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42219ec8e9
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🚜 feat: Support Native PostgreSQL Tool Favorites (#18032)
* 🚜 feat: Support Native PostgreSQL Tool Favorites
* fix: Guard PostgreSQL Reconciliation and Connection Leases
* fix: Scope Favorites Erasure Fences to Deletion Attempts
* fix: Preserve Account Erasure Ownership Until Cancellation Completes
* fix: Reject Unsupported PostgreSQL Command Flags Before Connecting
* fix: Keep Command Validation Compatible With the TypeScript Target
* fix: Keep Migration Previews Read-Only and Preserve Erasure Recovery Identity
* fix: Fence Erasure Recovery Across Tenant and Ownership Changes
* fix: Isolate Migration Dependencies and Keep Mongo Scans Outside Transactions
* fix: Inject PostgreSQL Backend Factories at Composition Roots
* ci: Shard Complete Mutation Work Without Relaxing the Aggregate Gate
---------
Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai>
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64f2124cc6
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🔐 fix: Keep the Admin OpenID State So PKCE Holds When the IdP Omits S256 (#17478)
openid-client's Passport Strategy replaces the authorization request's state with a random one when the IdP's discovery metadata does not list S256 in code_challenge_methods_supported and the request has no nonce. Azure Entra ID omits that field, so the admin callback could not find the admin panel's PKCE challenge under pkce:<state> and issued an exchange code that any code_verifier, or none, could redeem. The admin strategy now adds a nonce in that case, so openid-client keeps the admin route's state and checks the nonce against the ID token on the callback. The chat OpenID flow is unchanged. |
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e594cff874
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🏨 fix: Restore Strict Tenant Startup and Sign-In (#17441)
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* fix: restore strict tenant startup and sign-in * test: preserve real middleware in auth route fixtures --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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080e5f500c
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🏘️ fix: Resolve Tenant Profiles in Their Own Partition and Keep Role Operations in the Caller's (#17417)
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- GET /resolved resolves a group or user profile in the partition its document belongs to, as
writes judge it: for an admin without a tenant reading a tenant's profile, that tenant's
librechat.yaml and __base__. GET /catalog resolves such a scope there too, instead of
answering 404, and GET /effective finds a user by id the way profiles are addressed and
resolves them in their own tenant: their role, groups and documents there.
- findPartitionUser becomes findPrincipalUser, which also returns the user's tenant.
- Admin role operations address the role of the caller's tenant partition: the role lookup
(getPartitionRole), listing, creation's name check, the members a rename migrates or a deletion
reassigns, the members listed and counted, and the ACL entries (deletePrincipalAclEntries) and
grants a deletion removes. A member added or removed by id must be a user of that partition.
- getRoleByName, which every request's permission checks read, reads the role of the caller's
partition too: outside a tenant and under the system context the platform-level one, never an
older tenant role of the same name. updateRoleByName without an id and updateAccessPermissions
for a role read without its _id write that role, so the legacy permission route changes the
platform role. The grants route checks a role exists with getPartitionRole.
- runInPartition moves a read into another partition only from outside a tenant, and rejects
leaving an active one.
- deleteGrantsForPrincipal and findGrantsForPrincipal without a tenantId reach only
platform-level grants, as moveGrantsToPrincipal does.
- updateRoleByName takes { id } to change one role document; renames, their rollback,
description updates and updateAccessPermissions write the document they read.
- The exported keyed rename helpers (applyConfigChange rename, renameConfigEntryTombstones)
refuse a new name no keyed path can address, as the admin routes do.
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a2cd772d49
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🏭 refactor: Centralize Source Prompt Imports in the Prompt Service (#17272)
PromptService gains importSourceGroup, which finds or creates a source pointer group, grants the PUBLIC viewer role and rolls the group back if the grant fails. The Langfuse catalog sync calls it instead of four storage callbacks and two Mongo error predicates, and the prompt service is composed once in api/server/services/Prompts.js and passed to the prompt routes, linked instructions, instructions prompt access and the Langfuse sync runner. Co-authored-by: Rebase Probe <probe@example.com> |
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d481b6b695
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🏬 feat: Sync Langfuse Prompts into the Catalog (#17095)
* feat(prompts): sync Langfuse prompts into the catalog * refactor(prompts): compose the Langfuse prompt sync runner outside the admin handler Add createLangfusePromptSyncRunner, which binds the lock, the prompt-group methods, the ACL grant and the Mongo error predicates once and returns a runner that takes the per-request source, connection-bound listPrompts, lock lease and page cap. The admin handler receives that runner as one dependency instead of forwarding its parts, and its config method signatures return a LangfuseAdminConfig interface in place of Mongoose document types. In api, api/cache/distributedLock.js creates the one DistributedLock for the process and api/server/services/LangfusePromptSync.js composes the runner once with it; the admin route imports the composed runner. * fix(prompts): report incomplete Langfuse syncs and gate the sync action - Refresh the prompt-group and effective-permission queries after a failed sync too, because earlier imports can already be committed. - Return `complete: false` when the page limit stops a sync before the last upstream page, and show a warning instead of the success message. - Show the Sync prompts action only to users with `manage:prompts`, the capability the sync route requires. Resolve the Langfuse startup-config capabilities in one batched lookup. - Document that an interrupted import can leave a group without its initial PUBLIC grant, and that a page in progress can outlast an expired lease. --------- Co-authored-by: Rebase Probe <probe@example.com> |
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202756b37f
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🧐 feat: Preview Langfuse Prompts in Settings (#16854)
* feat(langfuse): test prompt listing and resolution from settings Add a dry-run dialog in Settings > Langfuse that lists Langfuse prompts and resolves one text prompt (production label or an exact version) through the tenant's Langfuse connection. Nothing is written. A tenant user's prompt reads never use the central env keys, even while TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT is off. DevOps makes the feature available with LANGFUSE_PROMPT_SYNC_AVAILABLE (timeout LANGFUSE_PROMPT_SYNC_TIMEOUT_MS). The tenant admin turns it on with langfuse.promptSync.enabled. Related: Linear AI-2271, ClickHouse/ai#4032 * fix(langfuse): isolate prompt credentials and expose prompt settings Use stored credentials with deployment headers for prompt reads. Show the settings tab when connection editing or prompt sync is available. Keep connection controls and trace links under their existing gates. Audit prompt-sync updates and reuse shared prompt response types. |
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9f617fc4ad
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🧬 feat: Re-Derive Azure Groups, Vertex AI, Custom Parameters and Spec Defaults for Config Profiles (#17399)
* 🧬 feat: Re-Derive Azure Groups, Vertex AI, Custom Parameters and Spec Defaults for Config Profiles AppService derives part of the served config from librechat.yaml at startup, and config profiles merged into that output without deriving it again. Azure `groups` now merge by `group` like `endpoints.custom` by `name`: a profile's partial group merges over the group of that name, groups it does not name stay, indexed writes are refused, change batches take entry ops on them, and groups that do not resolve over librechat.yaml and Base (or whose written `${VAR}` is not set) answer `invalid_azure_groups`. Each merged group keeps the key below it unless the profile supplies one, so the rebinding guard drops a key a partial item moves and a key a lower layer dropped stays dropped; Azure re-entry compares groups merged the same way. With `CONFIG_REDERIVE_ENDPOINTS=true` (opt-in for this release), a profile's Azure `groups` resolve into what the Azure clients read (unconditional before, now behind the switch so stored group overrides do not go live on upgrade), a profile's `endpoints.anthropic.vertex` derives `vertexConfig` and the Anthropic models it serves where librechat.yaml configures Vertex AI, and the Azure Assistants endpoint follows a profile's `assistants`. Startup logs the documents that hold such overrides, the groups that would not resolve over librechat.yaml and Base, and the Vertex AI overrides that never apply. Always on: Vertex AI's key file and region are base-only, a profile may turn Vertex AI on only where librechat.yaml configures it, its settings may reference only librechat.yaml's own Vertex AI variables (reads return them resolved), a profile's `vertexConfig` is never applied and writes skip it (`derived_path`, `rules.derivedPaths`), a model's own `deploymentName` resolves its `${VAR}` like the default one, the region, project ID and the deployment name each model's requests send (the model name where the client sends it as written) must stay in their URL host label or path segment, a `${VAR}` there is a whole `${NAME}` reference only, the Anthropic client refuses any other deployment name before building a request, and an invalid setup answers `invalid_vertex_config`. The rebinding guard no longer binds the derived Vertex AI region, which is librechat.yaml's. Custom endpoint `customParams` are expanded by `expandCustomEndpoint` into the served copy, so `appConfig.config` stays librechat.yaml as written, and each endpoint a profile writes is expanded again from its merged form (a changed `defaultParamsEndpoint`, OpenRouter defaults for a profile's own endpoint); invalid definitions answer `invalid_param_definitions`. After tenant scoping, `getAppConfig` derives `modelSelect`, `parameters` and `presets` again for the specs a principal is served where nothing sets them, the agents `memory` capability follows the merged memory config, and a model spec naming an unconfigured endpoint answers `unknown_spec_endpoint`. Meta flags: `azureGroupMergeKey`, `customParamsExpansion`, `specInterfaceRederive` and `endpointRederive`. * 🪜 fix: Judge Re-Derived Config on What Every Profile Layer Leaves Two re-derivations decided whether a profile had set a field from whether any layer ever set it, so a lower profile's value tombstoned by a higher one still counted as set. - Vertex AI (CONFIG_REDERIVE_ENDPOINTS=true): the marker that keeps a profile's `endpoints.anthropic.models` over Vertex AI's is cleared by a later tombstone of those models (or of `endpoints.anthropic` or `endpoints`), and such a tombstone derives Vertex AI again, so the Anthropic endpoint serves Vertex AI's models instead of none. A tombstone of librechat.yaml's own models does the same. - Spec-dependent controls: `modelSelect`, `parameters` and `presets` are derived again where their served value differs from the base config's, not only where the librechat.yaml-shaped value does, so a control one profile sets and a higher one tombstones, or a tombstone of one librechat.yaml leaves unset, follows the specs served instead of being dropped. The memory capability, Azure Assistants, Azure groups and custom parameters already derive from the merged result; tests now cover each set in one layer and tombstoned in a higher one, and the reverse. * 🧮 fix: Derive Each Config Part From What the Layers Leave A tombstone of an object above a derived part's inputs, alone or followed by a layer that recreates part of that object, left the part without what startup derives it to: - An Azure endpoint recreated after a tombstone of `endpoints.azureOpenAI` or `endpoints` had no groupMap, modelGroupMap or model lists, so its model lists fell back to the environment's default Azure models, which requests could not map to a group. It now serves no group, with or without CONFIG_REDERIVE_ENDPOINTS (completeAzureResolution). - A tombstone of the whole `interface` left modelSelect, parameters and presets out, which the client reads as off. They are derived from the specs served into a new interface. - A tombstone of `endpoints.agents` or `endpoints` left no agents endpoint, while a tombstone of its capabilities served the defaults. The agents endpoint startup derives is served there. - A tombstone of a Vertex AI setting that leaves the setup unable to load kept the vertexConfig derived below it. Vertex AI is off there, with a warning. A table in service.spec.ts runs every derived part against every way a layer changes its inputs (set, unset, a tombstone of the path and of each object above it, a layer recreating after such a tombstone, Base on either side, tenant scoping, the switch off) through getAppConfig, and compares each cell with what startup derives from the librechat.yaml the layers leave. * 🧭 fix: Serve Only Model Specs Whose Endpoint the Layers Leave A tombstone of `endpoints.custom` or `endpoints` in a higher profile (or the Base profile) left the model specs of the custom endpoints it removes served, librechat.yaml's or a lower profile's: the spec list pointed at endpoints /api/endpoints no longer offers, with the model selector, parameters and presets still off for them. The write check only ran when the write held `modelSpecs.list`, and the merge served stored specs as they were. After the last layer, the merge now serves only the specs whose endpoint is a built-in endpoint or a custom endpoint the YAML-shaped config the layers leave defines, the rule startup skips librechat.yaml's specs by (deriveServedSpecs). A removed endpoint hides its specs until a layer defines it again; where no spec is left, none is served (as with a tenant-hidden endpoint) and the spec-dependent controls come back on. Tombstones of a built-in endpoint's settings keep its specs, as startup does, and `addedEndpoints` stays as merged. A stored spec for an endpoint that is not configured is left out on its own instead of being served; writes of one still answer 400 unknown_spec_endpoint. The derived-part table in service.spec.ts gains the model specs served (with addedEndpoints and the controls they decide) against tombstones of `endpoints.custom`, `endpoints`, and each of `endpoints.openAI`, `azureOpenAI` and `anthropic`: by a profile, by Base under a profile, a lower profile under a higher one, recreated above or by the same layer, with no spec left, and with the switch off. * 🧩 fix: Reconcile Re-Derived Config With Dev's Keyed Tombstones, Write Report and Read APIs - Keyed tombstones of Azure groups (endpoints.azureOpenAI.groups["g"], now merged by key) resolve the groups left again where the merge resolves them, and stay inert without CONFIG_REDERIVE_ENDPOINTS. - Keyed tombstones count as touching endpoints.custom, so served specs and custom parameters are derived again after one. - The served-spec derivation keeps modelSpecs while added endpoints remain, as the hidden endpoint scoping does; hidden endpoint names leave addedEndpoints. - Derived paths join the held paths every write skips, built on first use. - Tests follow the merged behaviour: Azure groups merge by group, the agents endpoint is derived again below a tombstone. |
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0716094734
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🏷️ feat: Hide and Rename Custom Endpoints by Name in Config Profiles (#17396)
* 🏷️ feat: Hide and Rename Custom Endpoints by Name in Config Profiles Config profiles merge `endpoints.custom` over librechat.yaml entry by entry on `name`, but could not take one entry away. A tombstone that named one, such as `endpoints.custom["Name"]`, passed every check, was stored with a 200 and did nothing, because the merge removes object paths only and stops at arrays; a tombstone at a position (`endpoints.custom.0.headers`) was stored and did nothing either. Renaming a profile's own endpoint through PUT or PATCH lost its stored key, since the `renames` hint covered MCP servers only. POST `/fields/tombstone`, DELETE `/fields` and the `tombstone` and `unset` ops of a change batch now take a keyed path, `endpoints.custom["<name>"]` or `endpoints.custom["<name>"].<path>`, whose name is a JSON string compared as the merge folds it. A tombstone hides the inherited endpoint, or one of its fields or record keys, for the profile's principals and removes the profile's own entry or path; hiding an endpoint also hides the model specs that select it, whether librechat.yaml or a lower profile defines it. An unset resets the profile's own entry or path with the keyed tombstones at or below it, and writing an entry clears the tombstone that hides it whole. Malformed keyed paths, keyed paths after arrays not merged by key, the entry's name, its key, preview or destination fingerprint, keyed writes and positional tombstones answer 400, and the store's keyed mutations refuse a location whose stored tombstone would name another path. A `segments` target names keys as written on every route, so a segment such as `custom["Name"]` never reaches an entry past these guards: a write by it stores a key of that spelling and clears none of the entry's tombstones. A stored tombstone reads as keyed only after an array merged by key, so an older one such as `mcpServers.a["b"]` keeps hiding that server. PUT and PATCH `renames` also take `{ path: 'endpoints.custom', previousName, name }`: the renamed entry gets the stored ciphertext and preview, and the keyed tombstones of the old name move to the new one, as they do for a batch `rename`. The carried key stays bound to its destination (400 `CONFIG_SECRET_REENTRY_REQUIRED` when the renamed entry sends it elsewhere) and keeps the destination fingerprint it was entered with; a hint that cannot apply answers 400 `CONFIG_RENAME_INVALID` with a reason. Removing the destination of a profile's own keyed entry beside its stored key needs the key again, and removing an inherited one drops the inherited key at merge and lists it in `ignored`. The merge-key registry moves to its own module so mutations can match entries by identity without an import cycle. Meta reports `keyedTombstones` and `renameHints`, `rules.renameHintPaths` and `limits.maxEntryKeyLength`, and `docs/endpoint-overrides.md` documents the contract. * 🙈 fix: Scope Hidden Endpoint Allow-Lists and Refuse Duplicate Rename Sources - A hidden custom endpoint leaves endpoints.agents.allowedProviders as it leaves modelSpecs; scopeHiddenEndpointSpecs becomes scopeHiddenEndpointReferences. - modelSpecs collapses only when no spec and no added endpoint remain, so unrelated addedEndpoints survive when the hidden endpoint owned every spec (tenant scoping shares the helper). - An addedEndpoints or allowedProviders list that names only hidden endpoints is kept whole: an empty list allows every endpoint. - Two endpoints.custom rename hints from one previousName answer CONFIG_RENAME_INVALID duplicate_source; MCP hints may still duplicate a server. * 🔀 fix: Keep Keyed Tombstones Whole Across Dev's Patch Steps, Write Report and Resolved API - PATCH resets (dev's request-ordered steps) still move a renamed entry's keyed tombstones, in validation and in the stored state; lifted tombstones come from one data-schemas helper for both paths. - The write report of POST /fields/tombstone and DELETE /fields names a keyed location by its keyed path, collection, key and entryPath, as a change ref does, instead of the bare collection. - resolveConfigLayers scopes the model specs and allow-lists of hidden endpoints as getAppConfig does, so the resolved API keeps its parity. - GET /meta reports maxEntryKeyLength beside dev's catalogModelsTtlMs. |
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babf6f908b
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🧾 feat: Admin Config Write Report, Structured Issues and Deployment-Only Paths (#17395)
* 🧾 feat: Admin Config Write Report, Structured Issues and Deployment-Only Paths Admin config writes dropped what the API never stores (base-only sections, interface permissions, dedicated sections) with a 200 and no word of it, stored values nothing reads (boot-time and operator-only settings, overrides of MCP servers librechat.yaml runs as local processes, tombstones inside arrays), answered most 4xx without a stable code, returned validation issues without the bound or option that failed, and refused every admin write once the terms-acceptance modal was on for an admin who had not accepted it, including the write that turns it off. PUT, PATCH /fields, POST /fields/tombstone and DELETE /fields now answer with `applied` and `skipped` (with a reason per location); a whole `interface` PATCH keeps its UI fields; base-only paths are skipped on every route. A new DEPLOYMENT_ONLY_CONFIG_PATHS list (rate limits, CloudFront, permission leases, OpenAPI, skill deletion, the tool filters, the agents and MCP boot settings, `cache`) is skipped on write, kept at librechat.yaml's value by the merge and published in GET /meta. Writes and tombstones inside a librechat.yaml stdio MCP server answer 400 PROCESS_MCP_SERVER_OVERRIDE, and a whole-section value leaves those servers out. GET of a document lists what the merge leaves out of it (`ignored`, `ignoredBasis`). Validation issues carry allowlisted `params`; each refused allowedAddresses entry is one issue with a `reason`; agent recursion limits must be whole numbers of at least 1, and the runtime ignores any other value. The config handlers' 4xx carry a `code`, the capability middleware adds AUTH_REQUIRED/FORBIDDEN, and the admin config router opts out of the terms gate. PATCH checks a section manager on every section it names, skipped entries included, as /changes does. New meta flags: writeReport, issueParams, adminTermsExempt. * 🧪 test: Expect Issue Params in the Whole-Document Override Validation Scenario Validation issues now carry `params` (here the expected and received types), so the scenario that asserts the exact issue list for a rejected PUT expects them too. * 🧪 test: Cover Merged Read Codes, Tenant-Scoped Read Reports and Deployment-Only Resolution |
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f05f50460a
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🔭 feat: Admin Config Read APIs (Resolved and Effective Config, Scope Catalog, Env Status) (#17383)
* 🔭 feat: Admin Config Read APIs (Resolved and Effective Config, Scope Catalog, Env Status) Admin clients could read one config document at a time, or the deployment's merged config, but nothing showed what a profile or a user resolves to: a client had to re-implement the merge (Base-first precedence, merge keys, tombstones, the interface permission filter, base-only fields, runtime stops, secret rebinding, the env allowlist) to preview it, and had no way to see why part of a profile is ignored. Endpoint, model and tool pickers came from the end-user routes, called as the signed-in admin, so they showed the admin's own scope and keys and needed a browser User-Agent. The admin config API now has four read routes. GET /resolved/:principalType/:principalId and GET /effective?userId= return librechat.yaml, the documents that merge over it in merge order, each with the parts the merge does not apply and why, and the result, in librechat.yaml shape. They come from resolveConfigLayers, which tracks the same fold the served merge runs and is pinned to it by parity tests, and from the stored documents rather than the override cache. GET /catalog lists the endpoints (with the reason one is not served), models (served, configured and defaults), MCP servers and tools a scope serves, resolved for the scope rather than the caller and never with a user's stored key; GET /env-status reports whether each env name the config uses is set, never its value. Every read is filtered to the sections the caller can read, redacted as reads redact, and scoped to the caller's tenant. The admin Langfuse routes now say why a deployment offers no connection settings. Meta reports resolvedApi, catalogApi, envStatus and limits.catalogModelsTtlMs. * 🪞 fix: Report Duplicate Custom Endpoints from the Served Definition When librechat.yaml defines a custom endpoint name twice, or both `Ollama` and `ollama`, the catalog kept the first definition for a name's env names, reason and models, while `loadCustomEndpointsConfig` serves the last servable one. An entry could pair the served config of one definition with the env names of another. `resolveServedCustomEndpoints` now holds the runtime rule (the last definition with a name, key, base URL and models wins under its served name), and `loadCustomEndpointsConfig`, `loadConfigModels` and the catalog all use it. A name with no servable definition is reported from its last one. * ⏱️ feat: Make the Admin Catalog Model-List Lifetime Configurable `GET /api/admin/config/catalog` reused a scope's model lists for a fixed two minutes. The new librechat.yaml field `endpoints.catalogModelsTtlMs` sets that lifetime (milliseconds, `0` to one hour, two minutes by default); `0` resolves the lists on every read. It is a base-only path, so a profile cannot change it and `GET /meta` reports one value, now read from the deployment's config on each request as `limits.catalogModelsTtlMs`. |
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4d061fdd46
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🔄 fix: Judge Tenant Profiles on Their Own Base, Clear Config Caches on Principal Deletion, and Add a Config Reload Route (#17397)
Profile writes are judged in the tenant partition the profile merges in. For a role, or a
caller inside a tenant, that is the caller's partition. For a group or user profile written by
an admin without a tenant, it is the stored document's tenant: PUT, PATCH and POST …/changes
validate on librechat.yaml as that tenant resolves it with that tenant's __base__ over it, use
the same Base for the recheck after commit and for key binding, tombstones and field deletes
judge re-entry on that tenant's librechat.yaml, and every route reports `ignored` over that
tenant's Base. Each attempt reads the document in that partition only, and a document that
moved partition while the write ran answers 409 CONFIG_VERSION_CONFLICT. The config store's
partition rules are unchanged; another tenant's Base is read in that tenant's context.
Deleting a group, role or user clears the config caches when it removes or restores the
principal's profile (`invalidatingConfigStore`), awaited before the response and broadcast with
Redis as config writes do; a call that rejects clears too, since it may have committed.
POST …/changes lets `unset` remove any part of a top-level section configSchema does not
define; the section's own `unknown_section` issue is no longer blamed on the removal, and every
other op there still answers 400 UNKNOWN_SECTION.
POST /api/admin/config/reload, for an admin without a tenant holding broad manage:configs (a
tenant admin gets 403, since the reload reaches every tenant), runs the config cache clear without
a write, loads librechat.yaml again on the answering instance, and once it loaded publishes the
clear over Redis so every other instance loads the file on its next read. It uses
ConfigCacheInvalidation.reload, which reports the clear, the load and the publish instead of only
logging a failure (writes keep `invalidate`, which leaves the load to the next read). It answers
200 `{ success: true, broadcast }`, `broadcast` false without Redis; 422 CONFIG_RELOAD_INVALID
with each schema issue's location when the loader refuses the file, keeping the last good config
and publishing nothing; 500 CONFIG_RELOAD_FAILED when a clear fails or the config cannot be built
from the file; and 503 CONFIG_RELOAD_BROADCAST_FAILED when this instance reloaded but the publish
failed, since an instance that misses the broadcast keeps its cached librechat.yaml, which never
expires. Every reload that runs is audited as `config.reloaded`, a failed one with outcome
`failure` and its code. The meta reports `features.reloadRoute`. Writes still reload the file.
The e2e content-filter helper uses the route instead of a sentinel profile.
docs/mcp-overrides.md describes the current timing: the awaited clear, the Redis broadcast, what
still waits for a TTL, that a process the clear misses keeps its old librechat.yaml, and hiding
as an access boundary at checkout.
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db225c0919
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🔐 feat: Admin Config Secrets v2 (MCP and Azure Credentials, Re-entry, Env Allowlist, Rebinding) (#17353)
* 🔐 feat: Admin Config Secrets v2 (MCP and Azure Credentials, Re-entry, Env Allowlist, Rebinding) The admin config API stored MCP server credentials and Azure group keys in plaintext, returned them to config readers, let an admin who cannot read a stored credential send it to a host of their choosing, and let override values reference any environment variable. MCP credentials and Azure keys, in `groups` and in the `groupMap` the Azure clients read, are now encrypted with masked previews, hidden from every read and decrypted once after the merge. A write that keeps a stored MCP credential or web search key while changing where it is sent must enter it again, judged by the value the written document holds. `${VAR}` references in overrides are limited to an allowlist, named where a change batch leaves them, and the merge drops a credential a layer moves to a new destination without entering it, listing it in write responses only for sections the caller can read. A custom endpoint's key is bound to its base URL, its provider and the destination options in addParams and dropParams (such as the anthropicApiUrl the native Anthropic client sends to), matched across layers under the name the merge folds (ollama is Ollama). A restated `${VAR}` counts as entered, so allowlisted names are not bound to a destination. Azure's `${INSTANCE_NAME}` and `${DEPLOYMENT_NAME}` stay templates in a group's `baseURL`, and a scheduled job's MCP consent no longer depends on the masked previews that change when an admin rotates the key in place. * ♻️ refactor: Move the MCP Key Re-entry Guard Out of the Binding Helpers to Break an Import Cycle With #17351's OpenID provisioning on dev, the app config service reached itself through the rebinding guard: app/service -> app/overrides -> app/rebinding -> mcp/registry/binding -> mcp/errors (and mcp/types) -> mcp/oauth/obo -> utils/identity -> auth/openid -> auth/provision -> app/resolve -> app/service. The binding helpers are pure diffs; only requireApiKeyReentryForRebinding needs the MCP error class, so it moves to mcp/registry/reentry.ts, and the helpers take MCPOptions from librechat-data-provider as mcp/headers.ts does. No behaviour changes. * 🧪 test: Drop a Base-Held Endpoint Key That a Lower-Priority Profile Moves Base merges first since #17352, so a profile below Base's priority still lands over it. The rebinding guard drops the key Base stores for a custom endpoint whose baseURL the profile changes, and the PATCH response lists it in `ignored`. * 🔐 fix: Serve Admin Azure Group Keys and Keep Deployment Keys at Their Own Destinations Azure groups a profile writes now take effect: the merge resolves a layer's `endpoints.azureOpenAI.groups` as AppService resolves librechat.yaml's (`resolveAzureGroups`, shared with `azureConfigSetup`) into the `groupMap`, `modelGroupMap`, model list and assistant models the Azure clients read. A layer's groups replace the groups below whole, as its array does; groups that do not resolve stay unread with a warning. The rebinding guard judges the resolved groups like any `groupMap` entry, and an Azure group's destination now also covers a deployment name its base URL takes its host from and the destination options of its `addParams`/`dropParams`. A write that keeps a stored Azure group key (in `groups` or `groupMap`) while changing where the group sends it answers 400 `CONFIG_SECRET_REENTRY_REQUIRED` on PUT, PATCH, field deletes, tombstones and change batches, judged as the document resolves over librechat.yaml and on each `groups` item as written. OCR fills an empty key from `OCR_API_KEY` only for its default destination (no base URL, or `${OCR_BASEURL}`), so a key the guard dropped for an override's `${VAR}` base URL is not replaced by the deployment's. The env reference policy includes the `${OCR_API_KEY}` loading fills in for an `ocr` section without a key, so a client can write back what GET `/base` returned. The custom endpoint guard no longer needs the layer's overrides to name an entry: an entry changed some other way is judged as inherited (positional tombstones inside the list are not applied by the merge, so none reached one). A web search URL a layer points at a `${VAR}` other than librechat.yaml's without entering its key is set back: web search sends the deployment's key, or its client's environment default, to any `${VAR}` URL. * 🔐 fix: Keep Azure Assistants Served, Opaque Keys as Entered and Batch Env Checks on the End State Azure assistants: a profile's `groups` replace the groups below whole, so groups with no model that supports assistants under librechat.yaml's `assistants: true` left `assistants` on with an empty `assistantModels`, and the Azure Assistants initializer picked `assistantModels[0]` (undefined). `azureConfigSetup` refuses that combination at startup; the merge now turns `assistants` off when none of the models it leaves supports them, with a warning, judged on the merged result so a later layer whose groups serve assistants keeps them on. The check is `lacksAzureAssistantModels`, shared with `azureConfigSetup`. Opaque credentials: every runtime reader of the OCR, speech, web search and Langfuse keys uses the decrypted value as is (`resolveConfigSecret`, `resolveStoredConfigSecret`, `decryptConfigSecret`), so a `${...}` inside a key the write encrypts is part of the key. Those fields are marked `opaque`: the write-time check skips a value the write encrypts there, and the runtime pass keeps their ciphertext instead of blanking it. A whole `${VAR}` reference there, which the field passes through and its reader resolves, is still checked, and so is stored plaintext. Custom endpoint (`initializeCustom`), Azure group (`mapModelToAzureConfig`) and MCP (`processMCPEnv`) credentials are expanded by their clients once decrypted and stay checked; the Assistants keys have no reader yet and stay checked too. Change batches: env references are judged on the document the batch leaves, as its other issues are. An issue counts only when the end state still holds a disallowed reference (ciphertext by its plaintext) where the batch sent one, at a location the batch changed, so a value a later op removes or replaces (`set ocr.baseURL`, then `unset ocr`) is no longer refused, and a stored reference the batch puts back where it was is left to merge time. * 🔐 fix: Proxy-Bound OAuth Secrets, Consistent Azure Group State, Batch Issues by Entry Key and Loaded Web Search References - The MCP proxy is part of the OAuth client secret's binding (user tier, admin re-entry and the merge's rebinding guard share `getChangedOAuthSecretBindingFields`): the access token the secret obtains travels through it. - A tombstone of `endpoints.azureOpenAI.groups` resolves the groups to none in the merge (empty `groupMap`, `modelGroupMap` and model lists, so the model list does not fall back to the environment's defaults), and removes what they resolve to in `applyConfigTombstones`. - The merged Azure model lists name only models a merged group serves (`narrowAzureServedModels`), so an override's `assistantModels` no group serves no longer keeps Azure assistants on. - `/changes` env issues are held by entry identity (`toConfigIdentityPath`), followed through renames and resolved on the batch's end state, so a removal or rename no longer shifts them. - References loading librechat.yaml introduces (OCR's `${OCR_API_KEY}`, the web search defaults) are allowed at the location they are loaded at, so GET /base's sections are accepted written back, and nowhere else. * 🔐 fix: Re-entry for Endpoint, OCR and Speech Keys, Own Keys Bound Over Base and User Key Destinations Kept - The document that stores a custom endpoint, OCR or speech key can no longer move its destination without the key: PUT, PATCH, field deletes, tombstones and change batches answer CONFIG_SECRET_REENTRY_REQUIRED at the changed field (getBoundKeyReentryIssues), judged by value as the document alone sends it. - A profile's own key for an endpoint, MCP server, OCR or speech service, or Azure groupMap group that Base defines is bound to that destination when it is entered: the rebinding guard reports a fingerprint of where it goes, the write stores it beside the key (<secret>Binding), and the guard keeps the key there until a lower layer moves it. Reads and the merged config leave the fingerprint out; kept keys carry it; client values are replaced. - An inherited custom endpoint or MCP server that sends a credential each user holds (user_provided, customUserVars, apiKey.source user, OpenID or Graph token placeholders) keeps its destination: a layer's move is set back and listed in ignored. |
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76e3c6b134
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🪜 fix: Base-First Config Precedence, Profile Lifecycle and Role Renames That Keep Their Profile (#17352)
* 🪜 fix: Base-First Config Precedence, Profile Lifecycle and Role Renames That Keep Their Profile Config documents merge in one total order (`compareConfigPrecedence`): Base (`role` / `__base__`) first whatever its priority, then ascending priority, then role < group < user, then document `_id`. The merge, `getApplicableConfigs` and `listAllConfigs` all use it, so a tie no longer goes to the newest document whatever its type, and Base no longer outranks a profile through its priority. A profile that writes fields of a librechat.yaml MCP server therefore undoes a Base hide of that server for its principals. A write that creates a document without a priority gives it its principal type's default (role 10, group 20, user 100, Base 0), and a write that omits the priority keeps the stored one, so a broad PUT no longer resets a profile to 10. Langfuse writes no longer pass a priority. Profile writes (PUT, PATCH `/fields`, POST `/changes`) validate on librechat.yaml with the active Base document resolved over it (`resolveRawConfig`, the fold the merge itself runs), so a role write that is valid where it lands is accepted and one the merge would strip is refused. Base still validates on librechat.yaml alone, an inactive Base is ignored, and `/changes` still judges what librechat.yaml itself defines on the raw YAML. `PATCH /api/admin/config/:principalType/:principalId/priority { priority, expectedRevision? }` sets only the priority, for broad `manage:configs`, keeping overrides, tombstones and `isActive`; it is audited as `operation: 'priority'`. A write that would create a principal's first document (PUT, PATCH `/fields`, POST `/fields/tombstone`, POST `/changes` including a dry run or a priority-only batch) answers 404 `PRINCIPAL_NOT_FOUND` unless the role (exact name), group or user (lowercase ObjectId) exists in the caller's tenant partition, or at platform level outside a tenant (`principalExists`). Each route checks inside its compare-and-swap write, against the document the write replaces; the tombstone route now plans its write like the others, so `AdminConfigDeps` no longer takes `tombstoneConfigField`. A PUT with `expectedRevision: 'absent'` creates the profile even when it carries no overrides. Renaming a role moves its config profile, system grants and ACL entries to the new name in the caller's tenant partition. The profile moves through the store contract (`movePrincipal`: a create-only copy, then removal at the copied revision). A profile already at the new name answers 409 `ROLE_CONFIG_CONFLICT`, and any failed step rolls back the users, the role document and every move (500 `ROLE_RENAME_FAILED`). Profiles, grants and ACL entries that renames made before this change left at an old name are neither moved nor removed, and a role created under that name still picks them up. The Base principal id is a reserved role name (400 `ROLE_NAME_RESERVED`), and a legacy role by that name never moves or deletes Base. The admin config meta reports `deterministicPrecedence`, `priorityRoute`, `principalCheck` and `roleRenameMovesProfile`. * 🧪 test: Give the E2E Reload Sentinel a Role of Its Own Admin config writes now answer 404 PRINCIPAL_NOT_FOUND for a principal that does not exist, so the content-filter helpers' reload sentinel (a made-up user id) could no longer write and every spec that reloads librechat.yaml failed. The sentinel is now a role the helper creates once (409 when it already exists) and deletes after its profile in cleanup; no user is a member, so its empty profile changes no one's config. * 🛟 fix: Keep a Moved Profile Whose Removal Cannot Be Confirmed, Validate on the Caller's Base and Restore Rolled-Back Descriptions - `movePrincipal` no longer treats a failed read-back of the source, after its removal failed, as the source still being there. It keeps the copy, which may be the only one left, and rethrows the removal's failure instead of deleting the copy. - Profile writes read the Base validation floor from the caller's tenant partition, so a caller without a tenant validates on the platform-level Base and never on a tenant's. - A role rename that rolls back gives a role stored without a description the schema default back, instead of a `$set` of `undefined` that kept the new description. * 🧭 fix: Scope Profile Priority Changes to the Caller's Tenant Partition `setConfigPriority`, behind PATCH `/api/admin/config/:principalType/:principalId/priority`, read and wrote through the unpartitioned config store. A platform-level admin without a tenant runs in the default non-strict context, where the tenant-isolation plugin adds no predicate, so the route could reorder a tenant's profile for the same principal, and answer with it, when no platform-level profile existed. It now runs on the partitioned operations that the role rename and the partitioned `findConfigByPrincipal` use. The read is limited to the caller's partition: that tenant's document, or without a tenant only a platform-level one (no tenant, `null` or `''`). The write is pinned to the `_id` of the document that read returned. A tenantless caller therefore gets 404 `CONFIG_NOT_FOUND` for a profile only a tenant holds. An `expectedRevision` naming such a profile gets a revision conflict and changes nothing. Tests: `config.spec.ts` (data-schemas) adds "setConfigPriority in the caller tenant partition". It covers the platform profile changing alone, a profile that only a tenant holds being neither changed nor returned, and only the active tenant's profile changing inside a tenant. The tenant helpers are now shared with the rename suite. `config.precedence.integration.spec.ts` adds the same check through the handler. With the old wiring, a tenantless PATCH of a profile only tenant-a holds answers 200 and moves tenant-a's profile to 40. With the fix it answers 404 and tenant-a keeps 10. * 🧷 fix: Roll Back Only What a Rename Changed and Validate Profile Writes on the Base They Land Over - Grant moves report what they changed (re-keyed grants, and superseded grants whose removal was confirmed); the undo re-keys only grants still at the new name and re-creates a superseded grant only while the new name still holds the grant that superseded it, so a grant revoked during a rename is never resurrected. - The Mongoose binding settles a create whose acknowledgement was lost by the `_id` it chose (found at version 1: committed, returned), as the store contract now requires; a profile move whose copy committed finishes instead of leaving an orphan copy. The memory engine and the conformance suite cover it, plus a copy that cannot be withdrawn being logged. - A rename rollback moves back only the profile it moved (by identity, edits included), puts back only members still on the new name, and reverts the description only while it is still the one the rename set. - PUT, PATCH /fields and POST /changes read Base beside the profile on every attempt and read it again once the write commits; a write that Base changed under is judged on that Base and withdrawn (only at the revision it wrote) when it fails there. - The priority route rereads a lost race's current revision in the caller's tenant partition. |
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4e0d9145e0
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⚛️ feat: Atomic Admin Config Changes Endpoint (set, unset, tombstone, entry upsert/remove/rename) (#17328)
* 🗄️ refactor: Portable Admin Config Store with Revisions, Key Encoding and Coherent Writes Admin config writes went straight to MongoDB with dotted-path `$set`, `$unset`, `$pull` and `$addToSet`, and nothing checked `configVersion`. That caused six problems. * ⚛️ feat: Atomic Admin Config Changes Endpoint (set, unset, tombstone, entry upsert/remove/rename) Admin clients can change a principal's config overrides only one kind of change at a time: - PATCH `/fields` for sets, at most 100 entries; - POST `/fields/tombstone` for one tombstone; - DELETE `/fields` for one reset. * 🔁 fix: Reload librechat.yaml on Admin Config Writes Base-only sections such as `filters` and `messageFilter` live only in librechat.yaml, and an admin config write was how a running server picked up an edit to them. The coherent-cache change limited admin-write invalidation to the override and MCP caches, so the YAML base was never re-read after startup: the content-filter e2e suite, which activates filters by editing the YAML and writing a reload sentinel, saw `filters: undefined` from GET /base and every activation timed out. Admin config writes clear the YAML base config again, alongside the override and MCP caches, and the clear is broadcast with the others, so every instance reloads its YAML. The reload keeps the last good config on failure and republishes the tools derived from it, so the global tool cache is left for it to overwrite rather than emptied first. * 🧭 fix: Cap Dotted Field Path Depth and Hold Revision Preconditions on No-Op Writes A dotted fieldPath was split without the 32-segment cap that segments already had, so a deep path reached the recursive path writer and failed with a 500. Both spellings now share MAX_CONFIG_PATH_DEPTH and answer 400 CONFIG_PATH_INVALID / too_deep on PATCH, tombstone and DELETE /fields. Writes reduced to nothing (protected interface permissions, base-only or dedicated sections) answered 200 without checking expectedRevision. They now compare it with the stored document and answer 409 CONFIG_VERSION_CONFLICT with currentRevision on a mismatch, as the write itself would. * 📡 fix: Retry the Config Invalidation Subscription When Redis Comes Back A SUBSCRIBE that failed at startup (Redis unreachable, the client's retries spent) was only logged, and ioredis resubscribes only to channels it has joined, so the instance missed every other instance's config invalidation until it restarted. The subscription is now sent again each time the subscriber becomes ready until one succeeds; after that the client's own resubscribe takes over, and closing stops the retries. * 🧷 fix: Tighten Config Change Batches Around Array Entries, Cancelled Changes and MCP Tombstones - A tombstone with an index segment below a field configSchema does not define (an unknown key, or what an intersection or any holds) is refused as inside_array: the merge removes inherited values from objects only, so it was stored and reported applied while the element stayed visible. - unset joins set and rename in the merged-by-key position check: unset endpoints.custom.0.headers answers 400 indexed_merge_key_write, since the position can name another endpoint by the time the batch applies. upsertEntry and removeEntry address entries by key. - A batch whose changes cancel out (set interface.customWelcome, then unset interface) writes nothing: no empty document, revision bump, audit entry or invalidation. Its changes are reported as unchanged. - A whole-section mcpServers tombstone reports each librechat.yaml stdio server it leaves in place as ignored (process_mcp_server). - removeEntry no longer attributes the whole collection to itself, and existing issues of merged-by-key entries are matched by key rather than index, so removing an entry beside a legacy-invalid one (or shifting it) is no longer refused for that entry's issue. * 🪪 fix: Keep a Requested Priority on New Principals and Report Ignored MCP Renames POST …/changes discarded a broad manager's priority for a principal without a document when no change altered it: the batch answered written: false instead of creating the priority-only document PUT creates. An explicit priority on an absent principal now counts as a change. A rename under an MCP server librechat.yaml runs as a process persisted an override the runtime merge drops, but was not reported in ignored. It now is, like set and tombstone. An unset there stays unreported: it asks for the YAML value, which is what runs. * 🔁 fix: Drop YAML Reloads and Merges Overtaken by a Config Write Admin config writes clear the YAML base config on every instance, so a write is how a running server picks up an edit to librechat.yaml. Two races could undo that: - A base reload that read the old YAML before a write's clear cached it after the clear, and the base has no TTL, so the old base was served until the next write. - A request that read the old base before the clear, and was still resolving principals, cached its merge under the new override generation for the override TTL. The config service now keeps a base-config generation that `clearAppConfigCache` bumps. A reload publishes the base, the tools and the last good config only if its generation is still current, a read after a clear never joins a reload started before it, and the newer reload starts once the stale one settles so the loader's process-wide side effects end with the newest YAML. Merges capture the generation, base included, before they read the base config. Tests: - service.spec: a clear during a reload (stale success, stale failure, a read waiting on the newer reload) and a merge built on the pre-clear base. - invalidation.redis.spec: a write on one instance makes another reload librechat.yaml. - admin-config-reload.spec (api): every admin config write route, through the real router, handlers, database and config service, reloads librechat.yaml; a request with nothing to write does not. - invalidateConfigCaches.spec no longer asserts an order the parallel clears do not have. * 🧪 test: Reload librechat.yaml After a Committed Change Batch and Not After an Unwritten One * 🧮 fix: Validate Change Batches on Their End State and Report Base-Only Fields a Tombstone Keeps A batch's validation scope was built from every intermediate write, located in the state each change produced. A change a later one undid (set `balance.startBalance`, then restore `balance`) still widened the scope, so an issue the stored document already had there rejected an unrelated change, and an entry a later change moved (upsert one entry, then remove one before it) pointed its written index at a neighbour with a legacy issue. The written paths are now located in the batch's end state and kept only where that state differs from the stored document, with entries of merged-by-key arrays compared by key. A tombstone above a base-only field (`endpoints.agents`, `endpoints.agents.pullRequests`) is stored and hides the rest of the subtree, while the runtime merge puts back the provider, host, OAuth app and shared cache slots librechat.yaml sets. The response now lists those fields in `ignored` with reason `base_only_path`, as it already does for the stdio MCP servers a whole-section tombstone leaves in place. * 🧬 fix: Encode Config Keys in Objects Built in Another Realm The key encoder treated an object as plain only when its prototype was this realm's Object.prototype, and returned any other object unchanged, keys and all. Under Jest, structuredClone (which the secret pipeline uses) returns objects from the host realm, so the items of an array the pipeline had cloned, such as Azure groups or custom endpoints, reached the engine with their dotted keys raw. Node in production has one realm, but the encoding must not depend on prototype identity: a skipped object stores its dotted keys raw without an error. A plain object is now one whose prototype is null or a root Object.prototype from any realm. The encoding spec covers an object built in a vm context. * 🧪 test: Check Dotted Record Keys Reach the Store's Whole-Document Write dev's admin config route test asserted the keys on patchConfigFields, which the handlers no longer call; it now asserts them on the draft writeConfigDocument receives. * 🚩 feat: Publish the expectedRevision, prunesEmptyParents and awaitedInvalidation Config Flags GET /api/admin/config/meta now reports the three write-coherence behaviours this branch implements, so an admin client can drop the workarounds each one replaces: - expectedRevision: responses carry `revision`; PUT, PATCH /fields, POST /fields/tombstone and PATCH /active take `expectedRevision` in the body and both DELETE routes in the query. A mismatch answers 409 CONFIG_VERSION_CONFLICT with currentRevision, a malformed value 400 INVALID_EXPECTED_REVISION; unpinned writes re-read and re-apply up to 3 times. - prunesEmptyParents: a field delete or tombstone removes the objects it empties, stopping at arrays; shells-only documents count as empty for assign-only lifecycle calls. - awaitedInvalidation: writes answer after the config caches are cleared (broadcast with Redis), GET /base bypasses the merged-config cache, and a merge read before a clear is never cached. meta.spec probes each one against the behaviour: a stale and a malformed precondition on a PATCH, the store operations' unset and tombstone on nested objects and an array element, and a held invalidation, the GET /base read options and a merge raced by a clear. * 🔀 fix: Keep Config Keys Raw Where the Engine Stores Them, So Older Servers Read Them During Upgrades Servers before the key encoding (v0.8.9-rc1 among them) read every override key literally. The Mongoose binding encoded every write, so during a rolling upgrade the first write from an upgraded server turned a stored `gpt-4.1` or Bedrock inference profile into `gpt-4%2E1` for every server not yet upgraded, and an older server's restore of a deleted group or role config dropped the `keyEncoding` marker its schema lacks, after which upgraded servers read the encoded keys literally. The binding now sends keys raw first and encodes them only when the engine refuses a raw field name (DocumentDB, Cosmos, FerretDB or MongoDB 4.4 for `$` names): the refused write changed nothing, so it runs again encoded under the same revision precondition, and that process encodes later writes holding such keys directly. MongoDB 4.4+ stores dotted names (5.0+ also `$` names inside a value), so there an older server reads exactly what it wrote. A document whose raw keys spell escape sequences while none holds a raw `.`, `$` or NUL is still written encoded, since a raw read would decode it. A raw write clears the marker. Reads decode a marked document (raw keys an older server added beside encoded ones, or wrote under a marker it left, carry no escape sequence and read as stored) and an unmarked one unless some key holds a raw `.`, `$` or NUL, which no encoded document does; that reads an encoded document whose marker an older server dropped. Encoding stays in the binding for every engine that needs it (decision #15); the residual cases are in documentdb-compat.md. * ⏱️ fix: Remove Config Cache Writes a Clear Overtook in Flight With an asynchronous APP_CONFIG store (Redis or a custom Keyv store), a clear can bump the generation and finish its delete after a reload or merge checked the generation but before its `set` landed. The older value then repopulated `_BASE_` until the next write, or a merged config for the full override TTL. The base reload, the last-good restoration and the merge cache now check the generation again once their write lands and delete what they wrote if a clear overtook it. A deleted entry only costs the next read a reload or a merge; a newer base load cannot be removed this way, since it starts only after the stale one settles. * 🔐 fix: Require the Stored Web Search Key Again When a Change Batch Moves Its URL #17323 refuses a PUT, PATCH, tombstone or field delete that changes or removes a web search URL beside a stored API key unless the key is entered again, so a stored key cannot be sent to a destination it was not entered for. POST /changes skipped that check: a batch could set, reset or tombstone `webSearch.searxngInstanceUrl` (or replace `webSearch` without the key, which keeps the stored key) and point the stored key at another host. A batch is now judged on the document it would store, like PATCH: a URL that ends up beside a stored key it did not travel with answers 400 CONFIG_SECRET_REENTRY_REQUIRED and writes nothing, dry runs included. Only keys the request sent count as entered again; a secret a set kept from the stored document does not. * 🚩 feat: Publish the changesBatch Flag and the maxChangeOps Limit in Config Meta GET /api/admin/config/meta now reports `features.changesBatch: true` and `limits.maxChangeOps` (1000, from MAX_CONFIG_CHANGE_OPS), so the admin panel can gate its one-request save on the endpoint and size its batches from the server. The meta.spec probe checks the behaviour itself: an oversized batch answers TOO_MANY_OPS, a batch with one invalid op writes nothing, and a valid set plus tombstone lands as one write. |
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0b4dc238b3
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🗄️ refactor: Portable Admin Config Store with Revisions, Key Encoding and Coherent Writes (#17326)
* 🗄️ refactor: Portable Admin Config Store with Revisions, Key Encoding and Coherent Writes Admin config writes went straight to MongoDB with dotted-path `$set`, `$unset`, `$pull` and `$addToSet`, and nothing checked `configVersion`. That caused six problems. * 🔁 fix: Reload librechat.yaml on Admin Config Writes Base-only sections such as `filters` and `messageFilter` live only in librechat.yaml, and an admin config write was how a running server picked up an edit to them. The coherent-cache change limited admin-write invalidation to the override and MCP caches, so the YAML base was never re-read after startup: the content-filter e2e suite, which activates filters by editing the YAML and writing a reload sentinel, saw `filters: undefined` from GET /base and every activation timed out. Admin config writes clear the YAML base config again, alongside the override and MCP caches, and the clear is broadcast with the others, so every instance reloads its YAML. The reload keeps the last good config on failure and republishes the tools derived from it, so the global tool cache is left for it to overwrite rather than emptied first. * 🧭 fix: Cap Dotted Field Path Depth and Hold Revision Preconditions on No-Op Writes A dotted fieldPath was split without the 32-segment cap that segments already had, so a deep path reached the recursive path writer and failed with a 500. Both spellings now share MAX_CONFIG_PATH_DEPTH and answer 400 CONFIG_PATH_INVALID / too_deep on PATCH, tombstone and DELETE /fields. Writes reduced to nothing (protected interface permissions, base-only or dedicated sections) answered 200 without checking expectedRevision. They now compare it with the stored document and answer 409 CONFIG_VERSION_CONFLICT with currentRevision on a mismatch, as the write itself would. * 📡 fix: Retry the Config Invalidation Subscription When Redis Comes Back A SUBSCRIBE that failed at startup (Redis unreachable, the client's retries spent) was only logged, and ioredis resubscribes only to channels it has joined, so the instance missed every other instance's config invalidation until it restarted. The subscription is now sent again each time the subscriber becomes ready until one succeeds; after that the client's own resubscribe takes over, and closing stops the retries. * 🔁 fix: Drop YAML Reloads and Merges Overtaken by a Config Write Admin config writes clear the YAML base config on every instance, so a write is how a running server picks up an edit to librechat.yaml. Two races could undo that: - A base reload that read the old YAML before a write's clear cached it after the clear, and the base has no TTL, so the old base was served until the next write. - A request that read the old base before the clear, and was still resolving principals, cached its merge under the new override generation for the override TTL. The config service now keeps a base-config generation that `clearAppConfigCache` bumps. A reload publishes the base, the tools and the last good config only if its generation is still current, a read after a clear never joins a reload started before it, and the newer reload starts once the stale one settles so the loader's process-wide side effects end with the newest YAML. Merges capture the generation, base included, before they read the base config. Tests: - service.spec: a clear during a reload (stale success, stale failure, a read waiting on the newer reload) and a merge built on the pre-clear base. - invalidation.redis.spec: a write on one instance makes another reload librechat.yaml. - admin-config-reload.spec (api): every admin config write route, through the real router, handlers, database and config service, reloads librechat.yaml; a request with nothing to write does not. - invalidateConfigCaches.spec no longer asserts an order the parallel clears do not have. * 🧬 fix: Encode Config Keys in Objects Built in Another Realm The key encoder treated an object as plain only when its prototype was this realm's Object.prototype, and returned any other object unchanged, keys and all. Under Jest, structuredClone (which the secret pipeline uses) returns objects from the host realm, so the items of an array the pipeline had cloned, such as Azure groups or custom endpoints, reached the engine with their dotted keys raw. Node in production has one realm, but the encoding must not depend on prototype identity: a skipped object stores its dotted keys raw without an error. A plain object is now one whose prototype is null or a root Object.prototype from any realm. The encoding spec covers an object built in a vm context. * 🧪 test: Check Dotted Record Keys Reach the Store's Whole-Document Write dev's admin config route test asserted the keys on patchConfigFields, which the handlers no longer call; it now asserts them on the draft writeConfigDocument receives. * 🚩 feat: Publish the expectedRevision, prunesEmptyParents and awaitedInvalidation Config Flags GET /api/admin/config/meta now reports the three write-coherence behaviours this branch implements, so an admin client can drop the workarounds each one replaces: - expectedRevision: responses carry `revision`; PUT, PATCH /fields, POST /fields/tombstone and PATCH /active take `expectedRevision` in the body and both DELETE routes in the query. A mismatch answers 409 CONFIG_VERSION_CONFLICT with currentRevision, a malformed value 400 INVALID_EXPECTED_REVISION; unpinned writes re-read and re-apply up to 3 times. - prunesEmptyParents: a field delete or tombstone removes the objects it empties, stopping at arrays; shells-only documents count as empty for assign-only lifecycle calls. - awaitedInvalidation: writes answer after the config caches are cleared (broadcast with Redis), GET /base bypasses the merged-config cache, and a merge read before a clear is never cached. meta.spec probes each one against the behaviour: a stale and a malformed precondition on a PATCH, the store operations' unset and tombstone on nested objects and an array element, and a held invalidation, the GET /base read options and a merge raced by a clear. * 🔀 fix: Keep Config Keys Raw Where the Engine Stores Them, So Older Servers Read Them During Upgrades Servers before the key encoding (v0.8.9-rc1 among them) read every override key literally. The Mongoose binding encoded every write, so during a rolling upgrade the first write from an upgraded server turned a stored `gpt-4.1` or Bedrock inference profile into `gpt-4%2E1` for every server not yet upgraded, and an older server's restore of a deleted group or role config dropped the `keyEncoding` marker its schema lacks, after which upgraded servers read the encoded keys literally. The binding now sends keys raw first and encodes them only when the engine refuses a raw field name (DocumentDB, Cosmos, FerretDB or MongoDB 4.4 for `$` names): the refused write changed nothing, so it runs again encoded under the same revision precondition, and that process encodes later writes holding such keys directly. MongoDB 4.4+ stores dotted names (5.0+ also `$` names inside a value), so there an older server reads exactly what it wrote. A document whose raw keys spell escape sequences while none holds a raw `.`, `$` or NUL is still written encoded, since a raw read would decode it. A raw write clears the marker. Reads decode a marked document (raw keys an older server added beside encoded ones, or wrote under a marker it left, carry no escape sequence and read as stored) and an unmarked one unless some key holds a raw `.`, `$` or NUL, which no encoded document does; that reads an encoded document whose marker an older server dropped. Encoding stays in the binding for every engine that needs it (decision #15); the residual cases are in documentdb-compat.md. * ⏱️ fix: Remove Config Cache Writes a Clear Overtook in Flight With an asynchronous APP_CONFIG store (Redis or a custom Keyv store), a clear can bump the generation and finish its delete after a reload or merge checked the generation but before its `set` landed. The older value then repopulated `_BASE_` until the next write, or a merged config for the full override TTL. The base reload, the last-good restoration and the merge cache now check the generation again once their write lands and delete what they wrote if a clear overtook it. A deleted entry only costs the next read a reload or a merge; a newer base load cannot be removed this way, since it starts only after the stale one settles. |
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9ea3c5647d
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🔑 fix: Use Admin-Stored Web Search Credentials at Runtime (#17323)
* 🔑 fix: Use Admin-Stored Web Search Credentials at Runtime Use admin-stored (encrypted or literal) web search credentials as system credentials at runtime, add the Keenable key to the secret registry, bind a stored key to the layer that set its URL, and require re-entering the key when a write changes or removes that URL (checked atomically with a version precondition). * 🧹 fix: Keep Dotted-Key Write Guarantees on Version-Checked Web Search Writes A version-checked write the caller saw absent first creates an empty document. When the database then refuses the write (a key name it cannot store, answered 422 CONFIG_KEY_NOT_STORABLE), remove that document again so a refused write stores nothing, unless another write has changed it. Secret re-entry issues now carry `segments` like every other config issue. * 🚩 feat: Publish the webSearchStoredKeys Feature Flag in the Config Contract GET /api/admin/config/meta now reports `webSearchStoredKeys: true`, so an admin client can stop warning that only ${VAR} web search references work at runtime. meta.spec probes the behaviour behind it: an encrypted stored key reaches web search auth, the Keenable key is encrypted on write, and changing a URL beside a stored key requires entering the key again. * 🧪 test: Type the Refused-Write Driver Stub in the Config Methods Spec * 🧪 test: Expect the Write Precondition Arguments in the Admin Config Route Test The handler passes a session slot and an optional version precondition to patchConfigFields since the web search re-entry check; the route test added in #17322 asserted the earlier five-argument call. * 🧹 fix: Surface a Failed Cleanup of the Empty Config Document When a version-checked write the database refused cannot remove the empty document created for it, let that failure reach the handler (500) instead of logging it and answering 422 CONFIG_KEY_NOT_STORABLE, which promises that nothing was stored. * 📝 docs: State the Web Search Stored-Key Binding Rule Exactly in the webSearchStoredKeys Flag The flag's doc said a stored key goes only to a URL the same layer set. The merge rule keeps a stored key over an inherited ${VAR} or default URL, so the doc now names the exact rule: a stored key reaches a URL stored in config only when one layer set both, a later layer that changes, blanks or removes the URL drops the key, and a write that changes or removes the URL must enter the key again. * 🧹 refactor: Read the Secret Registry Through getConfigSecretRules Only The dev merge kept this branch's getConfigSecretFields and getConfigArraySecretFields beside dev's getConfigSecretRules, which returns the same registry data. Only the secret specs used the two extra accessors. They now read getConfigSecretRules().secretFields and .arraySecretFields, so the accessors and their exported ConfigSecretField and ArraySecretField interfaces (duplicates of AdminConfigSecretFieldRule and AdminConfigArraySecretFieldRule) are gone. |
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2591a15c10
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🔑 feat: Keep Dotted Record Keys in Admin Config Writes and Publish the Config Contract (#17322)
* 🔑 feat: Keep Dotted Record Keys in Admin Config Writes and Publish the Config Contract Keep dotted record keys in admin config write bodies behind a path-scoped sanitizer, reject $-prefixed and prototype keys after auth, report dotted_key issues with segments, and publish GET /api/admin/config/meta (features, rules, limits, versions) so clients can gate on backend capabilities. * 🧪 test: Expect Issue Segments in the Config Override e2e Scenario Override validation issues now carry `segments`; assert the full issue shape. |
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9adabde72e
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🗂️ feat: Audit MCP, Code Worker, Langfuse, Skill Credential, Passkey and Audit Log Access (#17054)
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* fix: Remove Group Dependents Before Deleting the Group * feat: Audit Code Worker Pairing and Langfuse Connection Changes * feat: Audit Skill Sync Credential Changes * feat: Audit Passkey Enrolment and Removal * feat: Audit Audit Log Reads and CSV Exports * feat: Audit Audit Log Retention Purges * feat: Audit MCP Server Create, Update and Delete * fix: Keep Purge Result When the Purge Audit Write Fails * test: Cover Admin Integration Audit Scenarios * fix: Tighten Admin Integration Audit Scope and Group Cleanup Order * fix: Run Security Fences Before Awaiting Audit Writes * fix: Move MCP Post-Commit Audit Ordering Into the Auditor and Audit Verify Reads * fix: Fail Closed When Recording Audit Log Access * fix: Audit Group Deletion Before the Cascade and Restore Dependents on Failure * fix: Restore Only Config Overrides When Group Deletion Fails * fix: Audit Worker Pairing and Export Before the Work and Append Failures * fix: Record Group Deletion as Pending Without Delaying Revocation * fix: Skip Config Restore When a Concurrent Delete Removed the Group * fix: Restore Group Config When the Existence Recheck Fails * fix: Keep Group Config Restricted When Delete State Is Unknown * fix: Record Worker Pairing and Revocation as Pending Until Confirmed * fix: Deliver the Pairing Code Before the Terminal Audit Write * test: Assert Pairing Code Delivery Precedes the Terminal Audit Write * fix: Send Revocation and Group Deletion Responses Before the Terminal Audit Write * fix: Snapshot Group Config Before the Destructive Cascade Step * refactor: Type the Group Config Snapshot Dependency Without Mongoose Shapes * fix: Fence Shared MCP Users Before the Deletion Audit and Correlate Audit Attempts * fix: Diff MCP Server Audits Against the Committed Config * fix: Read the Committed MCP Config at Commit Time for the Audit Diff * refactor: Start the Committed MCP Config Read Inside the Auditor * fix: Audit Langfuse Patches When Activation Fails and Surface Failed Group Config Restores * fix: Record Member Removals When Group Deletion Completes After a Failed Restore * test: Serve the Committed Config on the MCP Update Audit Reread * fix: Audit the Group Returned by the Compensating Deletion * fix: Keep Member Removal Audits Fail-Open During Group Deletion * fix: Retry ACL Cleanup After a Compensating Group Deletion * fix: Mark Unavailable Audit Detail and Order Member Removals After the Pending Deletion * fix: Guard Synchronous Committed-Config Read Failures in the MCP Auditor * fix: Return the Persisted MCP Config and Audit Commits That Outlive Cache Invalidation * style: Sort Imports in MCP Audit Files * style: Sort Imports After Restack * fix: Audit MCP Commits That Outlive Any Post-Write Step and Pend Audit Exports Until Complete * test: Provide the Fail-Closed Setting in the Code Route Mock * fix: Refresh MCP Read Caches When a Repository Step Fails After the Write * fix: Finish Audit Exports on Response Completion and Keep Error Details Out of Messages and Logs * fix: Watch Response Completion Before the Truncation Footer Write * fix: Skip Audit for No-op MCP Deletes and Close Remaining Post-Failure Audit Gaps * fix: Keep Causes Out of Structured Logs and Treat a Lost Compensating Delete as Not Found * fix: Mark Failed MCP Post-Commit Steps and Null Langfuse Activation in Audits |
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76192bdfd0
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🛂 feat: Audit Resource Sharing Changes and Fail Closed on Reversible Audit Writes (#17053)
* feat: Audit Resource ACL Changes and Fail Closed by Default * fix: Keep Non-Reversible Admin Audit Handlers Fail-Open * docs: Narrow AUDIT_LOG_FAIL_CLOSED Description * fix: Audit and Restore ACL and Insights Changes in One Pass * fix: Break Audit and Insights Permission Type Cycle * test: Cover Resource ACL Audit Scenarios * refactor: Audit Resource Permission Changes Before Writing * test: Align Concurrent Revoke Audit Expectation * fix: Skip Deleting ACL Entries That Were Not Audited * fix: Read ACL Snapshots Through the Write Session * fix: Never Block Revocations on Audit Outages and Normalize Principal Keys * fix: Let an Explicit Public Disable Win Over a Public Update * fix: Audit Duplicate ACL Rows as Combined Permissions * fix: Audit Permission Changes Under One Target and Dedupe Revokes * fix: Audit Capability Grants Before Writing Them * feat: Serialize Resource Permission Updates With a Per-Resource Lease * fix: Fence the Resource Lease Before Writes and Always Audit Grant Assignments * fix: Renew the Resource Lease Before Each ACL Write Phase * fix: Serialize System Grant Assignment and Revocation With a Per-Grant Lease * fix: Keep Leases Alive During Audits, Bound Lock Index Wait, Canonicalize Audit Target IDs * fix: Retry Deferred Revoke Audits Under the Lease and Audit Canonical Principal and Role IDs * test: Expect Role IDs in Permission Audit Metadata * fix: Read Mutation Snapshots From the Primary Outside Transactions * fix: Flush Deferred Audits Before Cache Invalidation, Keep Renewals Monotonic, Keep Role Case in Grant Lease Keys * refactor: Map the Busy Permission Error to Its Code in the API Package * style: Sort Lease Imports and Type the Renewal Spec Read * fix: Keep Success Audits After Commit, Report Downgrades as Revocations, Code Audit Outages * refactor: Move the Audit Outage Code to Its Own Module * fix: Translate Lock Failures, Lease Non-Transactional Sessions, and Code Grant Audit Outages * fix: Sanitize Lease Renewal Failures at the Permission Boundary * fix: Annotate the Unavailable Error Code for Isolated Declarations * fix: Keep the Admin Route Fail-Closed Opt-In and Document Lease Clock Skew Safety * fix: Translate Grant Lease Store Failures to a Retryable 503 * fix: Log Failed Grant Audit Writes With Safe Metadata Only * test: Detect Raw Error Arguments in the Grant Audit Log Spec * feat: Make Permission Lease Limits Configurable and Localize Retryable Sharing Failures * fix: Bound Lock Index Readiness by the Lease Wait and Carry the Resource ID in Every Audit Entry * test: Cover Lease Config Reaching the Leases and the Sharing Dialog Failure Messages * fix: Load App Config on the Sharing and Grant Routes and Log Failed Lease Releases * perf: Load App Config Only on the Grant Mutation Routes |
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ccae5b988d
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📜 feat: Audit Admin Role, Group, Config and IdP Role Mutations (#17052)
* feat: Extend the Audit Action Vocabulary to Admin, Sync and Credential Mutations * feat: Audit Admin Role, Group and Config Mutations Role deletion now removes the role's grants, ACL entries and config overrides before the role itself and returns ROLE_CLEANUP_FAILED instead of success when any of them fails, so a recreated role cannot inherit leftover privileges. * feat: Audit IdP and Startup Role Changes * fix: Keep the Startup Role Sync Running When Its Audit Verification Read Fails * test: Cover Admin Role Audit Trail End to End * fix: Audit a Remote Agent Role Sync Only After It Persists * fix: Restore Role Dependents When Role Deletion Fails Midway * fix: Restore Role Dependents Only When the Role Still Exists * style: Sort Role Admin Imports * fix: Keep the ACL Snapshot When Role Cleanup Fails Ambiguously * test: Read Role Audit Entries From the Audit Log Route * fix: Audit Only Real Membership Changes and Restore Deleted Role Config in Full * fix: Restore Deleted Role Grants in Full and Sanitize Audit Write Logging * fix: Audit and Report a Role Deletion Confirmed After a Lost Response * fix: Never Restore Dependents Onto a Recreated Role * fix: Snapshot Role Dependents Before Deleting and Detect Membership Changes Atomically * fix: Restore From the Data a Cascade Step Actually Removed * fix: Restore Only Config Overrides When a Role Delete Fails * fix: Log Only Safe Metadata When the Startup Audit Read Fails * fix: Audit Grants Removed by a Failed Role Delete * fix: Audit Removed Grants on Unverifiable Role Delete Exits * fix: Honor Fail-Closed Auditing in the Admin Config, Group and Role Routes * fix: Bind Role Deletion to the Captured Id and Audit Only Atomic Role and Config Changes * fix: Skip the Config Restore When the Targeted Role Is Gone * fix: Audit Initial Group Members and Skip No-Op Role Description Updates * fix: Record Role Deletion as Pending Before Cleanup and Append Its Outcome * fix: Audit Reassigned Role Members and Return the Persisted Config After a Tracked Toggle * fix: Keep a Committed Role Deletion Successful When Cascade Audit Writes Fail * fix: Decide Group Update Audits From the Atomic Write and Sanitize Permission Update Logs * fix: Audit Grants From a Snapshot, Fail on Member Lookup Errors and Chunk Member Audit Entries * fix: Audit Group Deletion Members and Previous Role Removal, Abort on Grant Snapshot Failure * fix: Invalidate Config Caches After Partial Secret Writes * fix: Retry Failed Cascade Restores, Report Changed Group Fields and Audit Every Reassigned Member * fix: Log Safe Metadata When Cache Invalidation Fails After a Partial Write * fix: Keep Error Messages Out of the Audit Write Failure Log * style: Sort Audit Log Spec Imports * fix: Sanitize Admin Handler Error Logs and Dispatch System Audit Writes Without Waiting |
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20d2c0d43d
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🧹 fix: Run the Full Erasure Cascade When an Admin Deletes a User (#17050)
* fix: Run the Erasure Cascade in Admin User Deletion * refactor: Share Generation Stop Logic Between Self-Service and Admin Deletion * refactor: Move Admin Erasure Dependency Assembly Into packages/api * fix: Bind getCleanupJob When Waiting for Generation Persistence * test: Pin the Deletion Fence Before Admin Generation Stop * fix: Resolve the Erasure Target Config Fail Closed * fix: Carry the Target Profile Into Admin Erasure Storage Cleanup * fix: Keep the Erasure Target Contract Storage Neutral and Reuse the Loaded Identity * fix: Refuse New Generations Once Account Deletion Has Begun * fix: Enforce Account Deletion Admission Once in createJob and Narrow the Erasure File Type * fix: Install the Admission Guard in Every Entrypoint and Purge Refused Jobs * fix: Guarantee Refused Job Purge and Sanitize Admission Failures * fix: Route Remote Admission Through createJob and Keep Refusal Cleanup Sanitized * fix: Log Admission Cleanup Failures With Safe Error Metadata * refactor: Check Account Deletion Before Creating a Generation and Drain Twice * refactor: Order Admission Against the Deletion Marker Without a Grace Period * fix: Sanitize Post-Commit Admission Retirement Failures * fix: Wire Shared-Server MCP OAuth Cleanup Into Admin Erasure * fix: Scope Admin Erasure Lookups to the Target Tenant and Await Shared-Link Cleanup * fix: Resolve the Erasure Target Config Under the Target Tenant * fix: Run Admin Erasure OAuth Fencing in the Target Tenant * fix: Match the Split OAuth Invalidate and Disconnect Hooks in Admin Erasure * refactor: Inject the Tenant Executor Into the Erasure Resolver |
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0bc344fcb9
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🔑 feat: Let Users Connect Their Own Account for Pull Request Lookups (#16989)
* feat: Let Users Connect Their Own Account for Pull Request Lookups * fix: Refuse Cross-Tenant Pull Request Callbacks and Surface Key Failures * fix: Keep Pull Request Grants Through Outages and Remove Them on Disconnect A token endpoint server error is an outage even with an OAuth error body, so it no longer deletes the grant, and a refresh outage reaches the lookup as unavailable instead of falling back to no token. Disconnect removes every pr_oauth row of the user, whatever app or host is configured now. A grant that never expires extends its retention when used, and the flow, request and retention limits are configurable. The connection routes are built in packages/api, mounted behind the pre-auth tenant middleware in both servers, and answer failures with stable codes. * fix: Keep the Pull Request OAuth App Out of Overrides A role, group, user or tenant override can no longer change or remove pullRequests.oauth, so the connect capability and the callback see the operator's app. * fix: Read a User's Pull Request Token Only With the Feature On * fix: Report a Malformed Stored Pull Request Grant as a Failure * fix: Remove a User's Stored Tokens When an Administrator Deletes the User * fix: Answer No Pull Request for a Conversation Without a Lane When the User Token Fails * fix: Share One Grant Read Between Concurrent Callers and Report an Expired Grant Disconnected * fix: Remove a Pull Request Grant Only on a Definite Refusal and Past Its Retention * fix: Version Pull Request Grants and Coordinate Refresh, Refusal and Retention Through Them * fix: Invalidate a Refused User Token and Read It Only for a Lane That Needs It * fix: Finish a Pull Request Connection Under the User's Effective Config Behind the Login Limiter * fix: Type the Pull Request User Token for Isolated Declarations and Settle Retention Before Answering * fix: Bind a Pull Request Connection Flow to the Generation a Disconnect Replaces * fix: Start a Batch's User Token Read Only Within Its Deadline * fix: Fence Pull Request Token Reads Against a Disconnect and Report a Failed Retention Cleanup * fix: Fence Connection Status Like Token Reads and Keep a Newer Read Joinable * fix: Report a Pull Request Grant Without Its App and Name the Sign-In That Made It * fix: Read a User's Unexpired Pull Request Grants Newest First * fix: Mark the Connection Callback as an OAuth Navigation and Report a Failed Extension * fix: Name the Pull Request Sign-In Flow on Its Landing Page * fix: Remove a Pull Request Grant of a Replaced App When It Is Read * fix: Keep a Replaced App's Grant Untouched and Extend Retention From Each Day's Use * fix: Accept a Pull Request Grant Only Under the User's Current Connection Generation * fix: Renew the Connection Generation With a Grant Still in Use * fix: Restore the Previous Connection When a Sign-In Cannot Store Its Grant * fix: Decide a Sign-In by What Was Stored When a Write Does Not Answer * fix: Roll Back a Sign-In's Generation Along With a Grant It Must Remove * fix: Refresh an Access Token a Lookup Was Refused With Before Ending the Connection * fix: Undo a Sign-In Only for a Confirmed Fence, Not a Failed Check * fix: Read a User Token Again When the Connection Changes Under the Read * fix: Apply the Current Retention Again When Another Replica Changed the Grant First * test: Answer Each Concurrent Sign-In by Its Own Code * fix: Skip Retention Rewrites for Grants That Expire Without a Refresh Token * fix: Retry a Token Rejection That Loses to a Concurrent Grant Write * fix: Skip User Token Reads for Lanes Without a Commit and Reread Status After a Reconnect |
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92432e95d5
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🔐 feat: Enforce Required Two-Factor Authentication (#14731)
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* feat: enforce required two-factor authentication Require local and LDAP accounts to enroll in TOTP before they can use the app when ENFORCE_TWO_FACTOR_AUTHENTICATION is set. Sign-in, refresh, bearer verification, optional share auth and image authorization all route an unenrolled account into a staged setup flow, and every bearer credential minted before enrollment or a password reset is retired. Password reset retirement uses the existing credentialsChangedAt stamp, and commitPasswordReset clears any staged enrollment in the same write. Passkey sign-in follows the same enrollment gate as password sign-in. * test: cover passkey sign-in handing off to required enrollment * refactor: keep Mongoose user types out of two-factor auth contracts * fix: withdraw a minted session when its retirement recheck fails * fix: hold Agent API keys and the reset CLI to the required two-factor policy * fix: adopt a setup token handed off after the setup screen mounted * fix: move every tab that receives an enrollment hand-off into setup * fix: read the enrollment gate's retirement cutoff in system scope * fix: clear minted session cookies before the fallible session deletion * fix: adopt a setup token persisted before the setup screen subscribed |
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4617302116 |
🔑 feat: Passkey Authentication with WebAuthn Sign-In and Management (#14715)
* feat: passkey authentication with WebAuthn sign-in and management
* refactor: tighten passkey account protections
Require password confirmation before adding or removing a passkey, and rate
limit those confirmations per user in their own namespace. Restrict passkey
enrollment and sign-in to local accounts, and re-evaluate account status once
the credential owner is resolved. Require user verification on the sign-in
ceremony. Invalidate outstanding access tokens on password reset. Tighten
redirect target validation and sanitize ceremony failure logs.
Adds coverage across the passkey controller, the WebAuthn helpers, the step-up
limiter, both JWT strategies, the redirect utility and the passkey settings UI.
* fix: localize passkey default name and respect router basename
Send a localized default credential label at enrollment so non-English
locales no longer persist the server's English fallback, and route the
passkey post-login and 2FA navigations through the deployment base path
so subdirectory installs stay inside the router.
Also mock syncStaticTools in the server boot specs; without it the
post-listen MCP initialization calls undefined and exits the worker.
* fix: harden passkey counter checks and reach stranded credentials
Make the signature counter write a compare-and-swap so two assertions
that verified against the same stored counter cannot both commit, and
reject the losing one; a cloned authenticator is otherwise accepted
inside that window. Counterless authenticators keep restamping at 0.
Keep the passkey panel reachable for identity-provider accounts, which
already get passwordless removal server-side but had no way in, while
hiding the add control they cannot use. Cascade passkey deletion from
the admin user-deletion path so credential IDs are not stranded.
* fix: reject stale 2FA temp tokens and surface passkey load failures
A temporary 2FA token proves only the first factor, so honouring one
minted before a password reset let anyone holding the second factor
survive account recovery. Apply the same credentials-changed cutoff the
JWT strategy uses.
Also distinguish a failed passkey query from an empty list; the error
state previously rendered as "no passkeys yet", which misreports what
is protecting the account.
* fix: fail closed when the passkey counter write cannot commit
Returning success on a storage error bypassed the compare-and-swap it
exists to enforce, so a cloned authenticator could be accepted while the
stored counter stayed stale. A database that cannot take this write
cannot mint the session either, so little is gained by failing open.
Counterless credentials carry no clone signal and keep their old path.
* fix: keep the passkey 2FA handoff inside the router
A full-page navigation to the 2FA screen remounted AuthContextProvider,
which silent-refreshes on mount; no refresh session exists yet at that
point, so it bounced back to login before the code could be entered.
Route through the router like the password flow does.
Also reveal the removal step-up field when the server refuses a
passwordless attempt, so an account migrated to an identity provider
without its old hash cleared can still clear its credentials; drop the
staged password when the dialog closes; and revoke passkeys in the CLI
password reset, which bypassed the HTTP controller's cleanup.
* fix: apply one email-verification policy across login methods
Accounts predating mandatory verification are marked verified as they
sign in when no email is configured, but only the password strategy did
it, so the same legacy account was admitted by password and refused by
passkey. Extract the rule into a shared helper and call it from both.
* fix: refuse a passkey sign-in when the ban check cannot complete
checkBan defaults next to a no-op, so calling it bare discarded any
internal failure and left req.banned unset, letting the request fall
through and be issued tokens. Capture the error the middleware chain
would have propagated and reject instead.
* fix: refine passkey management dialogs
* test: stabilize passkey tooltip assertions
* test: reconcile passkey specs with the canary reset and deletion flows
The credentialsChangedAt stamp now lives in commitPasswordReset, so its
assertion moves to the passwordReset unit spec. Restores the describe
blocks the rebase merged together.
* test: mock passkey routes in the cross-site login suite
* refactor: move passkey handlers and credential checks into packages/api
The passkey controller, the credentialsChangedAt predicate and the legacy
email-verification grandfathering now live in TypeScript with injected
dependencies; /api keeps only the wiring that builds the handlers.
* style: align passkey UI with Tailwind v4 order and design-rule lint
* fix: revoke earlier access tokens on a CLI password reset
passwordVersion is not a user schema field, so the write was dropped and
tokens issued before the reset kept verifying.
* test: cover passkey sign-in and credential revocation end to end
* fix: hide passkey sign-in when email login is disabled
The passkey endpoints already refuse under ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN=false, so
advertising the button only led to a 403.
* fix: let only one concurrent verification consume a passkey challenge
Without a native getDel the challenge was read then deleted, so two
concurrent verifications could both use it. The delete now arbitrates:
only the caller whose delete removed the key gets the challenge.
* test: run passkey ceremonies on the localhost relying party
WebAuthn refuses an IP address as the RP ID, and the harness serves the
app on 127.0.0.1. The reset scenario runs once per project, so the mock
harness lifts the per-IP reset request limit as it does for forks.
* fix: keep passkey management when email login is disabled
Gate only the sign-in button on emailLoginEnabled, since only the sign-in
routes sit behind that gate; list, rename and remove stay reachable.
* fix: build the passkey credential index before the first registration
With MONGO_AUTO_INDEX=false the unique credentialId index was never
created, so concurrent registrations could store the same credential.
* test: enable password reset in the mock harness and cover email-login-off passkeys
* fix: stop re-exporting the passkey cap from data-schemas
The bundler left every import of methods/passkey.ts unlinked while that
module re-exported MAX_PASSKEYS_PER_USER from librechat-data-provider, so
the index build and the counter-failure log threw ReferenceError at
runtime. Consumers now import the cap from librechat-data-provider.
* test: close nested settings dialogs before logging out in passkey scenarios
* fix: reject cross-site passkey assertions
The verify route accepted a form posted from another site, which let an
attacker sign a victim into the attacker's account. It now runs the same
requireSameOrigin guard as password login and the 2FA step.
* fix: end refresh sessions on a CLI password reset
A surviving refresh session could mint an access token issued after the
credentialsChangedAt stamp, so the CLI now deletes sessions like the web
reset does.
* fix: keep the passkey button locked when it supersedes autofill
Starting the modal ceremony aborts the pending autofill one, and the
autofill error path cleared the shared lock and busy state while the
modal ceremony was still running.
(cherry picked from commit
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9cf33cc8be
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🧿 fix: Bind Login Flows to the Browser That Started Them (#15880)
* 🧿 fix: Bind Login Flows to the Browser That Started Them Social OAuth logins (Google, Facebook, GitHub, Discord, Apple) now store a random state in an HttpOnly cookie scoped to the callback path and only exchange the returned code when the callback carries that state. Apple's form_post callback uses a SameSite=None cookie, and passport-apple's own fixed state no longer bypasses the store. Local login, temp-token 2FA verification and admin local login reject requests a browser sent from another origin (Sec-Fetch-Site, falling back to Origin vs Host), trusting DOMAIN_CLIENT and DOMAIN_SERVER. Requests without browser fetch metadata, such as server-side callers, pass unchanged. The sessionless OAuth callbacks drop failureMessage, which wrote to req.session and turned any rejected callback into a 500. * 🧿 fix: Configure Login State Cookies and Localize Origin Rejections - OAuth state cookies take secureCookie and maxAgeMs from the caller; registration.oauthStateTtlMs in librechat.yaml sets the lifetime (default 10 minutes). - Secure deployments use a __Host- cookie at Path=/ so a sibling subdomain cannot plant a state. - The cookie keeps up to three pending states, so logins started in separate tabs all complete, and an unmatched callback no longer discards them. - passport-apple's preset state is dropped by deferStateToStore in packages/api. - The Origin fallback compares scheme and host against the request itself. - The same-origin rejection carries ErrorTypes.AUTH_CROSS_ORIGIN, which the login and 2FA screens show as a localized message. * 🧿 refactor: Sign Login State Against a Per-Browser Binding - The OAuth state store keeps a random per-browser binding in a __Host- cookie (reused across flows) and signs each state as issuedAt.nonce.HMAC(JWT_SECRET, provider, binding, issuedAt, nonce). Nothing is stored per flow, so any number of tabs complete, each state expires on its own clock, and concurrent starts no longer overwrite each other. - The experimental server entrypoint passes its app config to configureSocialLogins. - The same-origin guard also trusts an explicitly configured ADMIN_PANEL_URL. * 🧿 fix: Keep Separate Bindings for Racing First Logins A browser without a login-state binding now gets one under a cookie name with a random suffix, so two tabs that start their first login at once each keep their own binding. Later starts reuse an existing binding, and a callback is accepted when its state was signed for any binding the browser presents. * 🧿 fix: Sanitize Request-Derived Values in the Cross-Site Rejection Log The same-origin guard logged the request Origin and path verbatim. A non-browser client fully controls the Origin header, and the console transport uses a printf format that does not escape control characters, so a crafted value could forge log lines. Strip ASCII control characters (CR, LF, NUL and the rest) before logging, matching the pattern apiNotFound already uses. |
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dd5829ed77
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🏰 fix: Enforce Platform Grants for Code Workers (#15700)
* fix: Require Platform Grants for Code Workers * fix: Separate Platform Scope From Tenant Identity |
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164f146bdf
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🛞 feat: Manage Personal Code Environment Lifecycles (#15369)
* feat: add self-service code worker pairing * fix: enforce code worker principal boundaries * fix: separate pairing control planes from execution * fix: preserve principal worker routing * fix: pin artifact traffic to code workers * fix: authenticate code worker selection * test: mock worker-aware artifact headers * fix: harden self-service code worker routing * fix: fail closed for principal code pairing * feat: manage personal code environments * fix: harden personal code environment lifecycle * fix: satisfy backend lifecycle types * fix: harden principal environment lifecycle and quotas * fix: fence environment lifecycle races * fix: reconcile code environment stack * style: format code execution headers * fix: reconcile code environment lifecycle * fix: close self-service pairing gaps * fix: close code environment reconciliation gaps * fix: close code environment UI review findings * fix: satisfy code environment type checks * fix: route code priming to selected worker * fix: harden code environment lifecycle fences * fix: type lease renewal interval * fix: harden environment lifecycle recovery * fix: close lifecycle recovery races * fix: type compensated agent timestamps * fix: fence lifecycle cleanup by tenant and revision * fix: scope environment revision fencing |
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fcae1025c0
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🧳 feat: Register Principal-Owned Code Environments (#15365)
* feat: add principal-owned code environments * fix: address code environment CI coverage * fix: expose principal code environments in endpoint config * fix: reject missing code environment bodies * fix: harden code environment lifecycle * fix: revalidate principal code environments * fix: synchronize code environment authorization * fix: bind code environments to current principals * fix: fail closed on code ACL cache errors * fix: prevent code environment override shadowing * fix: preserve principal environment defaults * fix: suppress revoked code environment aliases * fix: fail closed on environment augmentation * fix: narrow code environment defaults * fix: isolate code environment fallback * style: sort code config imports |
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a9ccac8656
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🧲 feat: Enable Secure Attached Environment Pairing (#15355)
* feat: add secure code environment pairing * fix: satisfy code environment type checks * fix: secure code environment administration * fix: isolate code pairing control plane * fix: validate code pairing control responses * fix: secure code pairing transport * fix: validate code pairing wire format * fix: harden pairing secret lookup |
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0383030817
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⚡ perf: Avoid Parallel Full and Paged Prompt Loading on Startup (#15031)
Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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a47ba7168f
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🪢 feat: Custom Request Headers For Langfuse (#14945)
* ✨ feat: Custom Request Headers For Langfuse Self-hosted Langfuse behind an authenticating proxy or gateway could not be reached: every outbound Langfuse request hardcoded `Authorization` and nothing else. Adds `langfuse.headers`, mirroring `endpoints.custom` headers, and applies it to all four request surfaces — trace/media export (via the agents run config), feedback scores, central project-identity lookup, and admin credential verification. Values resolve through the same pipeline as endpoint headers, so `${ENV_VAR}` interpolation and header-safe encoding come along. `extractEnvVariable` continues to refuse infrastructure secrets, so a config cannot exfiltrate `MONGO_URI` through a header. A header whose variable is unset is dropped with a one-time warning rather than sent as a literal `${...}`, which a gateway would read as a wrong credential instead of a missing one. Headers merge beneath LibreChat's own `Authorization` on the REST surfaces, matching `mergeHeaders`, so a custom header can never displace the Langfuse credential. These are deployment-level and documented as such: trace export batches spans from every user through a single exporter, so unlike endpoint headers they cannot carry per-user placeholders. The central project-id cache key now includes the headers, so the header-less module warm-up cannot record a proxy rejection against the entry the request path later reads. * 🔒 fix: Keep Langfuse Headers Out Of Stored Overrides The generic admin config API accepts any field path inside an allowed section, so `langfuse.headers` could be written through it. Unlike `langfuse.secretKey`, headers are a map rather than one scalar path, so the config secret registry cannot encrypt them at rest or mask them on read — an admin-written map would sit in Mongo in plaintext and come back in plaintext, widening exposure of what are gateway credentials. Rejects them on both the dotted-patch and object-upsert routes, the same way process-backed MCP servers are held to librechat.yaml. This is what makes "deployment-level" true rather than merely documented. * 🐛 fix: Wire Config Middleware And Header Collisions For Langfuse Two codex review findings. P1 — `api/server/routes/admin/langfuse.js` never mounted `configMiddleware`, so `req.config` was undefined in production and credential verification silently ran without the deployment's proxy headers: exactly the deployments this feature targets could not save a connection. The handler unit tests injected `config` into their mock requests, so they stayed green. Mounts the middleware after the access checks (unauthorized callers still short-circuit first) and adds route-level tests that assert the handler actually receives a resolved config — the composition root, not the component. P2 — spreading custom headers under `Authorization` only replaced an exact-case collision. A configured `authorization` survived alongside the managed `Authorization` and fetch appends rather than replaces, sending both credentials in one combined value. All four request sites now use `mergeHeaders`, which already merges case-insensitively with the override winning; tests cover the lower- and upper-case variants. * 🔒 fix: Mask Langfuse Headers On Read And Harden Value Handling Three codex round-2 findings. P1 — the write guard blocked storing `langfuse.headers` in Mongo but did nothing for the read path: `GET /api/admin/config/base` serves the resolved AppConfig through `redactConfigSecrets`, which only knows registered scalar secrets, so a yaml-configured gateway credential was returned in full to any admin with Langfuse read access. Adds a secret-map registry that masks values while keeping key names, so an admin can still see which headers a deployment sets. Masking is safe precisely because these are yaml-only — a masked read cannot be round-tripped back over the real values. A malformed non-object value at that path is dropped rather than serialized. P2 — `mergeHeaders` indexes one spelling per lowercase name, so a config holding both `authorization` and `AUTHORIZATION` had only one displaced; the survivor was then appended by `Headers` into a combined value. Case variants are now collapsed at resolution, before any consumer sees them. P2 — `resolveHeaders` encodes only values it substitutes a user field into, and no user is supplied here, so a literal or interpolated character above U+00FF reached `Headers` unencoded and threw. Final values now go through `encodeHeaderValue`; Latin-1 still passes verbatim. * 🔒 fix: Keep Langfuse Header Credentials Out Of Logs And Validate Names Three codex round-3 findings, plus a documented boundary for the fourth. P1 — `loadCustomConfig` logs the parsed config at startup (`printConfig` defaults true), so a literal gateway credential in `langfuse.headers` was copied into application logs on every boot, undoing the masking the admin read path had just gained. The printed copy now goes through `redactConfigSecretMaps`, reusing the same registry. Scoped to map-valued secrets so scalar-secret log behavior is unchanged; the live config keeps its real values. P2 — a nonempty but invalid field name (` X-Token`, `X Proxy Token`) passed the emptiness check and then threw in the `Headers` constructor, which would break export, verification, lookup, and feedback for the whole deployment rather than that one header. Names are trimmed and validated against the RFC 7230 token grammar, and dropped with a warning otherwise. P2 — unresolved `${VAR}` detection tested the *resolved* value, so a credential legitimately containing `${...}` was mistaken for a failed substitution and dropped. Detection now inspects the configured text and checks the referenced variables directly, which also drops references to denylisted infrastructure secrets instead of forwarding them verbatim. The fourth (fanout gateway forwards only `Authorization`, so a tenant Langfuse behind its own proxy is not covered) is a real limitation in a separate component. Documented on the schema field and in the example config rather than left implied. * 🔒 fix: Scope Langfuse Headers To Configured Origins Three codex round-4 findings. P1 — one header map was attached to every destination a run resolves to. Under fanout that means a credential meant for an internal gateway was also sent to the central destination, typically Langfuse Cloud: an unrelated third-party origin. Headers are now attached only when the destination's origin is one the deployment explicitly configured (a self-hosted base URL, the fanout collector, or a tenant destination set by env). The built-in `*.cloud.langfuse.com` defaults are excluded precisely because nobody pointed at them. For trace export this also means attaching after the export branch settles on a `baseUrl` rather than before, since which destination wins depends on the branch. P2 — `encodeHeaderValue` only encodes above U+00FF, so a newline, CR, or NUL passed through and threw in `Headers`, breaking every request rather than the one header. Values are trimmed (the common trailing-newline case) then validated against the legal field-value bytes; an embedded CRLF is a request-splitting attempt and is dropped, not stripped. P2 — the write guard matched only the exact `headers` property, so `{ langfuse: { "headers.X-Token": "..." } }` and root-level dotted variants slipped through into the Mixed overrides document, where the nested-map redactor never walks them and a later read returns them in plaintext. All dotted spellings are now rejected. * 🔒 fix: Bind Langfuse Headers To One Configured Origin Four codex round-5 findings. P1 — the round-4 allowlist still authorized every configured origin, so a deployment with both a collector and an explicit central host sent the same credential to both. `langfuse.headers` is one map with no way to say which endpoint it authenticates to, so it is only unambiguous when the deployment configures exactly one Langfuse origin. Iterating on which origins to guess was the wrong axis; headers are now sent only when there is a single configured origin and the destination is it, with a warning when several make the intent unresolvable. That covers the self-hosted case this feature exists for; multi-destination deployments need per-destination headers the schema cannot yet express. P1 — `fetch` defaults to following redirects, and Node strips `Authorization` across origins but keeps arbitrary headers, so a redirect off an allowed origin would hand the gateway credential to a host that passed no check. Requests carrying custom headers now refuse redirects; requests without them keep the default, so nothing changes for existing deployments. P2 — `extractEnvVariable`'s whole-string branch is anchored and greedy, so `${CLIENT_ID}:${CLIENT_SECRET}` parsed as one variable name and the raw template was sent as the credential. References are expanded here now, so only literal values reach that path. P2 — a valid token name is not necessarily usable: `Transfer-Encoding` makes `fetch` throw and a fixed `Content-Length` misdescribes the body of every other request sharing the map. Request-framing names are dropped. * 🐛 fix: Expand Langfuse Header References Exactly Once Codex round 6 (P2). After expanding `${VAR}` references myself I still handed the result to `resolveHeaders`, which runs `extractEnvVariable` over it again — so a credential containing `${PATH}`, or any other name that happens to be set, was silently rewritten on export, verification, lookup, and feedback. The round-3 test only used an *unset* embedded name, which the second pass leaves alone, so it could not catch this. Resolution no longer round-trips through `resolveHeaders`. The only part still wanted from it was stripping `{{...}}` user placeholders, which is now applied directly; expansion, encoding, and validation were already local. Adds a test whose embedded variable is set, which fails against the previous pipeline. * 🐛 fix: Process Langfuse Header Templates Before Substitution Codex round 7 (P2), the mirror of round 6. Having stopped re-expanding the resolved credential, the placeholder strip was still running over it: a token containing `{{LIBRECHAT_USER_ID}}` had that span deleted and `abc{{...}}ghi` went out as `abcghi`. Establishes the invariant the last two rounds were circling. Every template operation — placeholder strip, unresolved-reference check, expansion — now runs on the operator's configured text, and the credential is substituted last and never touched again. Gateway credentials are arbitrary strings, so none of their bytes are syntax. Also moves the unresolved-reference check after the strip, so it no longer reports a variable inside a `{{...}}` span that the strip removes. |
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aa35cd42b1
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📬 feat: Add Durable Agent Trigger Delivery (#14925)
* feat: wire trusted agent trigger dispatch * feat: add durable agent trigger delivery * fix: annotate trigger envelope byte limit * test: isolate trigger startup in server specs * fix: fence trigger delivery during account deletion * test: isolate trigger service in user controller specs * fix: close trigger deletion admission race * fix: harden account deletion fences * fix: close durable trigger review gaps * fix: require offline stale-fence recovery * fix: type trigger lane sequence ids * fix: fence admin user deletion triggers * fix: make trigger deletion recovery durable * fix: harden offline user deletion * fix: serialize trigger lane publication * style: sort trigger delivery imports * fix: recover orphaned trigger publications * fix: preserve trigger recovery ordering * fix: fence trigger publication during purge * fix: defer remote trigger deletion fences * fix: close durable delivery cleanup races * fix: drain CLI generation owners before deletion |
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9980b6221f
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🪢 feat: add Langfuse session links (#14776)
* feat: add Langfuse session links * fix: tighten Langfuse session link resolution * fix: clear stale Langfuse session links * test: verify tenant Langfuse session links * fix: align Langfuse link with client conventions |
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6d2f29266c
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🔑 feat: Refresh-Capable Google Admin OAuth Sessions (#13832)
* 🔑 feat: Refresh-Capable Google Admin OAuth Sessions Google admin sessions cannot be refreshed today. Three gaps add up to that: passport.authenticate('googleAdmin', ...) in api/server/routes/admin/auth.js never sets access_type=offline, so Google omits the refresh_token from its token response; createOAuthHandler in api/server/controllers/auth/oauth.js only forwards a refresh token into the admin exchange payload when the user's provider is 'openid' AND OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is enabled; and /api/admin/oauth/refresh is openid-only, calling openid-client.refreshTokenGrant against the configured OIDC issuer. OpenID admins refresh transparently because all three are in place for them. This PR closes all three. The googleAdmin authenticate call now passes accessType: 'offline' and prompt: 'consent' so Google issues a refresh token on consent; the chat-side googleLogin is untouched. The shared socialLogin verify callback now passes the IdP refreshToken through as passport's third argument (info), landing on req.authInfo, with the two-argument call shape preserved when no refresh token is present so existing strategy tests stay valid. createOAuthHandler reads req.authInfo?.refreshToken for non-OpenID admin providers and forwards it into the exchange code; the OpenID branch and its OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS gate are unchanged. /api/admin/oauth/refresh now accepts an optional provider field ('openid' | 'google', default 'openid'). The new Google branch POSTs grant_type=refresh_token to https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token, decodes the returned id_token for the sub claim, looks up the admin user by googleId, enforces tenant scope and ACCESS_ADMIN, and mints a fresh LibreChat JWT in the same response shape /oauth/exchange returns. It is gated on GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID and GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET being set (returns 503 GOOGLE_NOT_CONFIGURED otherwise); unknown provider values return 400 INVALID_PROVIDER. * 🔁 fix: Harden Google admin refresh against bot review findings Five validated findings from the initial bot pass: socialLogin.js: mirror the OpenID migrate-or-reject pattern on the email fallback. When an existing user is found by email and the stored provider id is empty, persist the refreshed sub so the refresh path can later bind to it. When the stored id is present and differs, reject as AUTH_FAILED to prevent identity-swap, matching the existing OpenID behavior in packages/api/src/auth/openid.ts. oauth.js: scope the non-OpenID admin refresh-token forwarding to provider === 'google'. The previous else branch would have forwarded a Discord refresh token (passport-discord supplies one) into the admin exchange payload even though /api/admin/oauth/refresh only accepts openid or google, leaving the admin client with a token it could not refresh. admin/auth.js (refreshGoogleAdminSession): drop id_token from the mandatory-fields check. Google's OAuth refresh response is documented to include id_token only conditionally, so the previous mandatory check broke refresh whenever Google omitted it. Decode id_token when present (fast path); when absent, call Google's userinfo endpoint with the access token to read sub. Wrap tokenResponse.json() in try/catch and return IDP_INCOMPLETE on parse failure instead of a generic 500. Tighten access_token to a typeof string check. admin/auth.js (refreshGoogleAdminSession): reuse serializeUserForExchange for the response user so the Google refresh shape matches /oauth/exchange and the OpenID branch exactly (full _id, id, email, name, username, role, avatar, provider, openidId). The previous Google-specific subset dropped fields the admin client relies on for later provider-specific refreshes and disambiguation. Tests cover each fix: socialLogin's migration and rejection cases, the oauth.js Discord-gating case, the userinfo fallback path on missing id_token, CLAIMS_INCOMPLETE when both id_token and userinfo are absent, IDP_INCOMPLETE on a non-JSON token body, and the full response shape on the happy path. * 🧪 fix: Add updateUser to appleStrategy test mock for socialLogin migration The shared socialLogin verify callback now invokes `updateUser` when the email-fallback path discovers a same-provider user with an empty provider id, persisting the refreshed sub. The Apple strategy test's `~/models` mock did not stub `updateUser`, so the migration path hit `TypeError: updateUser is not a function` and failed the `should handle existing user and update avatarUrl` case in CI shard 1/3. * 🧹 refactor: Move Google admin refresh into TypeScript @librechat/api helper Per repo guidance (CLAUDE.md): all new backend code must be TypeScript in /packages/api, and /api is a thin JS wrapper. The previous commit landed the Google admin refresh flow as ~120 lines of new JS inside api/server/routes/admin/auth.js, which violates that. This commit extracts the flow into a new TS helper at packages/api/src/auth/googleRefresh.ts and reduces the route handler to a thin dep-wiring wrapper. The helper exports applyGoogleAdminRefresh(deps, options) with the same shape as the OpenID applyAdminRefresh: callers pass findUsers, getUserById, canAccessAdmin, and mintToken as deps so the package stays free of /api model imports and capability/session helpers. The route handler now builds those deps from the existing model + capability + token modules and calls the helper, mapping AdminRefreshError to the documented HTTP responses. While moving the code, the helper now guards getUserById with Types.ObjectId.isValid before the direct-lookup branch, matching the OpenID admin path at packages/api/src/auth/refresh.ts. Without this guard a malformed user_id from the admin client would hit Mongoose findById's CastError and surface as a 500 INTERNAL_ERROR instead of falling through to the documented sub-based lookup. Tests move with the code: packages/api/src/auth/googleRefresh.spec.ts now owns the helper's behavior (token endpoint, userinfo fallback, ObjectId guard, USER_ID_MISMATCH/TENANT_MISMATCH/USER_NOT_FOUND/FORBIDDEN, rotated refresh-token pass-through, GOOGLE_NOT_CONFIGURED, IDP_INCOMPLETE on non-JSON body, CLAIMS_INCOMPLETE when both id_token and userinfo miss). The route-level api/server/routes/admin/auth.refresh.test.js drops the duplicated end-to-end Google cases and keeps a smaller surface: route delegates to applyGoogleAdminRefresh with the right deps + options, maps AdminRefreshError to HTTP status/code, falls through to 500 for unknown errors, and rejects unknown providers with INVALID_PROVIDER. * 🔁 fix: Tighten Google admin refresh and limit social-login changes Brutal-review findings on top of the upstream feature work. socialLogin.js: the migrate-or-reject pattern from the previous commit applied to every provider's chat-side verify callback, not just the admin flow. Gate both branches on `options.existingUsersOnly` so the chat-side googleLogin / facebookLogin / etc. keep their pre-existing email-fallback behavior unchanged. Tests follow: restore the original `should fallback to finding user by email` chat-side case and re-add the migration and mismatch-reject cases as admin-only by passing `{ existingUsersOnly: true }` to socialLogin in those tests. googleRefresh.ts: add a defense-in-depth `isEmailAllowed(user)` dep that the helper invokes before `canAccessAdmin`. Mirrors the `isEmailDomainAllowed` check the initial Google admin login already runs, so a deployment that removes a domain from `registration.allowedDomains` after issuance can no longer mint fresh JWTs for that admin via refresh. The route handler wires it up with `resolveAppConfigForUser` + `isEmailDomainAllowed`, falling back to `baseOnly` config for users without a tenantId. googleRefresh.ts: drop the unreachable `?? ''` defensive coalescing in `fetchGoogleTokenset`. The `GOOGLE_NOT_CONFIGURED` guard upstream already narrows `clientId`/`clientSecret` to non-empty strings; the function takes a narrowed `GoogleAdminRefreshConfiguredOptions` shape and `applyGoogleAdminRefresh` constructs that shape after the guard. * 🔒 fix: Apply brutal-review hardening to Google admin refresh Tighten the Google OAuth refresh flow against all outstanding code review findings: enforce JWT aud claim verification against the configured clientId (ISSUER_MISMATCH on mismatch), reject ambiguous googleId matches (limit:2 in findUsers, USER_ID_MISMATCH when multiple rows match), scope the authInfo refresh-token carrier to the Google provider only, add TOCTOU re-read defense after the admin googleId migration write in socialLogin, deduplicate canAccessAdmin/mintToken closures via buildAdminRefreshClosures shared by both OpenID and Google refresh paths, document rotation semantics on AdminExchangeResponse.refreshToken, standardise all log prefixes to [admin/oauth/refresh], and expand test coverage for all new paths. * 🔒 fix: Reject refresh for users migrated off the Google provider The interactive Google admin login path in socialLogin.js already rejects a user whose provider field is not 'google', returning AUTH_FAILED. Without a matching guard in the refresh path, a user migrated to OpenID could use an unexpired Google refresh token to keep minting admin JWTs indefinitely. Add a PROVIDER_MISMATCH check after resolving the user in both the direct getUserById branch and the findUsers fallback branch of resolveAdminUser, mirroring the provider gate the interactive path enforces. * 🔒 fix: Add ban check and fix domain allowlist on admin OAuth refresh Two gaps in the /api/admin/oauth/refresh route: Add middleware.checkBan to the route chain before preAuthTenantMiddleware, matching the gate that /login/local and createOAuthHandler already apply. Without it a banned admin could keep minting JWTs until their IdP refresh token expired. Replace getAppConfig({ baseOnly: true }) in the non-tenant isEmailAllowed closure with getAppConfig({ role: user.role }), which includes DB-layer overrides from the admin panel. baseOnly returns only YAML-derived config, so any allowedDomains list maintained entirely through the admin panel was silently inert on this path. Extract isEmailAllowedForUser as a shared helper, move it into buildAdminRefreshClosures so both Google and OpenID refresh paths enforce domain policy consistently, and add isEmailAllowed to AdminRefreshDeps in the TS package so applyAdminRefresh can invoke it. * 🔒 fix: Harden admin OAuth refresh against user bans, tenant scope gaps, and cross-tenant migration Post-identity-resolution ban check: the initial checkBan middleware fires before the refresh token is exchanged and req.user is populated, so it can only evaluate IP bans. After applyGoogleAdminRefresh/applyAdminRefresh resolves the user identity, we now synthesize req.user and re-run checkBan against the resolved user's id before emitting the JWT, so a user-level ban is enforced even from a fresh IP. Domain allowlist now includes userId: the getAppConfig call in isEmailAllowedForUser was passing only role, missing user and group-level allowedDomains overrides that the initial OAuth callback's checkDomainAllowed enforces via userId. Both branches now pass userId so buildPrincipals takes the full user+group+role resolution path. The tenant branch is also inlined (replacing resolveAppConfigForUser) to accept userId, wrapped in tenantStorage.run for correct Mongoose scoping and cache-key resolution. Cross-tenant email-fallback migration: the Passport verify callback fires before tenantContextMiddleware, so findUser({email}) is unscoped and can return a same-email user from another tenant. Writing googleId onto that document permanently corrupts the other tenant's account. Migration is now blocked for users with a tenantId; single-tenant users are unaffected. --------- Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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3551c1ba8e
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🪧 fix: Guard Admin OAuth Routes When Providers Are Not Configured (#14507)
* fix: guard admin OpenID routes without config * fix: guard remaining admin SSO routes without registered strategy --------- Co-authored-by: cyphercodes <cyphercodes@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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af795be0c2
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🪢 feat: Langfuse Fanout Connection Setting (#14108)
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* feat: encrypt tenant Langfuse secret in admin config Add generic per-field secret encryption to the admin config layer: registered secret paths (langfuse.secretKey) are encrypted with encryptV3 on write and a non-secret fingerprint companion is stored. Admin config reads (base + per principal) redact registered secrets so they are never returned; the fingerprint is kept so the UI can show which key is configured. The Langfuse fanout read path decrypts the tenant secret before export. Adds secretKeyFingerprint to langfuseConfigSchema and tests for the encrypt/redact policy. * fix(api): secure admin config secret handling * fix(api): preserve encrypted langfuse config secrets * fix(api): couple config secret fingerprint deletion * fix(api): read langfuse fanout collector url from env * fix(api): display langfuse secret key hint * fix(api): remove langfuse secret fingerprint breadcrumbs * fix(api): use langfuse destination keys for tenant config * fix(api): remove langfuse config compatibility fallbacks * refactor(api): simplify langfuse secret helpers * refactor(api): simplify langfuse config secret handling * feat: in-app Langfuse connection settings panel Add a discoverable, admin-gated Langfuse connection panel inside LibreChat Settings (Dify-style): enable toggle, host, public key, masked write-only secret, configured-key fingerprint, and a test-connection action. Backed by a dedicated /api/admin/langfuse/connection endpoint that encrypts the secret at rest, returns metadata plus fingerprint on read, and validates credentials. Builds on the per-field encryption and fanout decrypt from the langfuse-config-encryption branch. * refactor: align Langfuse secret field to CustomUserVars pattern Use the established SecretInput plus Set/Unset state pill (com_ui_set/com_ui_unset) from the MCP CustomUserVars UI for the saved-secret state, instead of a bespoke masked input. * fix: drop em dash from saved-secret placeholder * feat: show loading state on Langfuse test connection button * feat: gate in-app Langfuse settings on fanout config and admin role * test: align Langfuse connection spec with SecretInput refactor * feat(langfuse): refine tenant connection controls * fix(admin): refine Langfuse connection verification * fix(langfuse): refine tenant connection settings * fix(langfuse): simplify export enablement controls * fix(langfuse): validate tenant export configuration * fix(langfuse): align startup fanout gate * fix(admin): time out Langfuse verification * fix(ui): rename Langfuse connection setting * fix(admin): enforce Langfuse config capability * feat(langfuse): require explicit tenant export activation * feat(langfuse): support single-tenant connection settings * fix(i18n): remove obsolete integrations label * fix(langfuse): authenticate ingestion verification * fix(langfuse): validate public key independently * fix(langfuse): localize connection errors * perf(config): skip Langfuse checks for non-admins * fix(langfuse): preserve trace sampling for feedback * test(langfuse): fix feedback sampling fixture * fix(langfuse): align secret preview field * fix(langfuse): harden connection settings state * fix(langfuse): preserve trace destination state * fix(langfuse): enforce tenant-wide routing invariants * fix(langfuse): preserve verified connection invariants * fix(langfuse): preserve stable project identity * fix(langfuse): warm project identity asynchronously --------- Co-authored-by: Ravi Kumar L <ravi.lazar@clickhouse.com> Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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044c134ecf
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🤏 fix: Filter Admin Config Reads by Section-Scoped Read Capability (#14472)
listConfigs, getBaseConfig, and getConfig only checked the broad read:configs capability, so a caller holding nothing but read:configs:<section> grants got a blanket 403 on all three instead of a response filtered to the sections they hold. Any deployment using section-scoped config grants hits this. Adds hasAnyConfigReadAccess as a cheap pre-flight check covering broad and section-scoped read and manage grants (manage implies read), so a zero-access caller still 403s before a DB fetch while a section-scoped caller gets the response filtered to exactly what they hold. The same manage-implies-read rule is fixed at its root in getParentCapabilities so a manage-only caller sees the section they manage instead of having it stripped after passing the pre-flight. Resolves every section for a request in one batched getHeldCapabilities query via getReadableConfigSections instead of one round trip per section. Includes AppConfig field-renaming normalization (interfaceConfig, turnstileConfig, mcpConfig) so the filter checks the canonical section name rather than the renamed response field, and stops availableTools from bypassing the filter by gating it on its filteredTools/includedTools source sections. |
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73c43ded25
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💂 fix: Enforce ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN on the Backend Login Route (#14180)
* 🔒 fix: Enforce ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN on Backend Login Route
ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN=false previously only hid the login form; POST
/api/auth/login stayed mounted and accepted valid credentials. Add a
validateEmailLogin middleware (mirroring validateRegistration /
validatePasswordReset) that rejects login with 403 when the flag is
disabled, with an ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN_OVERRIDE escape hatch for
intentional direct API login (each use logged with request IP).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: Gate admin local login by email login flag
* fix: Move email login gate into api package
* test: Avoid mutating readonly request ip
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
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6a63531eb4
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📒 feat: Audit Log Backend for SystemGrant Assign and Revoke Events (#13087)
* 🛡️ feat: Audit log backend for SystemGrants changes
Add an AuditLog Mongoose collection that records every grant assign/revoke as an append-only entry capturing the actor, target principal, capability, timestamp, and tenant scope. Wire the entry-write into the existing admin assignGrant and revokeGrant handlers so the admin panel's audit-log tab populates as grants happen.
The data-schemas package gains the IAuditLog type, a Mongoose schema with tenant + target compound indexes for keyset pagination, a model factory wired through createModels, and an AuditLog methods factory exposing recordAuditEntry, listAuditLogPage (cursor-paginated, faceted, search-aware), findAuditLogEntry, and streamAuditLogEntries.
The packages/api admin layer adds createAdminAuditLogHandlers with three handlers backing the routes the admin panel already consumes: GET /api/admin/audit-log returns paginated entries, GET /api/admin/audit-log/:id returns a single entry for the permalink drawer, and GET /api/admin/audit-log/export.csv streams CSV with formula-injection defang plus UTF-8 BOM.
The Express layer mounts the new router at /api/admin/audit-log behind requireJwtAuth and the ACCESS_ADMIN capability, matching the existing admin route pattern. The audit emission failure is logged via logger.error but never rolls back the grant.
* 🧹 chore: Audit log backend cleanup — offset pagination, name-based filters, type tightening
Switch listAuditLogPage from cursor-based to offset-based pagination with skip().limit() + parallel countDocuments, returning { entries, total } instead of { entries, nextCursor }; the cursor encode and decode helpers are no longer needed and have been removed.
Interpret the actorId and targetPrincipalId filter parameters as case-insensitive partial regex against the denormalized actorName and targetName fields rather than exact-match against the underlying ObjectId. Admin panel users naturally filter by human name, not by Mongo identifier.
Replace the broad Record<string, unknown> casts on req.query with a typed AuditLogQuery shape, drop two unused exported types and the now-unused mongoose Types import, and fix the streamAuditLogEntries Omit literal to match the interface and the offset-based design.
* 🛠️ fix: Address audit log review feedback (CI typecheck, ISO offsets, no-op revoke, deps surface, schema, backpressure, tests)
Resolve the duplicate AuditAction export that broke the data-schemas TypeScript check by importing the canonical declaration from types/admin instead of re-declaring it in types/auditLog.
Accept timezone-offset ISO 8601 timestamps such as 2026-05-01T09:30:00+02:00 in the from and to filter params and reject local-time strings without a zone so every request resolves to an unambiguous instant.
Skip the audit emission on no-op revokes: revokeCapability now returns deletedCount so the admin handler can omit the grant_removed entry when the target grant did not exist, keeping the audit trail factually accurate. Mocks in the existing grants.spec.ts updated to the new return shape.
Drop the required recordAuditEntry from AdminAuditLogDeps since the audit-log handler factory never consumes it; the grants handler factory keeps its optional dep for the write path.
Tighten the tenantId validator on the audit log schema to require a non-empty trimmed string, and rewrite the listing-index comment to describe deterministic offset sort instead of keyset pagination.
Stream the CSV export with explicit backpressure (await drain when res.write returns false) and abort on client disconnect so a cancelled download no longer pins a Mongo cursor or buffers unbounded data in memory.
Add packages/data-schemas/src/methods/auditLog.spec.ts covering tenant and platform scoping, single and multi action filtering, partial-name filtering for actor and capability, the createdAt window, offset pagination with total, ObjectId and date stringification on the wire, regex-metacharacter escape, and streaming completeness.
* 🛠️ fix: Address P1 audit-log review findings (cursor cancel, drain race, filter naming, type dedupe, tenant scope, log enrichment)
The CSV stream handler kept draining Mongo batches after the client
disconnected because the `for await` loop only honored its abort flag
inside `onEntry`. Thread an `isCancelled` callback into
`streamAuditLogEntries` so the methods layer closes the cursor as soon
as the handler sees `close`/`aborted`; a `finally` block guarantees
release on throw. The drain promise in `writeChunk` now races against
the response's `close` event so a destroyed socket cannot strand the
handler on a `drain` that will never fire.
The HTTP filter keys `actorId` and `targetPrincipalId` always did
case-insensitive substring matches on the denormalized `actorName` /
`targetName` columns, never on ObjectIds — a client passing a real id
silently got zero rows. Renamed the wire-level keys to `actorQuery` /
`targetQuery` (matching what the matcher actually does) and kept the
old names as deprecated aliases for one release so the sibling
admin-panel PR can migrate without breaking; each legacy use logs a
deprecation warning. Renamed the corresponding fields in
`AuditLogFilters` too.
`AdminAuditLogEntryWire` duplicated `AdminAuditLogEntry` from
`types/admin.ts` field-for-field, violating the no-duplicate-types
rule. Deleted the duplicate, hoisted `AuditLogPage`,
`RecordAuditEntryInput`, and `AuditLogFilters` from
`methods/auditLog.ts` into `types/auditLog.ts`, and updated the
handler, method factory, and re-exports accordingly.
`tenantFilter` treated `''` as a valid tenant scope, producing a
`{ tenantId: '' }` query that silently returned nothing while the
schema validator rejected `''` on writes. Switched to a strict
`typeof tenantId === 'string' && tenantId.trim().length > 0` check so
reads agree with writes, with new spec coverage for empty and
whitespace-only inputs.
Audit-write failures now log the full forensic payload (action,
capability, tenantId, actorId, target metadata) inside a single meta
object so winston's standard signature surfaces it correctly; a comment
on the catch block explains why the failure mode stays silent (it must
never block a privileged operation).
Stronger filter parsing: invalid `action` values and unknown
`targetPrincipalType` now return 400 instead of silently dropping.
Extracted `MAX_LIMIT` to a constant. Replaced the
`Record<string, Date>` cast in `buildFilter` with a typed local.
Switched the stream cursor to `lean<IAuditLog[]>()` and removed the
`as IAuditLog` cast inside the loop.
* ✅ test: Cover admin audit-log handler with unit tests for auth, validation, tenant isolation, CSV output, and abort
The sibling admin handlers (grants, groups, roles, users) all have
handler specs; this one was missing. The new suite covers 401 on a
missing `req.user`, 400 on malformed ISO `from` / `to`, 400 on
limit > 500, 400 on negative offset, 400 on an unknown action or
`targetPrincipalType`, 400 on a non-ObjectId `:id`, 404 when the
methods layer returns null, that the caller's `tenantId` (not a
forged query-string `tenantId`) is the one passed to the methods
layer, that `actorQuery` / `targetQuery` round-trip, that the
deprecated `actorId` / `targetPrincipalId` aliases still map through,
that the CSV stream emits the BOM as the first chunk with CRLF line
endings and the expected header labels, that quotes, commas, and
newlines are properly escaped, that the formula-injection prefixes
(`=` `+` `-` `@` tab CR) are defanged, that an `isCancelled` callback
reaches the methods layer and flips to true on client `close`, and
that `res.end` is skipped when the client disconnected mid-stream.
* 🛡️ feat: Enforce append-only AuditLog at the schema level
Every field is now marked `immutable: true`, and pre-hooks on the
schema reject `updateOne`, `updateMany`, `findOneAndUpdate`,
`findOneAndReplace`, `replaceOne`, `deleteOne`, `deleteMany`,
`findOneAndDelete`, plus any `save()` against an existing document.
`timestamps` is reduced to `{ createdAt: true, updatedAt: false }`
since a mutable timestamp would imply mutation is allowed, and
`updatedAt` is dropped from `AuditLog` / `IAuditLog`. The methods
spec resets state between tests via the raw driver (`AuditLog.collection.deleteMany`),
which bypasses the pre-hooks; new specs assert that the model-level
update / delete / re-save paths reject with the append-only error and
that `updatedAt` is not stamped on new documents.
* ♻️ refactor: Share MAX_AUDIT_LOG_LIMIT between methods and handler
Renamed the methods-layer constant from the generic `MAX_LIMIT` to
`MAX_AUDIT_LOG_LIMIT`, exported it through `@librechat/data-schemas`,
and consumed it from the handler instead of duplicating `500` there.
Now the limit is single-sourced; bumping it once updates both the
clamp inside `listAuditLogPage` and the 400-error boundary the
handler returns to clients.
* 🛡️ feat: Gate audit-log routes on a dedicated `READ_AUDIT_LOG` capability
The audit-log routes were gated on `ACCESS_ADMIN`, which conflates "can log
into the admin panel" with "can see who granted what to whom." Anyone with
`ACCESS_ADMIN + READ_CONFIGS` (a config reviewer with no people-management
authority) could read the grant history of every user, group, and role —
information they have no need to know.
`READ_AUDIT_LOG` ('read:audit_log') is now an explicit, separately grantable
read capability with no MANAGE counterpart, matching the append-only nature
of the collection. `seedSystemGrants` iterates `Object.values(SystemCapabilities)`
so existing ADMIN-role seeds pick it up automatically on next startup.
This also makes an "auditor" persona possible: hold `ACCESS_ADMIN + READ_AUDIT_LOG`
without any MANAGE_* grants and you can review history without modifying anything.
* ♻️ refactor: Share AUDIT_ACTIONS, tighten audit dep types, document route order
Exports a runtime AUDIT_ACTIONS array from packages/data-schemas alongside the
AuditAction type so the Mongoose schema enum and the HTTP handler's whitelist
consume one source of truth instead of duplicating the literal pair.
Switches the grants handler's recordAuditEntry dep typing from a duplicated
inline object literal returning Promise<unknown> to the published
RecordAuditEntryInput type returning Promise<void>, and tightens the local
emitAudit args to AuditAction. Replaces the local ParsedFilters interface in
the audit-log handler with Omit<AuditLogFilters, 'offset' | 'limit'> to drop
the duplicate definition.
Drops the optional marker on AuditLog.createdAt. Mongoose always sets it at
insert time, so callers treating it as nullable were guarding against a state
the schema does not produce.
Adds a comment on api/server/routes/admin/audit.js noting that /export.csv
must precede /:id so a future contributor does not accidentally reorder them
into a 404 trap.
* 🛡️ feat: Resolve audit names without extra DB round-trips
For the actor name, JWT-authenticated `req.user` already carries `name`,
`username`, and `email`. `resolveUser` now derives the actor display name
from `req.user` directly and threads it through the caller context, so
every grant assign and revoke no longer triggers a separate `getUserById`
lookup.
For the target name, replaces the previous always-store-the-principalId
behavior (which buried opaque ObjectId strings in immutable audit rows
for USER and GROUP targets) with a `resolveTargetName` dep. ROLE
principals continue to use `principalId` directly because the SystemGrant
model stores role names there. USER and GROUP principals route through
the new dep, which in `api/server/routes/admin/grants.js` calls
`db.getUserById` or `db.findGroupById` respectively and falls back to
the principalId on miss or error so the audit row stays intelligible.
Drops the misleading "display name lookup happens in a later iteration"
comment.
* ✅ test: Cover audit emission, scope emitAudit to today's ROLE-only surface
Fixes a misleading test that claimed to verify "idempotent even if the grant
does not exist" while mocking deletedCount: 1 (the grant DID exist). Replaces
it with the actual no-op scenario (deletedCount: 0) and adds an assertion
that recordAuditEntry is NOT called, since the whole point of the
deletedCount > 0 gate is to avoid fictitious revocation rows.
Adds a dedicated audit emission describe block covering: grant_assigned
emission with the actor name resolved from req.user, grant_removed
emission when deletedCount is positive, and the no-emission fallback when
recordAuditEntry is not configured. The actor-name assertions exercise the
name / username / email fallback chain in resolveUser.
The previous commit also added a `resolveTargetName` dep and an
emitAudit branch for USER/GROUP targets. The grants surface is ROLE-only
today (MANAGE_CAPABILITY_BY_TYPE has only PrincipalType.ROLE), so that
code path is unreachable from the handler. Removed the dep and the
branch; the audit row uses principalId as the target name, which is the
human-readable role name for ROLE principals. A comment in emitAudit
flags where to plumb resolveTargetName back in once USER and GROUP
grants are enabled.
* 🛠️ fix: Inclusive `to` date filter and reject inverted ranges
A `?to=2025-01-15` filter previously stopped at midnight UTC of that
day, silently excluding everything that happened on January 15. The
`parseIsoDate` helper now widens a bare `YYYY-MM-DD` to 23:59:59.999Z
when called with the `end` boundary. Full ISO timestamps are honored
exactly, so callers that want minute-precision can still get it.
Also rejects inverted ranges (`from` later than `to`) with a 400 so
operators see a clear error instead of a silent empty result.
* 🛡️ feat: Cap audit-log CSV exports at 100k rows; cover stream error path
Introduces MAX_AUDIT_EXPORT_ROWS (100k) and threads a `maxRows` option
through streamAuditLogEntries. The handler now passes the cap into the
stream so a careless admin script or a hostile auditor cannot pin a
Node worker and a Mongo cursor by exporting unbounded result sets.
Beyond 100k rows, callers should slice exports by from / to date.
Adds a methods-layer spec for the cap behavior, a handler-layer spec
that asserts the option is plumbed through, and a handler-layer spec
that exercises the streamAuditLogEntries-throws-after-headers-sent path
(catch block falls through to res.end instead of attempting JSON).
Documents on buildFilter that case-insensitive substring regex filters
(actorName, targetName, capability, search) cannot use a B-tree index
and degrade to a tenant-scoped partition scan, so deployments with
hundreds of thousands of audit rows per tenant should constrain those
queries with a date window.
* 🧹 chore: Spell CSV_BOM as and drop a gratuitous optional chain
`revokeCapability` is typed `Promise<{ deletedCount: number }>` so the
`?.` on `revokeResult?.deletedCount` only obscured that the value cannot
be nullish.
`CSV_BOM` was a literal U+FEFF character invisible in most editors. Now
spelled as the Unicode escape so readers can see the constant; the test
that asserts on the first emitted chunk uses the same escape.
* 🔧 chore: Allowlist AuditLog in the tenant-isolation coverage guard
The AuditLog collection carries a tenantId field but scopes tenancy manually
inside listAuditLogPage / streamAuditLogEntries / recordAuditEntry using the
same $exists: false convention as SystemGrant. The tenant-isolation plugin
coverage spec now allows that and asserts it stays accurate.
* 🛠️ fix: Normalize blank tenantId before persisting audit entries
The `recordAuditEntry` write path was treating any non-null tenantId as a
real string, so empty or whitespace-only values reached the schema validator,
failed the non-empty-string check, and silently dropped the audit row. The
read-side `tenantFilter` already treats those values as platform-level scope,
so the write path now mirrors it: blank or whitespace-only tenantId becomes
an omitted field, which matches `{ tenantId: { $exists: false } }` queries
and clears validation. Added a regression test that records two entries with
blank and whitespace tenantId and asserts both persist with the tenantId
field absent.
* 🎨 style: collapse expect.objectContaining onto one line to satisfy prettier
* 🔒 fix: block document-level deleteOne/updateOne on AuditLog
Mongoose registers deleteOne and updateOne pre-hooks as query middleware
by default. The query-level append-only block on AuditLog therefore did
not cover Document.prototype.deleteOne() or Document.prototype.updateOne(),
leaving a path where a caller that had already loaded an audit row via
findOne could call .deleteOne() or .updateOne() on the instance and bypass
the schema contract.
Explicit { document: true, query: false } registrations close the holes,
and the spec now covers both code paths against a real in-memory Mongo.
* 🔒 fix: require ACCESS_ADMIN on audit-log routes
Every other admin router (config, grants, users, roles, groups, auth)
enforces requireJwtAuth followed by requireCapability(ACCESS_ADMIN) before
any feature-specific capability check. The audit-log router only required
READ_AUDIT_LOG, which is independent of ACCESS_ADMIN in CapabilityImplications,
so a role delegated only READ_AUDIT_LOG without ACCESS_ADMIN could read or
CSV-export the audit trail and bypass the admin boundary.
Aligned the middleware chain with the rest of the admin surface so
ACCESS_ADMIN gates entry and READ_AUDIT_LOG gates the feature within it.
* 🎨 chore: re-sort imports after dev rebase
Post-rebase sort-imports against the merge target — six audit-log files
landed with stale import ordering relative to the current scripts/sort-imports.mts
rules on dev. CI's import-order job flagged the drift; running the script
locally rewrites them in place. No semantic changes.
* 🔧 fix: explicit type annotations on audit-log model + schema exports
Dev migrated packages/data-schemas builds from rollup to tsdown with
--isolatedDeclarations enabled, which requires every exported function to
declare its return type and every exported variable to declare its type.
Two of our audit-log exports got swept up:
TS9007 models/auditLog.ts:12 createAuditLogModel return type
TS9010 schema/auditLog.ts:12 auditLogSchema variable type
Added Model<t.IAuditLog> on the factory and Schema<IAuditLog> on the
schema variable, matching the sibling SystemGrant convention. No runtime
behavior change.
* 🔧 fix: align revokeCapability type annotation with implementation
The rebase auto-merge of systemGrant.ts kept dev's outer type annotation
(`revokeCapability: ... => Promise<void>`) but our implementation returns
`Promise<{ deletedCount: number }>` (added during the bot-review loop to
let the audit emitter distinguish a real revoke from a no-op against a
nonexistent grant). The mismatch surfaced as TS2719 on the methods record
return at line 520. Updated the type annotation to match the impl.
The caller at packages/api/src/admin/grants.ts:444 reads
`revokeResult.deletedCount` to gate the audit emit, so the wider return
type is what the rest of the code already assumes.
* 🔧 fix: explicit factory return type on createAdminAuditLogHandlers
Same tsdown --isolatedDeclarations migration that hit packages/data-schemas
also applies to packages/api; the audit-log handler factory's inferred
return type tripped TS9013 against the new build pipeline. Annotated the
factory with explicit handler signatures matching the sibling
createAdminGrantsHandlers convention. Used Promise<Response | void> for
the export handler because its final res.end() path returns undefined,
unlike the other two handlers which always return a Response.
* 🛡️ feat: Generalize audit log into a tamper-evident, extensible event substrate
Reworks the SystemGrant-only audit log into a general-purpose, append-only
compliance substrate designed to absorb future event classes (agent runs,
tool/MCP calls, config + permission changes, approvals) without reshaping the
record. Nothing was shipped yet, so this replaces the grant-specific wire
shape rather than layering aliases.
Schema / record shape (packages/data-schemas):
- schemaVersion + two-level taxonomy: category + namespaced action
(grant.assigned/grant.removed), first-class outcome and severity.
- Structured actor{type,id,name} supporting non-user actors (system, agent,
service, schedule, webhook, api); generic target{type,id,name}; open
metadata map; request context{requestId,ip,userAgent,sessionId}.
Tamper-evidence (hash chain):
- Per-tenant chain keyed by chainKey with seq/prevHash/hash. Appends link to
the previous hash; a unique {chainKey,seq} index serializes concurrent
writes (dup-key retry) so the chain can never fork. createdAt is explicit so
it's covered by the hash.
- verifyAuditChain() walks a chain and detects modification, deletion, and
forged links; exposed via GET /api/admin/audit-log/verify.
Other best-practice gaps from the review:
- Keyset (cursor) pagination over seq alongside offset; stable under
concurrent appends. nextCursor in the page payload.
- Retention: purgeAuditLogEntries() privileged prefix-purge with a confirm
latch, returns a checkpoint; verify tolerates a purged prefix.
- Fail-closed option (AUDIT_LOG_FAIL_CLOSED) so a failed audit write can fail
the grant request instead of being swallowed; default stays fail-open.
- Grant handlers now capture request context and emit the new shape.
CSV export updated for the new columns (incl. seq/hash). data-schemas bumped
to 0.0.54 for the sibling admin-panel consumer. Tests rewritten: 28
methods-layer cases (chain genesis/linking, tamper detection, keyset, purge)
and the handler/grants specs updated for the new shape, fail-closed, and the
verify endpoint.
* 🛠️ fix: Address Codex review on the audit-log substrate
- F1 (fail-closed atomicity): assign/revoke now compensate (rollback grant /
restore grant) when a fail-closed audit write fails, so a 5xx never leaves an
unaudited mutation.
- F5: only emit grant.assigned for a real change — skip the audit when the role
already holds the capability (idempotent re-assert).
- F7: verifyAuditChain no longer silently trusts a non-genesis start; a purged
prefix must be authorized by a trusted checkpoint (purge now returns
{throughSeq, prevHash}), else verification fails as tampering.
- F4: block Model.bulkWrite on AuditLog (would bypass the append-only middleware).
- F3: CSV export appends an explicit TRUNCATED marker + logs when the row cap is hit.
- F6: reject out-of-range date-only filters (2025-02-31) instead of normalizing.
- F2: regenerate package-lock.json for the 0.0.54 data-schemas bump.
Tests: +1 methods (bulkWrite) +2 verify (deleted-prefix / checkpoint mismatch),
updated purge test for checkpoint flow; +4 api (re-assert skip, assign/revoke
fail-closed rollback, date reject, CSV truncation marker).
* 🛠️ fix: Address Codex round-2 on the audit-log substrate
- R2-1/R2-5 (P1/P2): base the grant.assigned audit decision on the atomic
upsert result. grantCapability now returns { grant, created } via
includeResultMetadata; the handler audits only when created. Removes the racy
pre-read, which also mis-handled inherited platform grants vs a new
tenant-scoped insert and concurrent double-assign.
- R2-2 (P2): namespace tenant chain keys (tenant:<id>) so a tenant whose id is
literally the platform sentinel can't share the platform audit chain.
- R2-4 (P2): validate literal calendar tokens for full ISO timestamps too, so
2025-02-31T00:00:00Z is rejected instead of normalizing to March 3.
Tests updated for the grantCapability { grant, created } contract (systemGrant +
grants specs) and the namespaced chain key (auditChainKey helper); +1 api date
case. data-schemas 141, api grants/audit 107 green.
R2-3 (deprecated actorId/targetPrincipalId aliases): not reinstating — the
surface is pre-release and its only consumer (admin-panel PR) migrates to the new
shape in lockstep, so there are no legacy clients to support.
R2-6 (role-deletion cascade emits no grant.removed): valid but a separate
workflow in roles.ts; tracked as a follow-up to keep this PR scoped.
* 🛠️ fix: Address Codex round-3 on the audit-log substrate
- R3-3 (P2): make a grant re-assert a true no-op — move grantedAt/grantedBy to
$setOnInsert so an existing grant is never silently mutated when the audit is
skipped (created:false now means nothing changed). grantedAt/grantedBy record
the original grant.
- R3-2 (P2): report CSV export truncation exactly. streamAuditLogEntries returns
{ count, truncated }; truncated is true only when rows existed beyond the cap,
so an exact-cap export is no longer falsely marked truncated.
- R3-5 (P2): block AuditLog.insertMany (another bulk path that skips the save
hook and could inject forged seq/prevHash/hash and poison the chain).
Tests: +insertMany rejection, +exact-cap vs truncated stream cases, +exact-cap
export-not-truncated handler case. ds 142, api 108 green.
R3-1 (deprecated query aliases) and R3-4 (role-deletion cascade audit) are
re-flags of R2-3/R2-6 — holding the prior decisions (pre-release surface; separate
roles.ts workflow tracked as a follow-up), pending maintainer direction.
* 🛡️ feat: Audit grant removals from the role-deletion cascade
Closes the forensic gap Codex flagged (R2-6/R3-4): deleting a role removed its
SystemGrants with no audit entries. `deleteGrantsForPrincipal` now returns the
removed grants, and the role-deletion handler emits a `grant.removed` audit entry
per removed grant (actor = caller, target = role, metadata.capability, request
context), matching the explicit revoke endpoint. Fail-open — the role is already
deleted, so a failed audit is logged, not propagated; sequential to keep the
per-tenant hash chain ordered.
Extracted `buildAuditContext` to admin/context.ts (shared by grants + roles).
Tests: role-deletion emits one entry per grant / none when no grants; ds 110,
api admin 202 green.
* 🛠️ fix: Address Codex round-4 on the audit-log substrate
- R4-1 (P2): don't silently drop an audit row under heavy append contention.
recordAuditEntry now retries duplicate-key seq collisions up to 12× with
jittered backoff (was 5, no backoff), so realistic bursts of parallel admin
writes resolve; the failClosed escape still applies on true exhaustion.
- R4-3 (P2): purge a contiguous seq prefix, not a date range. createdAt is
app-generated, so under multi-instance clock skew a later seq can carry an
earlier timestamp; a raw date delete could remove an interior row and break
verification. purgeAuditLogEntries now resolves the date to the first retained
seq and deletes only strictly-lower seqs, keeping the remaining chain contiguous.
Tests: +clock-skew purge case (no gap created). ds auditLog 33 green.
R4-2 (role-deletion grant audit) is a re-flag of R2-6/R3-4, already implemented
in
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fa20003952
|
🛂 refactor: Accept Targeted assign:configs for Config Scope-Lifecycle Endpoints (#13773)
* 🔓 fix: Accept Targeted assign:configs for Config Scope-Lifecycle Endpoints Three admin-config endpoints currently require broad manage:configs: PUT /:principalType/:principalId for empty-overrides scope creation, DELETE /:principalType/:principalId for scope removal, and PATCH /:principalType/:principalId/active for the active toggle. The capability model already defines assign:configs:user|group|role for delegated administrators and validates that shape in isValidCapability, but no handler accepts it, so a delegate granted assign:configs:role via /api/admin/grants cannot manage scope lifecycle for the principal type they were explicitly delegated. This aligns the server-side auth with the documented capability surface. Every destructive lateral path stays behind broad manage:configs: operations against the base config principal (__base__), non-empty PUT payloads that $set the full overrides field, and DELETE or toggle on a document whose existing overrides are non-empty (which would erase or neutralize sections the caller could not author). The new hasCapability dep on AdminConfigDeps is optional with a false default, so external consumers continue to get pre-PR behavior until they wire the resolver. * 🛡️ fix: Block Assign-Only Scope-Lifecycle When Existing Doc Has Tombstones The existing-overrides guard introduced in the prior commit only checked overrides, but configs also carry tombstones (suppressed inherited field paths) which are iterated during cascade resolution. An assign-only caller could delete, toggle, or empty-upsert a doc whose overrides is empty but whose tombstones is non-empty, which would erase or neutralize suppressions on fields they could not author. Extends the guard at all three call sites to treat a non-empty tombstones array as destructive state. * 🚨 fix: Log TOCTOU Race When Assign-Only Lifecycle Op Hits Non-Empty Doc The empty-state guard for assign-only callers performs a read-then-write across two DB roundtrips, so a concurrent broad-manage write can land between the guard and the destructive op. Adds post-write detection on the delete and toggle handlers: when the destructive op returns a doc whose state was non-empty at write time, emit logger.warn with the caller id, principal, and observed-state counts so ops can detect the race and restore from audit logs. A fully atomic fix would require extending deleteConfig, toggleConfigActive, and upsertConfig in packages/data-schemas/src/methods/config.ts to support compare-and-swap filters, which is a wider design change than this PR's auth scope. Empty-payload upsert is not covered because $set replaces overrides, so the post-write doc no longer reflects pre-write state. * 🔒 fix: Atomic Empty-State Filter for Assign-Only Scope-Lifecycle Writes Replaces the read-then-check guard with an atomic Mongo filter on the destructive write itself. Adds an options.expectEmpty parameter to deleteConfig, toggleConfigActive, and upsertConfig in the shared data-schemas layer. When set, the filter requires both overrides and tombstones to be empty before the write matches. The TOCTOU race window is eliminated: a concurrent write cannot land between the empty-state check and the destructive op because they are now a single atomic operation. For upsertConfig, the E11000 retry path returns null instead of falling back to a filterless update when expectEmpty is set, preserving the atomic property. Handlers fall back to findConfigByPrincipal only to disambiguate the null return between 404 (doc absent) and 403 (doc exists with non-empty state). The post-write logger.warn race detection added in the prior commit is removed as unreachable. |
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197a1dc4e2
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🧬 feat: Add GitHub Skill Sync (#13293)
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* feat: Add GitHub skill sync
* fix: Address GitHub skill sync CI
* fix: Harden GitHub skill sync review paths
* fix: Prevent overlapping skill sync runs
* fix: Address GitHub skill sync review findings
* fix: Satisfy Git ref lint rule
* fix: Address GitHub sync review follow-ups
* fix: Match skill frontmatter closing fence
* fix: Address GitHub sync review cycle
* fix: Address GitHub sync review follow-ups
* fix: Harden GitHub skill sync worker
* fix: Format GitHub sync rollback log
* fix: Address GitHub sync review feedback
* fix: Format skill import parse handling
* fix: Coerce scalar skill frontmatter and correct scheduler timer clear
- parse: coerce numeric/boolean name and description scalars to strings instead of dropping them to empty (restores pre-refactor behavior; preserves absent-vs-empty distinction for the when-to-use fallback)
- scheduler: clear the setTimeout handle with clearTimeout rather than clearInterval
- test: cover non-string scalar frontmatter coercion
* fix: Tolerate trailing whitespace after SKILL.md opening frontmatter fence
extractFrontmatterBlock required the opening fence to be exactly '---\n', so an opener with trailing spaces/tabs (e.g. '--- \n') silently dropped all frontmatter even though the closing-fence regex already tolerates it. Match the opener with /^---[ \t]*\n/ for symmetry. Addresses Codex P3 (parse.ts:24).
* feat: Run GitHub skill sync under a per-source tenant context
Under TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT, the sync ran with no async tenant context, so the tenant-isolation mongoose hooks threw on every Skill/SkillFile/AclEntry operation; in non-strict mode synced skills were written tenant-less and never matched tenant-scoped reads. Add an optional per-source tenantId to the skillSync config; when set, each source sync runs inside tenantStorage.run({ tenantId }) so skills, files, and public ACL grants are created and listed within that tenant, and the skill row is stamped with the tenantId for correct dedup. Sources without tenantId keep the prior single-tenant behavior. Avoids runAsSystem. Addresses Codex P2 (sync.js:70).
Lock/status/credential bookkeeping stays outside the tenant context (those collections are intentionally global).
* test: Restore dropped tenant-context coverage for GitHub skill sync
The prior commit shipped the getTenantId import in github.spec.ts without the tenant tests that use it (lost in an interrupted edit), which failed the eslint --max-warnings=0 CI job on an unused import. Restore both github.spec.ts tenant tests (tenant-scoped run stamps tenantId and executes inside the tenant ALS context; no-tenant run stays ambient) and the two config-schemas tenant tests (accepts tenantId, rejects __SYSTEM__).
* test: Restore dropped github.spec tenant-context tests
The previous commit's github.spec.ts edit did not apply (anchor mismatch), so the getTenantId import remained unused and failed eslint --max-warnings=0. Add the two tenant tests that use it: a tenant-scoped run stamps tenantId and executes inside the tenant ALS context, and a no-tenant run stays ambient.
* feat: Scope synced skill author to tenant and harden tenant-context sync
Addresses the latest Codex review on the per-source tenant change:
- makeSourceAuthorId now folds tenantId into the synthetic author hash so the
same source mirrored into different tenants gets distinct author ids (clearer
audits, no cross-tenant author collisions). Single-tenant author ids stay
stable (suffix omitted when tenantId is absent).
- syncSourceInTenantContext uses an async callback per the tenant-context
contract so the ALS store propagates across awaited Mongoose calls.
- Tests: same-source/different-tenant yields distinct authors; mirror cleanup
is scoped to the source and deletes only its absent-upstream skills.
* fix: Repair tsc error and guard external edits in github skill sync
- Fix TS2352 in github.spec mirror-cleanup test: build the existing-skill mock via makeSkill with authorName instead of an under-typed 'as CreateSkillInput' cast (this was the failing TypeScript CI check on f00ce3c5a).
- 808: commitExistingRemoteSkillAfterFileSync re-reads to clear our own file-sync version bumps, but now compares refreshed content against the pre-sync snapshot (body/name/description/always-apply) and throws SKILL_CONFLICT on a concurrent external edit instead of overwriting it.
* docs: Note skillSync source tenantId is effectively immutable
Changing/adding/removing a source's tenantId orphans previously mirrored skills in the old tenant (a tenant-scoped sync cannot clean another tenant's data without runAsSystem, which is intentionally avoided).
* fix: Key GitHub skill upstream identity on source id and path only
Addresses Codex finding (github.ts:217): makeUpstreamId previously included owner/repo, so repointing a source to a renamed or replacement repository (same source id) changed the upstreamId, made findSkillBySourceIdentity miss the existing mirror, and then collided on the (name, author, tenantId) uniqueness constraint — leaving the source stuck failing. Identity now keys on the stable source id + root path only. The feature is unreleased, so there is no stored-id migration. Updated spec upstreamId fixtures to the new format; the existing ref-independent identity test now also covers repo moves.
* fix: Scope GitHub skill mirror deletion to the source tenant
Addresses Codex P1 (github.ts:1047/1057): an ambient source (no tenantId) runs listSkillsBySource without tenant context, which under non-strict isolation returns github-synced skills across all tenants. The mirror-deletion pass then treated other tenants' skills as absent-upstream and could delete them. Filter existingSyncedSkills to rows whose tenantId matches the source's configured tenantId (absent = its own ambient bucket) before deleting, so a sync never removes another tenant's mirrored skills. Covered by a test where an ambient run leaves a tenant-b-owned skill untouched.
* fix: Apply tenant-scoped mirror deletion implementation
The prior commit (75ccfa3fc) added the test but the source change to github.ts was lost in an interrupted edit, leaving a failing test with no implementation. This adds the actual guard: the mirror-deletion pass skips skills whose tenantId does not match the source's configured tenantId (absent = ambient bucket), so an ambient source whose listSkillsBySource returns cross-tenant rows under non-strict isolation cannot delete another tenant's mirrored skills.
* fix: Resolve global access role outside tenant context for synced skill grants
Addresses Codex P2 (github.ts:1166): default access roles (incl. skill_viewer) are seeded globally with no tenantId under runAsSystem, but a tenant-scoped sync wraps ensurePublicViewer in the source's tenant context. The PermissionService grantPermission resolved the role via a tenant-isolated AccessRole query, so the global role did not match and tenant-scoped syncs failed with 'Role skill_viewer not found'. The sync adapter now resolves the role inside runAsSystem (matching the global seed) and writes the ACL entry in the active tenant context, so the AclEntry is tenant-scoped (visible to tenant users) while the role lookup still succeeds. Covered by service tests for the resolve-vs-write split and the missing-role failure.
* fix: Strip placeholder frontmatter booleans and check skill conflict before file sync
- 1083 (github.ts:759): toCleanFrontmatter now drops a non-boolean always-apply (e.g. the 'always-apply:' / 'always-apply: # TODO' placeholder, which js-yaml yields as null). The boolean is already captured in the dedicated alwaysApply field; persisting null left ambiguous frontmatter on the synced skill.
- 1080 (github.ts:1057): for an existing mirrored skill, check for an external content edit (via getSkillById + hasExternalSkillEdit) BEFORE syncSkillFiles mutates the bundled files, so a concurrently edited skill fails fast with SKILL_CONFLICT without partial file rewrites. The post-file-sync check still guards edits that land during the file sync window.
Tests: placeholder always-apply is dropped from synced frontmatter; concurrent-edit conflict leaves files unmutated (no upsert/delete).
* fix: Harden GitHub skill sync review paths
* fix: Reuse moved GitHub skill mirrors
* fix: Scope GitHub sync identity conflicts
* test: Fix GitHub sync conflict mock typing
* fix: Support nested env-backed skill sync
* fix: Keep skill sync config base-only
* fix: Scope GitHub skill identity lookup by tenant
* fix: Harden GitHub skill sync admin gates
* fix: Guard existing skill sync permission grants
* feat: Trigger skill sync from resolved config
* fix: Scope resolved skill sync by tenant
* test: Allow manual skill sync status tenant scoping
* refactor: Extract skill sync trigger orchestrator
* test: Complete orchestrator status fixture
* chore: Bump data provider version
* fix: Restrict skill sync server credentials
* test: Complete admin skill sync status fixtures
* fix: tighten skill sync trigger safeguards
* fix: preserve alwaysApply skill sync alias
* chore: sort skill sync imports
* fix: preserve skill sync request scope
* fix: harden skill sync review edges
* refactor: move skill sync admin access to api package
* fix: add skill sync declaration return types
* fix: satisfy skill sync type checks
* fix: resolve codex skill sync review findings
* fix: harden skill sync review edges
* fix: resolve codex skill sync edge findings
* fix: satisfy API declaration build after rebase
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aeb5adff34
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🪦 fix: Add Durable MCP Config Tombstones (#13534)
* fix: add durable MCP config tombstones * fix: preserve scoped config tombstones * fix: clean up config tombstone lint * fix: handle empty model spec skill allowlist * fix: preserve inactive config tombstones |
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0a7255b234
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🎭 feat: Support OpenID Audience On Refresh Grants (#13077) | ||
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e262219c8f
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🔄 feat: Cross-Origin Admin OAuth Refresh (#13007)
* feat(admin-panel): add /api/admin/oauth/refresh endpoint for cross-origin BFF refresh
The cookie-based /api/auth/refresh controller can't be reached cross-origin
from a separately-hosted admin panel because the refresh-token cookie isn't
sent on cross-origin fetches. Add a dedicated POST /api/admin/oauth/refresh
endpoint that accepts the refresh token in the request body, exchanges it
at the IdP via openid-client refreshTokenGrant, and returns the same
response shape as /api/admin/oauth/exchange.
Implementation lives in packages/api/src/auth/refresh.ts as the
applyAdminRefresh helper. It validates the refreshed tokenset, looks up the
admin user by openidId (with optional user_id disambiguation when multiple
user docs share an openidId), mints the bearer via an injected mintToken
hook, and runs an optional onRefreshSuccess hook for downstream forks that
need to update server-side session state.
The default mintToken passed by the OSS route signs an HS256 LibreChat JWT
via generateToken so admin panel callers continue to use the existing local
JWT strategy. Forks that prefer to hand back an IdP-signed token (e.g. for
deployments where the JWT auth gate is JWKS-only) override mintToken
without changing the helper or the route.
Also threads expiresAt through AdminExchangeData and AdminExchangeResponse
so admin panel clients can drive proactive refresh before the bearer
expires. Defaults the OSS exchange flow to Date.now() + sessionExpiry.
* fix(admin-panel): address review feedback on /api/admin/oauth/refresh
mintToken now returns {token, expiresAt} so the minter is authoritative
for the bearer's lifetime instead of deriving it from the IdP `exp` claim.
The refresh response would otherwise lie to the admin panel and trigger
premature or late refresh cycles.
The helper now falls back to the inbound refresh_token when the IdP omits
one on rotation (Auth0 with rotation off, Microsoft personal accounts).
Without this the admin panel loses its refresh capability after one cycle.
Other hardening:
resolveAdminUser validates user_id with Types.ObjectId.isValid before
hitting Mongoose, avoiding a CastError that would surface as a generic
500 with no useful information for the client.
If user_id resolves to a user whose openidId does not match the refreshed
sub, throw USER_ID_MISMATCH (401) instead of silently swapping in a
different user matching the sub.
Wrap tokenset.claims() in readClaims so an IdP that returns a tokenset
without a usable id_token gets mapped to CLAIMS_INCOMPLETE (502) rather
than bubbling a raw exception.
findUsers now uses the same SAFE_USER_PROJECTION as getUserById so the
fallback path no longer pulls password/totpSecret/backupCodes into memory.
Removed dead fields (email on AdminRefreshClaims, id_token on
RefreshTokenset) and fixed import ordering per AGENTS.md.
Adds packages/api/src/auth/refresh.spec.ts: 18 tests covering the happy
path, userId disambiguation (match, invalid ObjectId, null, mismatch),
all error branches (IDP_INCOMPLETE, CLAIMS_INCOMPLETE for both throw and
missing sub, USER_NOT_FOUND, mintToken/onRefreshSuccess propagation), and
refresh-token preservation under rotation/no-rotation.
* chore(admin-panel): polish per re-review on /api/admin/oauth/refresh
readClaims now logs the original error name/message at warn before mapping
to CLAIMS_INCOMPLETE so a programming bug doesn't get silently rebadged
as an IdP problem in production logs.
The route handler's JSDoc now enumerates every error response (status +
error_code) so admin-panel implementors can plan for each branch without
reading the source.
Tightens the helper's surface: removed the now-dead `exp` field from
`AdminRefreshClaims` (only `sub` is read since the v2 mintToken refactor),
and tightened `AdminRefreshDeps.findUsers`'s projection parameter from
`string | null` to `string` so the contract matches actual usage.
Test polish: the userId-resolves-to-null fallthrough test now asserts the
exact `findUsers` and `getUserById` call arguments so a regression in the
fallthrough query shape is caught. The "skips onRefreshSuccess" test now
asserts a populated response shape rather than just `toBeDefined`.
Declined per prior triage and re-confirmed: a role guard inside
`applyAdminRefresh` (downstream `/api/admin/*` already enforces
ACCESS_ADMIN via requireCapability) and moving the IdP grant call out of
the JS route into TypeScript (matches existing oauth.js / openidStrategy
pattern; package-boundary refactor belongs in a separate PR).
* fix(admin-panel): reject /api/admin/oauth/refresh tokensets from foreign issuers
When the route handler can resolve the configured OpenID issuer, it now
threads it into applyAdminRefresh as expectedIssuer. The helper compares
that against the tokenset claims iss (after normalizeOpenIdIssuer on
both sides to absorb trailing-slash differences) and throws
ISSUER_MISMATCH (401) on mismatch.
The check is skipped when either side is unset so behavior is unchanged
for IdPs that don't return iss on a refresh-grant id_token, and for
older deployments where the OpenID config doesn't expose serverMetadata.
This is a defense-in-depth measure for the refresh path only. The
deeper OIDC posture fix (binding IUser lookup to (sub, iss) as a pair)
is pre-existing debt across openidStrategy.js and the regular exchange
flow as well, and belongs in a separate PR with the schema change and
backfill migration.
* fix(admin-panel): bind refresh user lookup to (sub, iss) and handle getOpenIdConfig throw
Two fixes raised on the PR thread that I previously misdescribed:
The user lookup in resolveAdminUser was keyed on openidId alone, so a
tokenset from a different issuer that happened to share the same sub
could resolve to a local user from a different IdP. Now exports
getIssuerBoundConditions and isUserIssuerAllowed from openid.ts (the
helpers findOpenIDUser already uses) and reuses them. The findUsers
filter becomes ($or of getIssuerBoundConditions for openidId) when an
expectedIssuer is provided, with the same legacy backward-compat
clause for users whose openidIssuer field was never populated. The
direct user_id path now also checks isUserIssuerAllowed and throws
USER_ID_MISMATCH if the stored openidIssuer disagrees with the
configured issuer.
The route's getOpenIdConfig() call was previously documented as
returning null when uninitialized; the actual implementation throws.
That made the if (!openIdConfig) guard unreachable, and an unconfigured
server would surface as 500 INTERNAL_ERROR rather than 503
OPENID_NOT_CONFIGURED. Wraps the call in try/catch so the documented
503 response is what callers actually receive.
Adds 4 tests covering the new lookup binding behavior.
* fix(admin-panel): re-check ACCESS_ADMIN on /api/admin/oauth/refresh
The IdP refresh token can outlive a capability/role change, so the
initial requireAdminAccess on the OAuth callback isn't sufficient.
Inject canAccessAdmin via the existing capability model
(hasCapability with SystemCapabilities.ACCESS_ADMIN, matching
requireAdminAccess so custom roles and user grants are honored)
and gate token minting on it. Capability backend errors are
warn-and-denied to keep the bearer-mint path fail-closed.
* fix(admin-panel): scope /api/admin/oauth/refresh to the request tenant
The same (openidId, openidIssuer) pair is allowed across tenants by
the user schema's unique index. The refresh helper was wrapping both
the direct getUserById and the fallback findUsers in runAsSystem,
bypassing tenant isolation, so an IdP identity that exists in two
tenants could resolve to the wrong tenant's user and mint a JWT
bound to that tenant.
Drop the runAsSystem wrappers, add a trusted tenantId option to
applyAdminRefresh, AND it into the fallback findUsers filter, and
assert it against the direct getUserById result. Mount
preAuthTenantMiddleware on the refresh route so the deployment's
X-Tenant-Id header drives the trusted tenant via ALS. Single-tenant
deploys (no header) keep the existing openidId-only behaviour.
Adds TENANT_MISMATCH (401) and a regression covering duplicate
(sub, iss) across tenants plus the direct-userId tenant assertion.
* fix(admin-panel): gate /api/admin/oauth/refresh on OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS
The OSS refreshController only refreshes OpenID tokensets when
OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is enabled. The body-based admin variant was
unconditionally calling refreshTokenGrant, which made the flag
ineffective for the admin OAuth flow and let admin sessions keep
renewing in deployments that explicitly turned token reuse off.
Add the same isEnabled(process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS) check up
front and return 403 TOKEN_REUSE_DISABLED so the admin panel BFF
can surface the configuration mismatch instead of silently churning
through retries.
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55fc37ff49
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🔐 fix: Add Tenant Context to Admin OAuth Callback Routes (#12579)
* 🔐 fix: Add Tenant Context to Admin OAuth Callback Routes
* fix: add tenant context to admin local login route
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fa4a43da21
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🔐 fix: Strip code_challenge from Admin OAuth requests before Passport (#12534)
* 🔐 fix: Strip code_challenge from admin OAuth requests before Passport openid-client v6's Passport Strategy uses `currentUrl.searchParams.size === 0` to distinguish initial authorization requests from OAuth callbacks. The admin-panel-specific `code_challenge` query parameter caused the strategy to misclassify the request as a callback and return 401 Unauthorized. * 🔐 fix: Strip code_challenge from admin OAuth requests before Passport openid-client v6's Passport Strategy uses `currentUrl.searchParams.size === 0` to distinguish initial authorization requests from OAuth callbacks. The admin-panel-specific `code_challenge` query parameter caused the strategy to misclassify the request as a callback and return 401 Unauthorized. - Fix regex to handle `code_challenge` in any query position without producing malformed URLs, and handle empty `code_challenge=` values (`[^&]*` vs `[^&]+`) - Combine `storePkceChallenge` + `stripCodeChallenge` into a single `storeAndStripChallenge` helper to enforce read-store-strip ordering - Apply defensively to all 7 admin OAuth providers - Add 12 unit tests covering stripCodeChallenge and storeAndStripChallenge * refactor: Extract PKCE helpers to utility file, harden tests - Move stripCodeChallenge and storeAndStripChallenge to api/server/utils/adminPkce.js — eliminates _test production export and avoids loading the full auth.js module tree in tests - Add missing req.originalUrl/req.url assertions to invalid-challenge and no-challenge test branches (regression blind spots) - Hoist cache reference to module scope in tests (was redundantly re-acquired from mock factory on every beforeEach) * chore: Address review NITs — imports, exports, naming, assertions - Fix import order in auth.js (longest-to-shortest per CLAUDE.md) - Remove unused PKCE_CHALLENGE_TTL/PKCE_CHALLENGE_PATTERN exports - Hoist strip arrow to module-scope stripChallengeFromUrl - Rename auth.test.js → auth.spec.js (project convention) - Tighten cache-failure test: toBe instead of toContain, add req.url * refactor: Move PKCE helpers to packages/api with dependency injection Move stripCodeChallenge and storeAndStripChallenge from api/server/utils into packages/api/src/auth/exchange.ts alongside the existing PKCE verification logic. Cache is now injected as a Keyv parameter, matching the dependency-injection pattern used throughout packages/api/. - Add PkceStrippableRequest interface for minimal req typing - auth.js imports storeAndStripChallenge from @librechat/api - Delete api/server/utils/adminPkce.js - Move tests to packages/api/src/auth/adminPkce.spec.ts (TypeScript, real Keyv instances, no getLogStores mock needed) |
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2451bf54cf
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🛡️ fix: Restrict System Grants to Role Principals (#12491)
* 🛡️ fix: restrict system grants to role principals only Narrows GrantPrincipalType to PrincipalType.ROLE, rejecting GROUP and USER with 400. Removes grant cascade cleanup from group/user deletion handlers and their route wiring since only roles can hold grants. * 🛡️ fix: address review findings for grants roles-only restriction Add missing GROUP rejection test for revokeGrant (symmetric with getPrincipalGrants and assignGrant coverage), add extensibility comment to GrantPrincipalType, and document the checkRoleExists guard. |
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3d1b883e9d
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👨👨👦👦 feat: Admin Users API Endpoints (#12446)
* feat: add admin user management endpoints
Add /api/admin/users with list, search, and delete handlers gated by
ACCESS_ADMIN + READ_USERS/MANAGE_USERS system grants. Handler factory
in packages/api uses findUsers, countUsers, and deleteUserById from
data-schemas.
* fix: address convention violations in admin users handlers
* fix: add pagination, self-deletion guard, and DB-level search limit
- listUsers now uses parsePagination + countUsers for proper pagination
matching the roles/groups pattern
- findUsers extended with optional limit/offset options
- deleteUser returns 403 when caller tries to delete own account
- searchUsers passes limit to DB query instead of fetching all and
slicing in JS
- Fix import ordering per CLAUDE.md, complete logger mock
- Replace fabricated date fallback with undefined
* fix: deterministic sort, null-safe pagination, consistent search filter
- Add sort option to findUsers; listUsers sorts by createdAt desc for
deterministic pagination
- Use != null guards for offset/limit to handle zero values correctly
- Remove username from search filter since it is not in the projection
or AdminUserSearchResult response type
* fix: last-admin deletion guard and search query max-length
- Prevent deleting the last admin user (look up target role, count
admins, reject with 400 if count <= 1)
- Cap search query at 200 characters to prevent regex DoS
- Add tests for both guards
* fix: include missing capability name in 403 Forbidden response
* fix: cascade user deletion cleanup, search username, parallel capability checks
- Cascade Config, AclEntry, and SystemGrant cleanup on user deletion
(matching the pattern in roles/groups handlers)
- Add username to admin search $or filter for parity with searchUsers
- Parallelize READ_* capability checks in listAllGrants with Promise.all
* fix: TOCTOU safety net, capability info leak, DRY/style cleanup, data-layer tests
- Add post-delete admin recount with CRITICAL log if race leaves 0 admins
- Revert capability name from 403 response to server-side log only
- Document thin deleteUserById limitation (full cascade is a future task)
- DRY: extract query.trim() to local variable in searchUsersHandler
- Add username to search projection, response type, and AdminUserSearchResult
- Functional filter/map in grants.ts parallel capability check
- Consistent null guards and limit>0 guard in findUsers options
- Fallback for empty result.message on delete response
- Fix mockUser() to generate unique _id per call
- Break long destructuring across multiple lines
- Assert countUsers filter and non-admin skip in delete tests
- Add data-layer tests for findUsers limit, offset, sort, and pagination
* chore: comment out admin delete user endpoint (out of scope)
* fix: cast USER principalId to ObjectId for ACL entry cleanup
ACL entries store USER principalId as ObjectId (via grantPermission casting),
but deleteAclEntries is a raw deleteMany that passes the filter through.
Passing a string won't match stored ObjectIds, leaving orphaned entries.
* chore: comment out unused requireManageUsers alongside disabled delete route
* fix: add missing logger.warn mock in capabilities test
* fix: harden admin users handlers — type safety, response consistency, test coverage
- Unify response shape: AdminUserSearchResult.userId → id, add AdminUserListItem type
- Fix unsafe req.query type assertion in searchUsersHandler (typeof guards)
- Anchor search regex with ^ for prefix matching (enables index usage)
- Add total/capped to search response for truncation signaling
- Add parseInt radix, remove redundant new Date() wrap
- Add tests: countUsers throw, countUsers call args, array query param, capped flag
* fix: scope deleteGrantsForPrincipal to tenant, deterministic search sort, align test mocks
- Add tenantId option to AdminUsersDeps.deleteGrantsForPrincipal and
pass req.user.tenantId at the call site, matching the pattern already
used by the roles and groups handlers
- Add sort: { name: 1 } to searchUsersHandler for deterministic results
- Align test mock deleteUserById messages with production output
('User was deleted successfully.')
- Make capped-results test explicitly set limit: '20' instead of
relying on the implicit default
* test: add tenantId propagation test for deleteGrantsForPrincipal
Add tenantId to createReqRes user type and test that a non-undefined
tenantId is threaded through to deleteGrantsForPrincipal.
* test: remove redundant deleteUserById override in tenantId test
---------
Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
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4f37e8adb9
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🔐 feat: Admin Auth Support for SAML and Social OAuth Providers (#12472)
* refactor: Add existingUsersOnly support to social and SAML auth callbacks
- Add `existingUsersOnly` option to the `socialLogin` handler factory to
reject unknown users instead of creating new accounts
- Refactor SAML strategy callback into `createSamlCallback(existingUsersOnly)`
factory function, mirroring the OpenID `createOpenIDCallback` pattern
- Extract shared SAML config into `getBaseSamlConfig()` helper
- Register `samlAdmin` passport strategy with `existingUsersOnly: true` and
admin-specific callback URL, called automatically from `setupSaml()`
* feat: Register admin OAuth strategy variants for all social providers
- Add admin strategy exports to Google, GitHub, Discord, Facebook, and
Apple strategy files with admin callback URLs and existingUsersOnly
- Extract provider configs into reusable helpers to avoid duplication
between regular and admin strategy constructors
- Re-export all admin strategy factories from strategies/index.js
- Register admin passport strategies (googleAdmin, githubAdmin, etc.)
alongside regular ones in socialLogins.js when env vars are present
* feat: Add admin auth routes for SAML and social OAuth providers
- Add initiation and callback routes for SAML, Google, GitHub, Discord,
Facebook, and Apple to the admin auth router
- Each provider follows the exchange code + PKCE pattern established by
OpenID admin auth: store PKCE challenge on initiation, retrieve on
callback, generate exchange code for the admin panel
- SAML and Apple use POST callbacks with state extracted from
req.body.RelayState and req.body.state respectively
- Extract storePkceChallenge(), retrievePkceChallenge(), and
generateState() helpers; refactor existing OpenID routes to use them
- All callback chains enforce requireAdminAccess, setBalanceConfig,
checkDomainAllowed, and the shared createOAuthHandler
- No changes needed to the generic POST /oauth/exchange endpoint
* fix: Update SAML strategy test to handle dual strategy registration
setupSaml() now registers both 'saml' and 'samlAdmin' strategies,
causing the SamlStrategy mock to be called twice. The verifyCallback
variable was getting overwritten with the admin callback (which has
existingUsersOnly: true), making all new-user tests fail.
Fix: capture only the first callback per setupSaml() call and reset
between tests.
* fix: Address review findings for admin OAuth strategy changes
- Fix existingUsersOnly rejection in socialLogin.js to use
cb(null, false, { message }) instead of cb(error), ensuring
passport's failureRedirect fires correctly for admin flows
- Consolidate duplicate require() calls in strategies/index.js by
destructuring admin exports from the already-imported default export
- Pass pre-parsed baseConfig to setupSamlAdmin() to avoid redundant
certificate file I/O at startup
- Extract getGoogleConfig() helper in googleStrategy.js for consistency
with all other provider strategy files
- Replace randomState() (openid-client) with generateState() (crypto)
in the OpenID admin route for consistency with all other providers,
and remove the now-unused openid-client import
* Reorder import statements in auth.js
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