* 🪵 fix: Aggregate Audit Findings and Rate Limit Shared Link Reads
Audit-mode content filter rules wrote one `logger.info` per matching
fragment, and inspection deliberately continues past every finding. A
shared conversation full of distinct matching strings therefore produced
one log write per fragment, regenerated on every retrieval of
`GET /api/share/:shareId` — a public, unauthenticated route with no
limiter. The 4,096-entry inspection dedupe set is a memory bound, not an
event budget: once full, further values are inspected and logged again.
Audit metadata carries no inspected text — only rule, source, field and
provenance — so thousands of those writes were byte-identical lines.
Findings are now counted inside an aggregation scope and reported once
per distinct key with an `occurrences` count when the scope ends:
- `assertModelBoundContent` opens a scope when audit rules are configured,
bounding one inspection pass (a single message's fragments).
- `assertConversationImportContentAllowed` opens the outer scope for
import and shared-link snapshots, so per-message inspections nest into
one report instead of one per message.
- `createShareContentPreflight` spans the shared-file metadata pass too.
Nested scopes reuse the outermost aggregation, and outside any scope the
previous immediate write is kept.
`GET /api/share/:shareId` re-inspects the whole snapshot on every request,
so it now carries IP and user limiters like the neighbouring fork route
(`SHARE_IP_MAX`/`SHARE_IP_WINDOW`, `SHARE_USER_MAX`/`SHARE_USER_WINDOW`,
`SHARE_VIOLATION_SCORE`); the user limiter skips anonymous viewers.
* 🔒 fix: Address Codex Findings on Share Audit Aggregation
- The aggregation key joined rule fields with a space, but the filter
schema allows spaces in custom pattern ids and labels, so
`{id: 'a', label: 'b c'}` and `{id: 'a b', label: 'c'}` collided on the
same source/field/provenance and merged two rules' counts under one
identity. Serialize the tuple instead.
- `SHARE_VIOLATION_SCORE` left unset reached `logViolation` as
`undefined`, which selects that function's default score of 1 rather
than the documented zero. With default ban settings a viewer refreshing
a rate-limited shared link would be banned after 20 rejections. Default
the score to 0 in code, not only in `.env.example`.
- `removePorts` returns a full IPv6 address, so an attacker holding a
prefix could rotate the host portion for a fresh bucket on every
request — and for anonymous viewers the IP limiter is the only bound.
Derive the key through `ipKeyGenerator` so IPv6 clients group by /56.