startup role read moved off the critical path into the existing
`Promise.all`, and the direct tool-call check passes `req` so the shared
loader gate reuses its result rather than repeating the lookup.
- `toolCapabilityGates.spec.js` pins every file that reads either capability
with a count and a reason. A new read fails the suite until it is classified,
so the next boundary announces itself instead of waiting for a reviewer.
* 🔐 fix: Abort Assistant Writes on Role-Lookup Failure, Authorize Legacy Uploads First
Round 5 found no missed boundary — the inventory held. All three findings are
about how the gates behave.
- Failing closed is right where a denial blocks the operation, and wrong where a
denial instead filters a payload the caller persists. A transient role-store
outage during an assistant create or patch was silently stripping
`code_interpreter` / `file_search` / `retrieval` and saving the result, turning
a momentary failure into permanent config loss. `checkToolRolePermission`
gains `throwOnError`, and `resolveAssistantToolPermissions` uses it: every one
of its callers either persists the filtered list or rejects the request, so a
lookup failure has to propagate.
- The legacy-assistant upload gate ran after `sanitizedUploadFn` had already
pushed the file to the provider, so a denied role left an untracked remote file
and got a 500 for what is a 403. Moved to the route, next to the tool-resource
gate, before any bytes are sent.
- `resendFiles` hydration derived its resource set from unfiltered `agent.tools`,
so a denied role still paid the thread walk and code-file reads for a tool
about to be dropped. The `execute_code` half now keys off
`effectiveCodeEnvAvailable`, which already carries the grant.
The `file_search` half of that last one needs the grant threaded into
`initializeAgent`, which is plumbing in the most delicate file here for a latency
win on an already-correct path — deliberately left for a follow-up.
* 🧪 fix: Declare `resolveToolRoleGrants` in the Upload Spec's Module Stub
`Tests: api (shard 2/3)` failed on `
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3f9285355d
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🏠 fix: Route Standalone File Writes to BYOM Workers (#15675) | ||
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aeac7a2065
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🪪 feat: Add Per-Agent Git Identity (#15628)
* feat: Add per-agent Git identity * fix: annotate git identity schema * fix: complete git identity controls * fix: clear git identity on version restore * fix: Require a complete agent Git identity * fix: Complete Git Identity Across Bash And Form Validation * fix: Discard Incomplete Hidden Git Identity Edits * fix: validate Git identity across panel lifecycle * fix: preserve saved Git identity when discarding drafts |
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770238f22b
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🔣 refactor: Replace Mongo Filters With Typed Criteria (#15580)
* ♻️ refactor: Take Typed Criteria, Not Mongo Filters, for Actions and Assistants `createActionMethods` and `createAssistantMethods` accepted `FilterQuery<T>`, putting Mongoose's query language in the package's public surface: every caller wrote raw Mongo, and no engine other than Mongo could satisfy the signatures. Both now take domain criteria — `ActionQuery` and `AssistantQuery` — naming concepts rather than stored fields, with an array meaning "any of these". A per-domain field map translates them, so `FilterQuery` survives only inside the two translators. `buildFilter` throws on a criterion the field map does not cover. Callers in `api/` are JavaScript and get no compile-time checking, and the server sets `strictQuery`, under which a silently dropped criterion widens the filter instead of narrowing it — an unscoped `findOne` returns an arbitrary document rather than none. Failing closed is the only safe default. `AssistantQuery.avatarFilepath` covers the avatar-authorization lookup, which queries a nested path no plain field name reaches. No behaviour change: every migrated call site produces the same filter as before. * 🧪 test: Update Avatar Authorization Assertion to Typed Criteria `validateImages.spec.js` asserted the old `{ 'avatar.filepath': { $in: [...] } }` call shape for `getAssistant`. The earlier sweep matched on `action_id`, `agent_id` and `assistant_id`, none of which appear in a dotted avatar path, so this one assertion was missed. The `getAgent` assertions in the same file keep the filter shape — that method still takes a `FilterQuery`. * 🔒 fix: Reject Unknown Criteria Before Omitting Undefined Ones `buildFilter` skipped a criterion whose value was `undefined` before checking it against the field map, so a JavaScript caller misspelling a key that happened to carry `undefined` — `deleteActions({ agent_id: maybeId })` — produced `{}` and reached `deleteMany` unscoped. That is the exact failure the guard exists to prevent, defeated by the order of the two checks. Validate every key first, then apply the undefined-omission rule. The lookup is an own-property check so inherited names cannot resolve through the field map's prototype: `{ toString: 'x' }` previously found `Function.prototype.toString`, passed the truthiness test, and wrote a garbage filter key instead of throwing. A recognized criterion left `undefined` is still omitted, so optional parameters keep working. * 🔒 fix: Reject Query Fragments as Criteria and Keep the Translator Internal Three review findings on the criteria translator, all of the same shape: the guard was narrower than the surface it protects. Criterion values are now validated as scalars or lists of scalars. `matchAny` copied any non-array through unchanged, so a JavaScript caller could pass `{ agentId: { $ne: null } }` and have the operator land verbatim in the filter — the fail-open case the field map exists to close. `null` is rejected too; it would have matched documents missing the field entirely. `matchAny`, `buildFilter` and `FieldMap` are no longer re-exported from the package barrel. They emit Mongo, and shipping them as public API undercut the point of the change; they were reachable as `require('@librechat/data-schemas') .buildFilter`. `OneOrMany` moves to `types/query` because the domain query types reference it and it names no engine — which also drops the `types` -> `utils` import. `loadActionSets` names `ActionQuery` through `import()` so the JSDoc type actually resolves. |
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fddf7e31f2
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🛻 feat: Route Bash Through Attached Workspaces (#15546)
* feat(code): Route bash through attached workspaces * fix(code): harden attached bash schema adapter |
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e23e13e712
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🌳 feat: List Attached Workspace Trees (#15527)
* feat(code): list attached workspace files * test(code): include workspace list history * fix(code): validate workspace tool scope consistently * fix(code): Harden workspace listings * fix(code): Align workspace list validation * fix(code): Continue complete workspace listings * fix(code): preserve canonical path protections * test(code): keep workspace list specs type-safe |
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9a64e85b1e
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🕯️ feat: Search Text in Attached Workspaces (#15525)
* feat(code): search attached workspaces * fix(code): remove duplicate workspace type import * fix(code): abort attached workspace searches * docs(code): correct workspace abort parameters * test(code): include workspace search history * fix(code): keep workspace search foregrounded * fix(code): preserve attached search routing * fix(code): Bound workspace search output * style(code): Format workspace search output |
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51edb2a660
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🛫 feat: Enable Self-Service Code Worker Pairing (#15367)
* feat: add self-service code worker pairing * fix: enforce code worker principal boundaries * fix: separate pairing control planes from execution * fix: preserve principal worker routing * fix: pin artifact traffic to code workers * fix: authenticate code worker selection * test: mock worker-aware artifact headers * fix: harden self-service code worker routing * fix: fail closed for principal code pairing * style: format code execution headers * fix: close self-service pairing gaps * fix: satisfy code environment type checks |
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fa913148fb
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🔒 fix: Refresh MCP OBO Tokens From the Live OpenID Session (#15334)
* 🧊 fix: Inline-refresh OpenID session tokens at MCP OBO call time Resolves the walk-away failure mode where MCP tool calls using OBO auth fail with "No valid OpenID access token is available for OBO exchange" after a user idles past their access-token lifetime. The strategy-time snapshot on `user.federatedTokens` could expire mid-stream before `resolveOboToken` ran, while `req.session.openidTokens` carried a still- valid (or refreshable) token that nothing read. - New OpenIDSessionRefresh service: per-user single-flighted closure that reads `req.session.openidTokens` at OBO time and inline-refreshes via `openid-client.refreshTokenGrant` when expired (30s skew), persisting via `req.session.save()`. No cookie writes (headers already flushed). - `resolveOboToken` gains a required UpstreamTokenProvider parameter (typed as `() => Promise<OIDCTokens | null>`, reusing the shared shape from @librechat/data-schemas). Compile-time guarantee that every call site is updated. - New `session_refresh_failed` OboTokenResolutionReason distinguishes "session expired and IdP rejected refresh" from "no upstream token ever existed." - `req` threaded through createMCPTool/createMCPTools/createToolInstance to construct the closure with captured request, plus fail-closed guards in MCPConnectionFactory.getOboTokens and MCPManager.callTool when the closure isn't plumbed. - Startup warning in MCPServersInitializer when OBO is configured but OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is unset (the strategy populating user.federatedTokens is only registered under reuse, so OBO would fail every call without it). Tests: 16 new in OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js; obo.spec.ts extended for the new param + error reason; wiring smoke tests in MCPManager, MCPConnectionFactory, MCPServersInitializer, and MCP.spec.js. * 🛡️ fix: Harden OBO inline-refresh against token type and session edge cases - Token-preference asymmetry: live-token reuse and expires_at derivation now strictly gate on the access_token, not the id_token. Added a required `tokenPreference` parameter on isLiveSessionTokenStillValid, buildOIDCTokensFromSession, and createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider so every call site is explicit. Dropped the bogus id_token-exp fallback in performIdpRefresh — id_token TTL is governed by IdP session policy and would mark a short-lived access_token reusable past its real lifetime. - Missing req in /reinitialize route: the manual reconnect endpoint now forwards req into reinitMCPServer, so OBO servers can build a session-aware upstream-token closure instead of failing with missing_upstream_token. - Single-flight key collisions: composed key as tenantId:openidIssuer:openidId:sessionId via getSingleFlightKey. Concurrent calls in the same session still coalesce; separate sessions never share an in-flight refresh, preventing refresh-token rotation from breaking sibling sessions and preventing cross-tenant token crossover when distinct users share an IdP sub. - Opaque access token reuse): persist accessTokenExpiresAt (unix seconds, from tokenset.expires_in) on each refresh AND on initial login / SPA refresh in setOpenIDAuthTokens. New getAccessTokenExp helper falls back to it when the access token isn't a JWT, avoiding redundant inline refreshes for Microsoft Graph and Auth0 default audiences. - Log hygiene: the single-flight key (containing sessionId, openidId, openidIssuer, tenantId) is now SHA-256-hashed in the "Joining in-flight refresh" debug log. Preserves cross-line correlation via a 12-char prefix without leaking credential or PII material. Documented req.session.openidTokens shape contract via JSDoc typedef so the new accessTokenExpiresAt field has a discoverable home alongside the existing accessToken/idToken/refreshToken/expiresAt/lastRefreshedAt. Tests: OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js up to 30 passing (added coverage for opaque-token reuse, JWT-access-token-exp fallback, no-id_token-fallback regression, cross-session no-coalesce, persistence on refresh, and a guard against stale accessTokenExpiresAt carryover). AuthService.spec.js adds two cases covering accessTokenExpiresAt persistence on login. mcp.spec.js (route) gains a regression test asserting req flows into reinitMCPServer. * 🔍 fix: Detect OBO-only MCP admin config overrides Admin Config overlays for YAML-defined MCP servers compare only ADMIN_CONFIGURABLE_FIELDS to decide whether to lazy-init a config-tier override. The OBO config field was added after that fingerprint list, so an override that only added or changed `obo` was treated as unchanged YAML and skipped. Include `obo` in the admin-configurable field list and add a regression test for an OBO-only override. * 🔊 fix: Mock MCP OAuth timeout in SDK integration test MCPConnectionFactory.attemptToConnect reads mcpConfig.OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT when building the OAuth connection timeout. The SDK OAuth integration test mocked mcpConfig without that field, which made the timeout calculation produce NaN and caused the test to fail before the OAuth refresh/start path completed. Add OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT to the test mock. * ♻️ refactor: Pass OBO upstream-token closure into MCP instead of req Build the OpenID upstream-token provider at the request boundary and thread only the closure through MCP handling, so the MCP service layer no longer receives the raw Express request. The closure still reads/refreshes the live session at tool-call time, preserving the walk-away recovery. - Drop `req`/`capturedReq` from createMCPTools, createMCPTool, reconnectServer, createToolInstance, and reinitMCPServer; forward `upstreamTokenProvider` instead. Closure is constructed in loadTools, loadToolDefinitionsWrapper, and the reinitialize route, where req/res are in scope. - OBO: fall back to user.federatedTokens when the provider yields no live session, so OIDC remote-agent calls (verified bearer, no session) still work. - Inline refresh: mirror a rotated refresh token to the refreshToken cookie via a shared setRefreshTokenCookie helper, guarded by !res.headersSent (no-op on the streaming path; session copy stays authoritative). - Single-flight: hydrate a joining request's own session from the resolved tokens so a later OBO call doesn't replay a rotated-away refresh token. Addresses owner feedback and three review findings. * 🔒 fix: Recover OIDC refresh-token rotation after SSE OBO refresh When an inline OBO refresh rotates the OpenID refresh token after SSE headers have already been sent, the browser refreshToken cookie cannot be updated. Store a short-lived encrypted bridge from the stale cookie token to the rotated token so /api/auth/refresh can recover after express-session loss. Use the signed openid_user_id cookie to load user context for bridge validation, retry only on invalid_grant, and delete the bridge only after the bridged refresh succeeds. * 🔨 fix: hydrate joined OIDC refresh sessions with stable refresh tokens Update single-flight OIDC refresh joiners whenever refreshed access token state changes, even if the IdP keeps the refresh token unchanged. This prevents joined requests from retaining stale accessToken or accessTokenExpiresAt values and redundantly refreshing later in the same run. * 🌉 Persist OIDC refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB Store SSE OBO refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB instead of process-local memory so /api/auth/refresh can recover after worker restarts or cross-worker routing. Derive bridge expiry from REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY so the recovery window matches the stale refreshToken cookie it repairs, and delete bridges after successful recovery. * 🤝 Coordinate OIDC inline refreshes across workers Add a short-lived Mongo-backed refresh-flight record so concurrent OBO refreshes for the same OpenID session do not redeem the same rotating refresh token on different workers. The winning worker performs the IdP refresh and stores an encrypted result; joiners wait for that result, hydrate their request session, and return without calling the IdP. * ⚓ Keep OpenID marker cookies aligned on inline refresh Refresh token_provider and openid_user_id with the same expiry as the rotated refreshToken cookie when an inline OBO refresh can still write headers. Share the marker-cookie writer with the normal OpenID auth refresh path so the fallback /api/auth/refresh branch continues to recognize valid OpenID refresh tokens after session expiry. * 🔑 fix: include refresh token in OIDC local refresh flight key Key the process-local OIDC refresh coalescing by the current session refresh token, matching the Mongo-backed flight key. This prevents a request with a newly rotated token from joining an older pending refresh and inheriting its failure/result. * 🌉 fix: store OIDC refresh bridge without cookie response Treat missing or non-cookie responses like headers-sent streaming responses during inline OIDC refresh. When the IdP rotates the refresh token and cookies cannot be written, persist a recovery bridge so a later /auth/refresh can recover after session expiry. * 🫙 fix: preserve stale OIDC cookie bridge key Track the refresh token last written to the browser cookie separately from the current session refresh token. When inline OIDC refreshes rotate tokens without a writable response, keep bridging from the browser-stale token directly to the latest session token. * 🙌 fix: keep OIDC bridge recovery success on cleanup failure Make refresh-token bridge cleanup best-effort after a bridged OIDC refresh succeeds. A transient delete failure now logs a warning but does not convert the already-refreshed session and cookies into a 403 response. * 📦 test: Exclude RefreshTokenBridge from tenant-isolation coverage Add RefreshTokenBridge to the tenant-isolation coverage allowlist because refresh bridge lookups run during unauthenticated OpenID refresh recovery. The controller first recovers user context from the signed OpenID marker cookie, then the bridge methods apply explicit user and tenant filters. Ambient tenant isolation would bind this recovery path to request-local tenant context that is not available at the point the stale cookie is being resolved * ⚡ Fix OpenID refresh flight retry and marker hydration Allow failed OpenID refresh flights to be reclaimed immediately instead of pinning transient errors. Preserve the browser refresh-token marker when joined refreshes hydrate session tokens from a shared flight result. Stabilize AuthService tests by isolating mocked module imports from prior suites. * 🛠️ fix: centralize OBO identity scoping Add shared auth identity helpers for app user ids, OpenID subjects, tenant ids, and normalized OpenID issuers. Thread a non-placeholder-visible OBO identity context from the real request user through MCP connection, tool-call, reinit, and refresh paths. Keep tenantId and openidIssuer out of createSafeUser so MCP user placeholders do not expose those fields. Scope OBO token cache and in-flight exchange keys by tenant, issuer, OpenID subject, scopes, and a SHA-256 hash of the upstream assertion. This prevents cross-tenant/cross-issuer collisions and avoids reusing tokens minted from stale rotated assertions. Use the shared identity helpers for OpenID refresh-flight keys and refresh-token bridge recovery records so related OBO refresh paths share the same identity normalization rules. The helper is intended for auth-boundary and credential-cache code, not as a blanket replacement for ordinary app user id ownership checks. * 🛠️ fix: preserve OIDC refresh-token sync on save failures Sync OpenID refresh-token cookie/bridge state before persisting the session so a transient session-store failure cannot lose an IdP-rotated refresh token. Also trigger sync when the session refresh token differs from the browser refresh-token marker, not only when the current grant rotates the token. This lets later writable refreshes repair stale browser cookies left behind by SSE refreshes. Route refresh bridge identity through the shared identity helper with the threaded OBO identity context, falling back to request/user context when needed. Add regression coverage for session-save failures, stale browser cookie repair, non-writable bridge storage, and shared-helper identity fallback. * 🛠️ fix: keep OIDC refresh bridge during recovery grace After successful bridged refresh recovery, re-store the stale-cookie bridge with a short grace TTL instead of deleting it immediately. This lets parallel /api/auth/refresh requests that already sent the stale browser cookie recover before they can observe the first response's Set-Cookie. Retarget the bridge to the refresh token returned by the bridged retry so B-to-C refresh-token rotation remains recoverable. The grace TTL is parsed with math() and defaults to 60s, which shrinks the replay window from the original REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY bridge lifetime to the short recovery grace period. Remove the now-unused explicit bridge delete path from the service and data-schemas method surface. Add regression coverage for grace re-store, identity symmetry, retry failure behavior, and same-key upsert replacement. * 🛠️ fix: fail closed on OBO MCP user identity mismatch Add an OBO-specific guard before MCP tool execution that requires the effective invocation user and captured request user to both have ids and to match. This prevents OBO tool calls from falling back to a separate configurable.user_id identity after request-bound OBO context has already been captured. Keep the existing user id fallback behavior for non-OBO MCP calls. Tests cover mismatched OBO users, missing user ids, and the matching-user path ignoring a conflicting configurable.user_id. * 🛠️ fix: Guard OpenID bridge retry user identity Extract the shared OpenID refresh/user-resolution flow in AuthController so the normal refresh path and bridge-recovery retry use the same grant, claims, issuer, user lookup, and diagnostic logging code. Preserve the existing path-specific behavior: the normal path still owns migration updates and 401 login redirects, while the bridge retry still falls through to the existing 403 invalid-token response. Add a bridge-recovery guard that rejects retry results whose resolved user id differs from the signed openid_user_id cookie before issuing tokens or re-storing the grace bridge. Cover both the successful matching-user recovery and the mismatched-user rejection. * 🛠️ fix: type-safety polish on OBO data layer Replace refresh token bridge query/update Record<string, unknown> usage with typed Mongoose FilterQuery and UpdateQuery definitions. Harden OpenID marker cookie JWT expiry handling by converting refresh expiry milliseconds to integer seconds and rejecting invalid or non-positive durations. Add focused CSRF tests for fractional refresh expiry values and invalid expiry configuration. * 🛠️ fix: Bind OpenID session tokens to authenticated identity Stamp OpenID session token state with the LibreChat user id, OpenID subject, tenant id, and normalized issuer when tokens are stored. Fail closed before OBO inline token reuse/refresh when the session token identity does not match the current authenticated identity, preventing a stale or mixed Express session from supplying another user's upstream assertion. Also validate the normal /api/auth/refresh session-token reuse shortcut against the signed marker-cookie user before returning cached session tokens. Note: sessions created before this change carry no identity stamp and are treated as a mismatch. This is self-healing — the reuse path forces a full IdP refresh (which re-stamps the session) and the OBO path throws, surfacing as a one-time re-authentication for active OBO users at deploy time. The session re-stamps within one session lifetime (SESSION_EXPIRY, default 15 min). * 🛠️ fix: Recover OpenID refresh token drift Prefer the browser refresh-token cookie when it differs from the server-side OpenID session state, and force a real IdP refresh in that case instead of reusing stale session tokens. Store a short-lived refresh-token bridge when inline OBO refresh writes a rotated browser cookie but session persistence fails, so follow-up refreshes can still recover from the old token. Keep the bridge grace TTL centralized in RefreshTokenBridge so both recovery paths use the same env-backed value. Note: drift is measured against the last-synced browserRefreshToken marker, so the SSE path (intentionally stale cookie, authoritative session) does not false-positive. Sessions predating the marker have no browserRefreshToken; for those, drift falls back to comparing the cookie against the session refresh token and prefers the cookie on difference. This is the same self-healing pre-change-session window as the identity binding fix and re-syncs within one session lifetime. Tests cover cookie/session drift selection, reusable-session bypass on drift, bridge storage after session-save failure, and the shared bridge constant wiring. * 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO token caching and expiry handling Reject malformed OBO grant responses before writing them to the exchanged-token cache so a missing access_token cannot poison the cache. Store absolute expires_at values with cached OBO tokens and ignore legacy cache entries without usable expiry metadata. This keeps cached-token freshness based on the token’s real remaining lifetime instead of reusing the original relative expires_in on cache hits. Move OBO expiry normalization and skew helpers into packages/api and use them from both the JS exchange service and the TS MCP resolver. Apply a 30-second safety margin with a one- second floor for short-lived tokens, covered by direct helper tests and caller-level regression tests. Tests: - packages/api: npm run build - packages/api: npx jest src/mcp/oauth/expiry.spec.ts src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts - api: npx jest server/services/OboTokenService.spec.js * 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO refresh-token bridge lookup and indexing Reuse getValidOpenIDReuseUserId for the bridge-recovery user lookup in refreshController instead of re-verifying openid_user_id inline. The shared helper enforces the JWT_REFRESH_SECRET presence check and a strict typeof payload.id === 'string' guard, rejecting tokens whose id claim is present but not a string (e.g. a numeric id) that the inline check accepted. Fail closed on issuer mismatch in getRefreshTokenBridge. Both the stored and the expected issuer are now normalized and compared for equality, so a bridge is recovered only when both sides agree (both absent, or both present and equal after normalization). Previously the check was skipped whenever the stored issuer was absent, allowing recovery across mismatched issuer context. Drop the unused {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId, openidIssuer} index and the openidIssuer field on RefreshTokenBridgeQuery. The data-layer filter only queries the 3-field {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId} index; the issuer is verified in application code, not the query. Hoist the repeated model accessor into getRefreshTokenBridgeModel. Note: issuer is now load-bearing for recovery. A bridge stored with an issuer recovers only when the lookup supplies a matching issuer; the recovery lookup reads user.openidIssuer via AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION (an exclusion projection that retains the field). If a user's persisted openidIssuer is empty while the stored bridge has one, recovery fails closed (falls through to normal re-authentication) until the bridge TTLs out — no security regression. Tests cover invalid signed-cookie payloads bypassing the bridge, both asymmetric issuer-presence cases, issuer normalization before comparison, and an index-alignment assertion guarding against re-adding the dropped index. * 🛠️ fix: Degrade OBO discovery on token resolution failures Catch expected OboTokenResolutionError failures during MCP tool discovery and fall back to unauthenticated tool listing instead of aborting discovery. This keeps discovery aligned with the existing unauthenticated listing behavior while preserving unexpected errors as real failures. Also correct OBO tool-call freshness comment and tighten the OBO trust-check permissions type to the existing role permission shape. Tests: - npx jest src/mcp/__tests__/MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts --runInBand --coverage=false - npx jest src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts --runInBand --coverage=false * 🛠️ fix: tighten OBO tool-call errors, bridge logging, and flight typing Move resolveToolCallUserId inside the tool-call try/catch so an OBO identity mismatch surfaces with serverName/toolName context and the standard tool-call-failed message instead of an opaque bare Error. Raise the refresh-token bridge lookup failure log from debug to warn so transient infrastructure failures on the unauthenticated /api/auth/refresh path are observable, and guard the message access against non-Error values. Replace the unknown+cast in isDuplicateKeyError with a hasErrorCode type predicate so the duplicate-key check reads error.code without an assertion. Preserve real math/isEnabled in the MCPConnectionFactory test mock (mock only processMCPEnv) so mcpConfig timeouts no longer resolve to NaN, fixing the TimeoutNaNWarning that masked slow OAuth retry behavior. * 🧪 fix: Restore the Flight Uniqueness Index and Buffer the Graph Cache TTL Two CI failures on the merge, both in suites this environment cannot run (their MongoDB binary download is blocked). `GraphApiService.spec.js` still asserted the unbuffered TTL. Graph tokens route through the same `getTokenCacheTtlMs` as the OBO and openidStrategy caches, so the entry now expires 30s before the credential does. `openidRefreshFlight.spec.ts` dropped the database between tests, which takes the indexes with it, and Mongoose builds them only once when the model is compiled. Whether the unique `key` index survived into a test was a race with that one-time build. Without it a second `create` inserts instead of raising a duplicate-key error, so every worker believes it won the flight — the mutual exclusion the file exists to prove. Indexes are now rebuilt after each drop, which also makes the reclaim and complete cases reach those paths for the right reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * fix: address OBO review findings * 🔐 fix: Install Bridge Indexes and Carry OBO Through Assistant Recovery Two findings from the Codex pass on |
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4b113697b5
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🔌 feat: Background Execution Toggles for Actions & Plugin Tools (#14407)
* 🧵 feat: Background Execution Toggles for Actions & Plugin Tools * 🩹 fix: Resolve action background opt-in across encoded-domain forms and scope it per action * 🧹 refactor: Resolve action domain in a single pass * 🧩 fix: Merge Normalized Action Background Options * 🪢 fix: Reconcile Action Background Aliases * 🧭 fix: Harden Action Background Compatibility * 🕰️ test: Allow Settled Task TTL Expiry * 🧬 fix: Merge Refreshed Action Tool Registrations |
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89494d45fd
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🚦 fix: Restrict Programmatic Tool Execution Maps (#15105)
* fix: restrict programmatic tool execution maps * chore: bump `@librechat/agents` to v3.6.10 * fix: honor live programmatic caller projections * style: sort caller capability imports * test: expect caller projection loader argument * chore: bump agents sdk to v3.6.11 * refactor: use SDK caller projection type * style: sort agent handler imports |
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67b7b441b2
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🛂 feat: Filter Model-Bound Content by Source (#14425)
* feat: introduce optional content protection seam * feat: enforce source-aware content filters * feat: complete source-aware content enforcement * test: activate skill file-text fail-close fixtures * fix: harden source-aware content filters * fix: harden model-bound content filtering * fix: preserve legacy filters and generated files * fix: inspect shared scalar metadata * test: align mocks with current dev dependencies * feat: add persisted content filter safeguards * feat: complete source-aware content filter enforcement * fix: move resume content preflight into TypeScript * fix: close content inspection edge cases * fix: harden content protection boundaries * fix: complete content protection safeguards * test: align persisted memory filter coverage * fix: reconcile content protection with current dev * fix: reconcile content protection with latest dev * fix: close content protection review gaps * fix: enforce source-aware provider boundaries * fix: preserve legacy PII preflight semantics * test: stabilize stored branch preflight fixture * fix: defer agent writes until protected model admission * perf: harden source-aware model-bound filtering * fix: canonicalize provider lineage before validation * fix: satisfy model-bound callback type checks * perf: Bound content protection filtering work * fix: Bound submission array traversal * fix: Stabilize bounded content snapshots * fix: Scope model-bound traversal overflows * fix: Preserve scoped content inspection * fix: Accumulate aggregate traversal scopes * fix: centralize content policy boundaries * test: align deferred tool policy context * test: align controller policy mocks * style: normalize content protection imports * fix: close content policy review gaps * fix: narrow active skill policy config * fix: address content protection review boundaries * fix: retain exact provenance overflow sentinel * fix: preserve literal and scoped provenance updates * fix: narrow persisted edit provenance * fix: isolate exact overflow attribution * fix: centralize stored prompt protection * fix: fail closed on incomplete transcript evidence * fix: align canonical transcript routing * refactor: centralize content policy preflights * fix: isolate upload policy error typing * style: sort policy preflight imports * refactor: centralize content policy boundaries |
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8ae94afa91
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🪡 fix: Thread Parent Message ID Through MCP Request-Scoped Bodies (#15095)
* fix: Unify MCP request-scoped headers * fix: address request-scoped MCP review findings * test: preserve request scope on status errors * fix: treat authorized on-demand MCP servers as ready * refactor: separate MCP readiness from connection state * fix: preserve on-demand MCP readiness labels * test: satisfy OpenAI conversation ownership guard * fix: keep MCP action predicates boolean * fix: close deferred MCP request context gaps * fix: preserve on-demand MCP configuration actions * fix: fail closed on unavailable MCP parent context * test: complete MCP connecting-state mocks * fix: preserve missing MCP parent on continuations * fix: align native MCP request identities * fix: preserve edited MCP parent identity * test: use scoped Agent initializer fixture * test: expose MCP request body helper * fix: preserve MCP turn identity across resume * style: sort stream metadata imports * fix: carry normalized MCP identity to execution |
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06bf324cf0
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🛤️ feat: Per-Agent Code Execution Routing With Stateful Session Scopes (#14848)
* feat: route code execution per agent profile * chore: sort execution profile imports * test: preserve stateful environment literal types * fix: isolate stateful code environments by user * fix: preserve per-agent code routing end to end * fix: route code priming by execution profile * fix: isolate code profile lifecycle state * fix: preserve mixed-profile code resources * fix: complete stateful skill routing |
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1a3e2aebcb
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🛰️ fix: Attach Request-Scoped MCP Servers (#14780)
* fix: attach request-scoped MCP servers * fix: satisfy MCP static checks * fix: format MCP runtime hint |
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5ff46d8c67
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🛟 fix: Stop Agents When Code Resources Cannot Recover (#14651)
* fix: Block Agents When Code Resources Cannot Recover * fix: Preserve Resource Recovery Failures Across Agent Paths * fix: Centralize Fatal Agent Initialization * chore: sort agent imports |
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489bc02d4a
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🧭 fix: Fail Closed When Expected MCP Tools Are Unavailable (#14646)
* fix: fail closed when expected mcp tools are unavailable * test: strengthen MCP handoff coverage * fix: clarify unavailable MCP tool guidance * fix: preserve MCP discovery for empty catalogs |
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b11978017d
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🧱 fix: Enforce Agent Runtime File Trust Boundaries (#14577)
* fix: secure agent runtime file metadata * chore: sort agent resource test imports * fix: Align Agent Tool Resource Types * fix: Rehydrate Agent Image Resources * fix: preserve remote agent file authorization |
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6f45a9e32e
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🔗 fix: Normalize MCP Tool Keys at Every Producer, Resolve Raw Names via Aliases (#14553)
* 🔗 fix: Normalize MCP Tool Keys at Every Producer, Resolve Raw Names via Aliases Tool keys had two spellings that could diverge for any server whose name contains characters outside [a-zA-Z0-9_.-]: the tool cache (and registry inspector) built keys with the RAW server name, while runtime instances are named with normalizeServerName(serverName). Three code comments already asserted "tool keys embed the normalized server name" - no producer honored it. For a special-character server that meant: - definitions-only mode shipped raw def names the model echoed back, but the executor's tool map held the normalized instance name, so every call failed with "Tool not found"; - per-tool tool_options (defer_loading / allowed_callers / run_in_background / describe_intent) were persisted under raw keys that never matched the definition names the option passes resolve against, so builder settings were silently inert; - tool-key parsing against normalized candidate lists silently fell back to last-delimiter splitting, which mis-parses delimiter-bearing tool names. The reconciliation is one contract enforced in three moves: 1. PRODUCERS NORMALIZE. The tool cache (packages/api/src/mcp/tools.ts) and the registry inspector build keys with the normalized server name, matching the instance names MCP.js has always assigned. The builder's tool ids, agent.tools entries, tool_options keys, and definition names all flow from these keys, so every model-facing name now agrees. The cache STORE stays keyed by the raw config name. 2. CONFIG LOOKUPS RESOLVE ALIASES. New shared helpers in data-provider (buildServerNameAliases, normalizeMCPToolKey) map a parsed normalized name back to the raw config name that the registry, config maps, tool cache, and plugin-auth rows are keyed by. Applied in the definitions loader closure, handleTools grouping, createMCPTool's parsing fallback, getUserMCPAuthMap, and the MCP tools endpoint - matching both spellings so legacy raw keys keep resolving. 3. LEGACY DATA HEALS AT ONE BOUNDARY. initializeAgent rewrites raw-keyed agent.tools entries and tool_options keys to the normalized form (normalizeAgentToolKeys) before anything consumes them, so agents persisted under the old convention load their tools AND have all four per-tool options honored. Placeholder and server-pin tokens stay raw - they are config-identity references, not model-facing names. Servers whose names are already in the safe character set (the common case) produce byte-identical keys before and after; the fast path allocates nothing. Stale Redis-cached raw keys self-heal via the existing reconnect-on-missing path within one cache cycle. * 🧯 fix: Deterministic Alias Collisions + Raw Names in Definition Metadata Two review findings on the normalization contract: - Two configured server names that normalize to the same segment (e.g. 'Sales Force' and 'Sales:Force' -> 'Sales_Force') produce inherently ambiguous tool keys; the alias map silently resolved last-wins, so a tool selected from one server could execute against the other's config. buildServerNameAliases now resolves collisions to the FIRST configured name deterministically, and resolveMCPServerContext warns once per colliding pair per process so the operator can rename one server. A collision-resistant identifier would change every existing tool key, so detection + stable routing is the right treatment here; startup-time config validation can follow separately. - The definitions loader resolved parsed (normalized) server names to raw only inside the ToolService closure, while the definition metadata (serverName -> mcpRawServerName) kept the normalized value. Server instructions are keyed by raw config names, so a special-character server's instructions were silently omitted in definitions-only mode. loadToolDefinitions now takes rawServerNames, resolves the boundary against both spellings, and stores the RAW name in definition metadata - consistent with the instance path. * 🧯 fix: Heal Stale Caches, Skill Allowed-Tools, and Builder Selectors Three review findings on the normalization rollout, all in the transition class: - Stale cache entries (P1): the definitions-only loader treats the per-server tool map as authoritative and never reconnects on a per-key miss, so a pre-change raw-keyed Redis entry would make a special-character server's tools vanish for up to the cache TTL. getMCPServerTools now heals legacy raw-keyed entries to the normalized format at read time (keys and function names), covering every consumer with no coordinated invalidation; safe names return the map untouched. - Skill allowed-tools: a skill declaring a raw MCP key in allowed-tools bypassed the initialize-boundary heal (the union runs after it) and would neither dedupe against healed agent tools nor match the normalized tool map. The primes' allowedTools now pass through the same normalizeAgentToolKeys heal before unioning. - Builder selectors: matchesMcpServer and useVisibleTools parsed tool ids against raw server names only, so an attached special-character server rendered as an unselected orphan card. Both now accept the normalized spelling and resolve it back to the raw map key, keeping legacy raw ids working. * 🧯 fix: Fail Closed on Normalized Server-Name Collisions Escalation of the collision finding: a deterministic first-wins alias plus a warning still let the tools listing publish BOTH colliding servers, so a tool selected under the shadowed second server would silently execute against the first server's configuration (their model-facing keys are identical, so routing cannot ever distinguish them). - findShadowedServerNames identifies later-configured names whose normalized form an earlier different name claimed. - getMCPTools excludes shadowed servers from the published listing entirely (with a warn naming the collision), so their tools are never selectable - nothing ambiguous can be picked. - Server creation reserves both spellings: a generated slug may not collide with a raw config name OR the normalized form its tool keys would carry. Collision-resistant model-facing IDs remain out of scope: changing normalizeServerName's output would rewrite every existing tool key (agent documents, caches, instance names) for ALL servers to handle a misconfiguration that is now blocked from exposure instead. * ✅ fix: Dedupe Reserved Server-Name Spellings at Creation The reservation list appended normalized forms unconditionally, which duplicated every safe name (raw === normalized) and broke the route-level contract test pinning the exact list. Dedupe via a Set so safe names contribute one entry, while special-character names still reserve both spellings; adds the special-character reservation case. * 🧯 fix: Never Heal a Shadowed Server's Keys; Align Authorization Tie-Break Persisted references were the remaining collision vector: an agent or skill saved with the shadowed later server's raw key was HEALED into the shared normalized key, authorized through a last-wins map, and routed first-wins - authorized as one server, executed as another. - normalizeAgentToolKeys now refuses to rewrite keys of shadowed servers (findShadowedServerNames): rewriting would produce exactly the first server's key. Left raw, the key cannot match the normalized-keyed tool map and the tool fails visibly - broken beats misrouted. Covers agent.tools, tool_options, and skill allowed-tools through the shared heal. - filterAuthorizedTools (agents/v1.js) builds its normalized-to-raw map via the shared buildServerNameAliases instead of a last-wins Map constructor, so authorization resolves a colliding key to the SAME first server execution routes to. * 🧯 fix: Direct Identity Wins Over Aliases; Heal Client Forms and Degraded Contexts Four review findings on the normalization edges: - Alias hijack (P1): a user-DB server named exactly like an operator server's normalized form ('foo' vs YAML 'foo!') had its tools rerouted to the operator server by unconditional alias resolution. Resolution is now DIRECT-FIRST everywhere: the parsed name is tried as-is, and only when nothing resolves is it treated as a normalized spelling (definitions loader, handleTools grouping, createMCPTool fallback). buildServerNameAliases seats identity entries before derived ones so a literal name owns its slot regardless of config order, findShadowedServerNames and the collision warning derive from the same construction, and getUserMCPAuthMap fetches auth under both spellings so either owner finds its rows. - Builder double-match: a normalized name containing the delimiter ('foo mcp bar' -> 'foo_mcp_bar') also suffix-matched a server named 'bar', selecting both cards and making removal strip the wrong tool. matchesMcpServer now resolves the token ONCE against the full configured list (longest boundary, both spellings) when the caller supplies it; selection and removal share the resolution. - Builder legacy ids: an agent saved with raw-keyed ids showed its tools unchecked while the runtime heal kept them active, and selection updates never replaced the legacy entries. McpSection maps legacy raw ids to their current normalized ids when deriving and rewriting this server's selection. - Degraded context: a transient ensureConfigServers failure returned an entirely empty context, leaving normalized keys unresolvable for the request. resolveMCPServerContext now keeps the name lists (they derive from the config snapshot alone) and degrades only the lazy-init configs. * 🧯 fix: Collision Detection Sees Accessible Servers; Shadowed Refs Fail Closed End to End Round follow-ups on the collision design, all in the DB-server-visibility class: - The legacy-key heal detected collisions against operator-config names only, so healing could still produce a key that direct-first resolution routes to an invisible user-DB server. initializeAgent gains an optional getAccessibleMcpServerNames dep (wired through ToolService for controllers that mock it, directly elsewhere), consulted ONLY when a configured name needs normalization - zero cost for safe-name deployments. The heal then sees the full accessible set and skips shadowed servers' keys. - Wildcard and legacy raw tokens bypassed catalog filtering, letting a shadowed server's instances join a run under the same normalized names as the winner's. filterAuthorizedTools rejects tools of shadowed servers at authorization (its merged map sees DB + config), and handleTools skips them at execution. - The builder migrated only tool selection, not tool_options: legacy raw option keys showed disabled while the runtime honored them, and toggles could not clear them. McpSection now migrates option keys to the current normalized ids (existing normalized entries win). - A transient ensureConfigServers failure degraded to an EMPTY server context, leaving normalized keys unresolvable for the request. resolveMCPServerContext keeps the name lists (derived from the config snapshot alone) and degrades only the lazy-init configs. * 🧯 fix: Complete the Collision Audit at Every Gate; Safer Heal Semantics Round follow-ups hardening the collision audit: - Execution guards now consult the FULL accessible set: the caller's heal threads its already-fetched names through loadTools, and handleTools fetches them itself when a configured name needs normalization (never for safe-name deployments) - so a cross-tier collision (user-DB 'foo' vs operator 'foo!') fails closed at eager execution instead of joining the run under one normalized name. - Healing is SKIPPED when the collision audit cannot complete (transient lookup failure, or no dep): un-healed raw keys still resolve through the direct-first candidates, so skipping is safe while rewriting against an incomplete audit is not. - The audit lookup is gated on the agent actually carrying delimiter-bearing keys (tools, tool_options, or skill allowed-tools), so non-MCP agents never pay a registry round-trip even on specially named deployments. - normalizeAgentToolKeys gives the CURRENT (normalized) entry precedence when both spellings carry options, matching the builder's migration semantics instead of letting insertion order decide. - The builder's toCurrentToolId resolves entries boundary-exactly against every configured server (longest match, both spellings), so a raw suffix shared with a LONGER server name can no longer reassign that server's selection or options while another dialog is open. * 🧯 fix: Shared Collision Audit for Definitions Loading; Fail Closed on Audit Failure Round follow-ups closing the remaining audit gaps: - The definitions-only loader now consumes the same collision audit as eager loading: shadowed servers' entries (wildcards included) are dropped before definitions are emitted, so the default execution path can never resolve a shadowed server's normalized function name to another server. The audit names thread from initializeAgent's heal; the loader self-fetches only when a configured name needs normalization. - resolveCollisionAuditNames centralizes the audit-resolution policy (threaded set > self-fetch when needed > incomplete on failure), and BOTH loaders now fail closed under an incomplete audit: any normalization-sensitive reference (its own name needs normalizing, or it equals the normalized form of a configured special-character name) is skipped with a warning instead of being audited against operator names alone. isNormalizationSensitiveName lives in packages/api as a pure helper so test mocks use the real predicate. - normalizeAgentToolKeys collapses duplicate ids after healing (order-preserving): a document carrying both spellings converges on one key, never two instances with the same function name. * 🧯 fix: Thread the Audit Everywhere; Identity-Aware Alias Fallback Round follow-ups on audit plumbing: - The OpenAI-compatible and Responses tool loaders now forward the already-resolved accessibleMcpServerNames instead of discarding it, so the definitions loader neither repeats the registry lookup nor fails closed on a transient second lookup after the first succeeded. - The skill-only path threads its audit: when the baseline agent has no MCP keys but a primed skill's allowed-tools fetched the complete set, that set (not the operator-only list) reaches the loader, so the collision remains visible and the shadowed reference stays rejected end to end. - OAuth discovery iterates the collision-FILTERED tool list, so a request can no longer emit an OAuth prompt, wait out the connection timeout, and reconnect a server whose definitions were deliberately rejected. - The definitions loader's alias fallback is identity-aware: when the parsed name IS a known accessible server, a null tool fetch means temporarily unavailable (OAuth pending, missing user variables, disconnected) and no longer reroutes to the raw alias - previously the aliased operator server's definitions could be emitted under the unavailable DB server's names. * 🧯 fix: Legacy-Key Definition Lookup; Retain Audit for Deferred Execution - createMCPTool resolves tool definitions by BOTH spellings: the key as persisted plus the canonical normalized key built from the resolved server name. Assistants and direct tool calls persisted before the rollout bypass the agent-boundary heal and arrive with raw keys, while availableTools is now indexed canonically - previously every such call missed the index, burned a reconnect, and returned the unavailable stub permanently via the negative cache. - The initialized agent retains accessibleMcpServerNames (the COMPLETE collision audit this initialization resolved), buildAgentToolContext copies it into every per-agent tool context, and loadToolsForExecution threads it into the eager loader as bare options. Deferred/event-driven execution therefore reuses the snapshot instead of repeating the merged registry read - a transient failure there could fail-closed a tool the same turn already advertised from the successful first audit. - MCP.spec.js keeps @librechat/api pure helpers REAL (requireActual spread) so normalization paths are exercised rather than mirrored. * 🧯 fix: Parse Legacy Keys Against Both Server-Name Spellings createMCPTool's boundary candidates were normalized-only, so a legacy raw key whose server name contains the delimiter (foo_mcp_bar!) missed the suffix match and fell to the generic last-delimiter split - the canonical rebuild then produced a key that could never hit the index and the persisted call stubbed out. The candidate list now carries the RAW resolved name (and raw config names on the parse-only path) next to the normalized spellings. * 🧯 fix: Honest Audit Completeness; Shadowed-Server Form-Key Guard - resolveAllMcpConfigs tolerates ensureConfigServers failures, so the merged registry read can silently omit config-only servers while the audit still reported complete: true - a foo/foo! collision would go unseen and a persisted key could route to the wrong server. Both audit consumers now union the snapshot-derived raw config names back in (resolveCollisionAuditNames unions the caller's rawServerNames; the initializeAgent heal unions configRawServerNames), keeping the completeness label honest without an extra read: operator names come from the registry-independent config snapshot, user-DB names from the merged read that fails loudly into the existing incomplete path. - The client tool_options migration now mirrors the runtime heal's fail-closed rule for SHADOWED servers: when the dialog's server has lost its normalized slot to another catalog name, legacy raw keys stay raw instead of being rewritten onto the winning server's key, where a later save would apply the wrong server's per-tool settings. The dialog's own server joins the alias construction so a stale catalog map can't misread as a collision. * 🧯 fix: Heal Legacy Assistant MCP Tool Names on Save The assistants create/update controllers look tools up in the cached definitions by exact key, and the cache is now normalized-keyed - an assistant saved before the convention resubmits its raw-suffixed MCP name on every edit, so any save silently removed the tool. healMcpToolNames pre-heals the payload's tool list: a delimiter-bearing string that misses the cache resolves through the configured raw names (longest-suffix, boundary-exact) and rewrites to the normalized key only when that key actually exists in the cache. SHADOWED raw names stay raw and fail closed, mirroring the runtime heal; the config read happens only when a delimiter-bearing name actually misses, and read failures propagate (write path) rather than silently dropping tools. v2's update loop also stops re-reading the tool cache per iteration. * 🧯 fix: Full-Audit Shadow Set + Dedupe in the Assistant Key Heal - The assistant-save heal built its shadow set from operator config names alone, so a cross-tier collision (user-DB `foo` owning the normalized slot of operator `foo!`) looked unshadowed and the legacy key healed into the shared normalized name - which direct-first execution then binds to the DB server. The shadow set now comes from resolveCollisionAuditNames' full accessible audit, and an incomplete audit skips healing outright (every rewrite candidate is normalization-sensitive by construction, so raw-and-fail-closed is the only safe answer). - Healed string entries dedupe order-preserving: a payload carrying both spellings of the same tool collapses to one entry instead of expanding into duplicate function definitions the provider rejects. |